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ABSTRACT
In 1954 the Supreme Court's Brown v. Board of Education ruling nullified the

Plessy v. Ferguson (1896) doctrine of "separate but equal." At the time, a racially
dysfunctional America looked to the South to observe the results of the Court's sweeping
statement. Few realized that, carried to its logical conclusion, the decision would
necessarily bring into question the racial practices of every part of the nation. To the
dismay of Northerners, blacks began to challenge the unofficial system of segregation
which existed outside of the South. The most controversial aspect of this challenge
centered around school desegregation and busing. When the courts acted in support of the
desegregation movement in the North, the nation's white majority deftly mustered its
political clout to frustrate further civil rights progress. At the center of this backlash was
the school busing case which arose out of Detroit.
The 1974 case of Milliken v. Bradley dealt with the desegregation of Detroit, a large
urban-suburban area which was divided along racial lines--literally as well as figuratively.
As with so many other Northern cities, racial separation was achieved through public and
private housing discrimination, which produced one-race neighborhoods. This, together
with the discriminatory actions and inactions of school officials, affected the racial
composition of neighborhood schools, which then affected housing choices made by both
races--producing a more and more tightly-wound spiral of apartheid. Blacks were
effectively confined to the inner city, where property values were relatively low, and where
the schools they supported were hard-pressed to provide the kind of education that white
suburbanites were getting. This made it difficult to compete in the job market, which made
escape to the suburbs a financial impossibility--not to mention the fact that blacks were
likely to be kept out of white neighborhoods one way or another, whether they had the
means or not.

For blacks, then, the inclusion of suburban school districts in a plan to desegregate
Detroit might be a significant step toward equal distribution of community resources. For
many whites, on the other hand, this scheme threatened to burst the bubble of comfortable
suburban life. Nine Supreme Court justices would finally be asked to resolve the struggle
between the clashing interests of America's urban-dwellers. In a five-to-four ruling which
spawned three bitter dissents, the Court invalidated cross-district desegregation. The
turmoil on the Court matched that in the nation as a whole: By 1974 the urban
desegregation controversy had reached the boiling point among voters, and it seemed that a
confrontation between Congress and the Court was imminent. The outcome of such a case
depended on the resolve of Supreme Court members to protect minorities in the face of a
resistant majority. In the end, the Court championed the power of the suburbs to maintain
the status quo: Integration would be limited to Detroit proper, leaving the Detroit school
district heavily black and the suburban districts nearly all-white. With this ruling, the
Supreme Court demarcated the limits of minority rights vis-a-vis majority rights and,
according to critics, created a "formula for American Apartheid."
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I
INTRODUCTION

Milliken v. Bradley: Two Worlds Collide
In 1954 the Supreme Court's Brown v. Board of Education ruling nullified the

Plessy v. Ferguson (1896) doctrine of "separate but equal." At the time, a racially
dysfunctional America looked to the South to observe the results of the Court's sweeping
statement. Few realized that, carried to its logical conclusion, the decision would
necessarily bring into question the racial practices of every part of the nation. As the stains
of racial separation were scoured away in the South, the North and West began to look
rather tarnished. To the dismay of Northerners, blacks began to challenge the unofficial
system of segregation which existed outside of the South. The most controversial aspect of
this challenge centered around school desegregation and busing. When the courts acted in
support of the desegregation movement in the North, the nation's white majority deftly
mustered its political clout to frustrate further civil rights progress. At the center of this
backlash was the school busing case which arose out of Detroit.
As a subject of study, the Supreme Court case of Milliken v. Bradley (1974)
necessarily involves two of the most troubling issues our nation faces: poverty and racism.
The landmark Brown decision symbolized a renewed commitment to deal with these
tangled problems; Milliken, on the other hand, represents the limitations of America's
willingness to keep the promise of Brown. It is therefore also indicative of the limitations
of our Constitution to protect minorities from that "tyranny of the majority" which so
concerned the founding fathers.
The Milliken case dealt with the desegregation of Detroit, a large urban-suburban
area which was divided along racial lines--not unlike many other Northern metropolitan
areas in the 1970s. The turmoil over integrating city and suburb stemmed from the fact that
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Northern and Western states, by this time, had backed themselves into a comer:
Desegregation was a noble cause--as long as the distant Southern states were the primary
targets. Now, the South was more integrated than the North and West, and the focus of
the courts was shifting toward the newer problem of urban segregation. It looked as
though the North would be forced to take inventory of its own offensive behavior.
Whereas Southern states had quite openly legislated separation of the races in
schools, the origins of segregation in the North were much more elusive. In fact, the
complexity of this process of racial separation cannot be overstated. In many ways it was
the result of benign forces, or even the free choices of both races. And yet, given the
widespread discrimination in many areas of life, it was difficult to discern where "free
choice" ended and insidious oppression began. It was that area of doubt which demanded
examination; the question was, would Americans see things as they really were, or would
they see what they wanted to see?
The Milliken case will be discussed in the context of the evolution of the Supreme
Court's interpretation of the Constitution. The equal protection clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment lies at the heart of the desegregation question: After decades of turmoil and
debate America has not determined the meaning of the commitment it made therein. The
Court's reading of Brown v. Board of Education (1954), and the desegregation cases
which followed it, also shape the debate--a debate which centers on the fundamental
institution of education.
Because Americans have always viewed education as an essential tool for life and
citizenship, tempers often flare when people talk about desegregation, sex education, or
prayer in the schools. The younger the children, the more sensitive the public seems to be;
desegregation of graduate schools, for example, did not engender nearly the same rancor as
did desegregation of elementary schools. Education is one of our biggest investments--it is
an investment in our children, in our communities and country, and ultimately in our way
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of life. But the diversity of world views in America has been a major source of contention;
indeed, the evolution of education in this nation has been driven largely by the constant
struggle among various groups to inject their own philosophies into the education system.
The concept of local control sprang from this struggle over the direction of schools.
Local control allows the battles over education to take place on a smaller scale, with the
chances for consensus being much greater in a single community of shared interests.
Officials are elected locally and remain in touch with and accountable to those they serve.
Locally-controlled education systems respond more readily to the particular needs of the
community. Most importantly, there is greater interest and participation on the part of
parents when the quality of schools is largely the responsibility of those who send their
children to them.
The concept of local control has a negative side as well. Communities are, for the
most part, microcosms of the nation. They are comprised of majorities and minorities, and
only rarely do the minorities have the upper hand. The majorities, unfortunately, often
justify their power thusly: "We are in command because there are more of us. There are
more of us because we are better. Since we are better, our way of doing things is better."
A major use of local control, then, has been to create policies which siphon off
"undesirables" into particular schools, thereby preserving the "right" way of doing things.
Naturally, the majority clings to local control most tenaciously when its way of life is
threatened.
Indeed, those who fought desegregation of the Detroit area spoke often of the
importance of community control of schools. The majority-white population had
constructed a way of life that rested significantly upon the segregation of whites and blacks
in both neighborhoods and schools. As with so many other Northern cities, separation
was achieved through public and private housing discrimination, which produced one-race
neighborhoods, which in tum affected the racial composition of neighborhood schools,
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which then affected housing choices made by both races--producing a more and more
tightly-wound spiral of apartheid.
But the majority's way of life was about more than segregation; it was about
garnering the best resources available, from property, to services, to jobs, to education.
Whites could have the best jobs in the city, while building better homes, in better
neighborhoods, on more valuable property in the suburbs. They benefited from city
services--water, electricity, goods and services, culture and entertainment--but could avoid
urban hazards by sending their children to quiet, new suburban schools generously funded
from a large tax base.
Members of the majority could hardly be blamed for pursuing the "American
Dream." Most were honest people who minded their own business. They labored long
and hard for their education and worked diligently at their profession so that they could
afford to live in the suburbs and send their children to good schools. Why should they be
forced to put those children on buses only to have them hauled away to urban schools amid
the dangers of the inner city? Some of these people, perhaps, had never uttered a racist
comment or actively participated in discrimination of any kind. It wasn't their fault that
schools were segregated.
Racism, then, was not as simple as it seemed. It was not a diabolical conspiracy of
all white people to oppress all black people. Nor, on the other hand, could its obvious
effects be ignored. Blacks were confined to the inner city, where property values were
relatively low, and where the schools they supported were hard-pressed to provide the kind
of education that white suburbanites were getting. This made it difficult to compete in the
job market, which made escape to the suburbs a financial impossibility--not to mention the
fact that they were likely to be kept out of white neighborhoods one way or another,
whether they had the means or not.
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For blacks, then, the inclusion of the suburbs in a plan to desegregate Detroit might
be a significant step on the long road toward equal distribution of community resources.
For many whites, on the other hand, this scheme threatened to burst the bubble of
comfortable suburban life. The Supreme Court's decision as to whether inner-city school
district boundaries could be breached in order to tap white populations would affect two
very different worlds: one striving for something better, and one seeking to maintain the
status quo. As usual, the outcome of such a case would depend on the resolve of Supreme
Court members to protect minorities in the face of a resistant majority.

Milliken v. Bradley: The Historiography
No case can possibly be understood outside of its legal context, and in the case of
Milliken v. Bradley building that context is a challenge. Each of the cases prior to Milliken
has its own protracted history, adding a new twist to the winding road of desegregation.
Desegregation, moreover, represents only one of many concurrent paths leading toward the
ill-defined goal of "equality." Finally, the various strands of racism are so inextricable--a
sign of the pervasive nature of this problem in our society--that one can hardly talk about
Milliken without getting into complex and sensitive issues such as poverty, housing
discrimination, and white flight. The controversy associated with desegregation, and in
particular busing, is evident even in the writings of "objective" scholars. Most who have
written on this subject come down clearly, often stridently, on one side or the other.
Many, too, have been deeply involved in the litigation of desegregation cases or in policymaking and enforcement, thus the source of their bias is obvious.
The proper starting point, however, is an understanding of the evolution of the
Fourteenth Amendment, which gives a sense of the obstacles which stood between blacks
and the rights which were supposedly guaranteed them by the Civil War amendments.
There are dozens of books and articles dealing with this subject; however, the first chapter
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of Harvie Wilkinson's From Brown to Bakkel and the second section of Norman
Amaker's article,2 taken together, provide a sufficient explanation of the history and
meaning of the Amendment. It is also useful to survey the beginning of the end of
"separate but equal," ably chronicled in the first three chapters of Randall Bland's Private
Pressure on Public Law.3 Bland details the development of NAACP strategy and the
preludes to Brown, and discusses the progress made in other civil rights arenas--voting,
housing, and due process--before education took the spotlight in 1954. In that year,
through Brown, Thurgood Marshall and his associates stepped forward to reclaim the
Fourteenth Amendment on behalf of its intended beneficiaries.
The history of Brown's enforcement is of crucial importance in evaluating Milliken.
For general purposes, Harvie Wilkinson's From Brown to Bakke is probably the best
account of the post-Brown era. Wilkinson writes from a Southern (Virginia) perspective,
but takes great pains to present all sides of his multi-faceted subject.4 Wilkinson, a onetime law clerk to Justice Lewis Powell, views the Brown decision as a watershed in
twentieth-century American history, but is critical of the Court's enforcement of
desegregation thereafter. Too often the Court went to extremes, sometimes timid and
tentative, other times forceful and demanding--consistent only in its inconsistency. After
five brief years of bold rulings (1968 -73), the Court's momentum was lost as it ran up
against the "legitimate competing ideals" of whites; accordingly, the Milliken (cross-district

1 J. Harvie Wilkinson, From Brown to Bakke: The Supreme Court and School
Integration: 1954-1978 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1979).
2 Norman C. Amaker, "Milliken v. Bradley: The Meaning of the Constitution in
School Desegregation Cases," Hastings Constitutional Law Quarterly 2 (Spring 1975).
3 Randall W. Bland, Private Pressure on Public Law: The Legal Career of Justice
Thurgood Marshall, Publication of National University Publications Series in American
Studies, ed. James P. Shenton (Port Washington, N.Y.: Kennikat Press, 1973).
4 C. Vann Woodward, review of From Brown to Bakke, by J. Harvie Wilkinson
III, In The New Republic 180 (June 23, 1979): 27.
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desegregation) and Bakke (affirmative action) decisions denoted the outer limits of white
indulgence.5
The literature pertaining to desegregation and busing is abundant Like
Wilkinson's, many of these works chronicle, in varying detail, the progress of
desegregation since Brown. A number of authors include chapters devoted to analysis of
particular cases, with Milliken as a frequently chosen topic. These sources proved to be
most helpful for the purposes of this study.
Wilkinson himself devotes one chapter to discussion of Milliken. He contends that
the Court's decision to forestall multi-district desegregation was largely a result of the
majority's "deep conservative distrust. .. of central planning;" it could not abide one district
judge having so much power over so many people via desegregation.6 In its haste to
preclude the expansion of judicial power, the Court abandoned its own established
principle of judging desegregation plans by their effectiveness,7 and gave top priority to
local control of schools.s Wilkinson's lucid presentation does not oversimplify; on the
contrary, he delves into the complex issues of housing and class as they relate to the
effectiveness of busing remedies. Wilkinson's work is by far the clearest and most
thoughtful treatment of the intricacies of desegregation.
George Metcalf, himself a civil rights activist, follows the progress of
desegregation in From Little Rock to Boston. 9 He focuses upon the politicization of the
issue, tracing its evolution up through the Carter presidency, with special attention given to
the Nixon administration. Metcalf is openly critical of the many community and national

Wilkinson, 308.
6 Ibid., 226.
7 Ibid., 222.
8 Ibid., 225.
9 George R. Metcalf, From Little Rock to Boston: The History of School
Desegregation, Contributions to the Study of Education Series, No. 8 (Westport, Conn.:
Greenwood Press, 1983).
5
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leaders who opposed desegregation for the sake of politics rather than principle, President
Nixon being foremost among them. It was Nixon, he charges, who manipulated the
various branches of government and stirred public outrage over busing in an effort to
thwart reform efforts and score political points.lo Metcalf also points out that, amid the
furor over desegregation in Detroit, the area's congressional delegation--a normally liberal
group which had previously supported busing--"cut and ran," aggressively pursuing
measures which would halt progress and pacify angry white constituents.11
Metcalf gives much consideration to Milliken, presenting it as a pivotal case: It
was, in his estimation, the Court's "one failure to stand up. "12 The Milliken majority was
more concerned with the Court's status among white, middle-class America than with
integration, and was unwilling "to fashion new remedies to fit a new situation, a
metropolitan situation."13 Metcalf's own support of busing to overcome residential
segregation is based on his belief that busing itself is not in fact the cause of white flight;14
rather, fear and hatred keep the races apart, and this will only change if they are educated
side by side.15
As is evident from the title, Gary Orfield's Must We Bus? deals exclusively with
urban desegregation.16 The author is a political scientist who has written extensively on
this subject. Orfield's analysis parallels that of Metcalf in that he believes busing to be our
best hope for realizing an integrated society. On the other hand, he is not as optimistic as
Metcalf where white flight is concerned: He is in fact convinced that majority-black
10 James C. Duram, review of From Little Rock to Boston, by George R. Metcalf,
In American Historical Review 89 (April 1984): 551.
11 Metcalf, 163.
12 Ibid., 268.
13 Ibid., 192.
14 Judy Jolley Mohraz, review of From Little Rock to Boston, by George R.
Metcalf, In The Journal of American History 70 (March 1984): 926.
15 Metcalf, ix.
16 Gary Orfield, Must We Bus? Segregated Schools and National Policy
(Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1978).
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schools will never be accepted by whites, and will instead be deserted by them.17 Orfield
takes on a despairing tone as he evaluates the prospects for city-dwellers who lack any and
all access to suburban resources.
The importance that Orfield attaches to Milliken is evident throughout the book, but
its significance is highlighted in a chapter on "Metropolitan Desegregation." For Orfield, as
for Wilkinson, Milliken carried with it consequences of socioeconomic as well as racial
segregation: The Supreme Court lacked vigor enough to challenge the economic and
political power of the suburbs, with the result that blacks and poor whites have been left to
carry the burden of desegregation. By ignoring the issue of residential segregation, the
Court left intact the ability of the suburbs "to determine their residential character" in terms
of race and class.is Had the Court's decision in Milliken not precluded it, Orfield would
be in favor of busing across city-suburb lines in order to achieve majority-white schools.
He includes suggestions for sensible, practical busing plans that would produce maximum
desegregation--the only kind that really counts, in Orfield's view.
Wilkinson, Metcalf, and Orfield all take the Court to task for its failure to confront
residential segregation, but none so passionately as Paul Dimond, a lawyer for black
plaintiffs in the Detroit litigation as well as several other prominent desegregation cases. In
his book, Beyond Busing, 19 Dimond not only provides a behind-the-scenes account of
several school segregation battles, but also focuses intensely upon the nature of residential
segregation, via the Chicago public housing discrimination case, Hills v. Gautreaux
(1976).20 Dimond contends that the copious housing discrimination evidence which was

17 Robert L. Crain, "School Desegregation: The First Good Policy Review,"
Contemporary Sociology 8 (July 1979): 557.
18 Orfield, 32.
19 Paul R. Dimond, Beyond Busing: Inside the Challenge to Urban Segregation
(Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 1985).
20 Drew S. Days III, "School Desegregation Law in the 1980's: Why Isn't
Anybody Laughing?"The Yale Law Journal 95 (July 1986): 1741.
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presented to the District Court in Milliken, and which formed much of the basis for that
court's ruling, was subsequently ignored in both the Court of Appeals and the Supreme
Court.21
Though Dimond's book is not a scholarly work in the traditional sense, his sources
are overwhelmingly primary ones (trial records, briefs, oral arguments, opinions), and he
gives life to what could otherwise be dry reading. The particulars he provides about the
various proceedings--facial expression, tone of voice, and body language, as well as the
ideologies and temperaments of the major personalities--give a unique dimension to this
drama. His insights into the thinking and actions of the plaintiffs' lawyers, as well as the
conflicted Detroit defendants, illustrate the complexity and turmoil that characterized the
unfolding events. As one might guess, Dimond's perspective is not unbiased, but his
account of the case is probably the most detailed to be had short of wading through the
entire case record.
In Disaster by Decree, Lino Graglia presents a viewpoint entirely antithetical to that
of Wilkinson, Metcalf, Orfield, and Dimond.22 Graglia, a professor of constitutional law,
is avidly opposed not only to busing but also to the integration requirement itself. His
aversion to desegregation stems from his belief that existing racial segregation has little to
do with the legal segregation of the past. The title of the book clearly indicates his attitude
toward judicial involvement in resolving issues of race and education; indeed, Graglia finds
error in the Court's desegregation decisions all the way back to Brown. In that landmark
case, the Court's reliance on social theories encouraged controversy, while its failure to
demand immediate compliance put the court system in a position of having to supervise

21 Dimond, 111.
22 Lino A. Graglia, Disaster by Decree: The Supreme Court Decisions on Race and
the Schools (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1976).
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implementation.23 Subsequently, the Court proceeded to tum its own ruling inside out:
Whereas in 1954 it prohibited the assignment of students to schools on a racial basis, in

1971 its endorsement of busing to integrate required precisely that. Graglia is also highly
critical of court proceedings in desegregation cases, citing instances of questionable
evidence and flawed reasoning at all levels.24
For Graglia, Milliken is "a fitting conclusion to the unhappy story of the Supreme
Court's decisions on race and the schools since Brown . ... the story of how the
Constitution came to require racially balanced schools and the busing necessary to achieve
such schools. ''25 As far as he is concerned, a decision from the Court in favor of multidistrict desegregation would have been no more appalling than the ruling they did hand
down, approving integration within Detroit--an "irrational" result given the predominantly
black population there.26 Graglia obviously embraces the theory that residential
segregation is a natural, benign occurrence~ he does not acknowledge the existence of
housing discrimination, and is apparently oblivious to the patterns and connections between
various forms of discrimination. Indeed, he dismisses the findings of dejure (purposeful)
school segregation in Detroit as "preposterous. "27 Thus, his views do not appear to be
grounded in a realistic appraisal of racism in America. While providing a useful critical
perspective, Graglia's work makes for laborious reading, as his arguments are difficult to
follow and his style is ungainly.
Eleanor Wolf, a sociology professor, takes Graglia's critical view of Milliken to a
deeper level in her book, Trial and Error, which deals exclusively with the Detroit

23 Elliott Abrams, "Desegregation and the Courts," Commentary 62 (November
1976): 85.
24 Nathan Glazer, "In Uplifting, Get Underneath," National Review 28 (October
15, 1976): 1132.
25 Graglia, 203, 256.
26 Ibid., 203.
27 Ibid., 204.
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litigation. Wolf is harsh in her analysis of federal court procedures in that case, charging
that the judge based his rulings upon expert testimony which was highly questionable in
many regards.28 Indeed, Wolf expresses great skepticism concerning most judges' ability
to evaluate such testimony; furthermore, she questions the practicality and efficacy of the
busing remedies these judges order into effect.29
Wolf is wholly unconvinced that school segregation is the product of anything more
than residential segregation, which in tum is the result of the natural tendency of racial and
ethnic groups to band together in communities.30 Wolf does not, therefore, confront
issues of discrimination at the individual or governmental level.31 Her critical analysis, like
Graglia's, provides a useful contrast to authors such as Metcalf and Dimond; however, her
focus is almost exclusively upon lower court proceedings. Since this study will not attempt
a detailed analysis of the specific evidence presented at trial, her critique is of limited use
here.
Perhaps the most balanced work is the collection of essays in Limits of Justice,
edited by Howard Kalodner and James Fishman.32 This volume brings together several
chapter-long case studies of desegregation litigation in large cities around the nation,
written by experts with a wide range of opinions on the subject. In his introduction,
Kalodner describes the many problems courts face in performing remedial tasks, including
their "political isolation," their lack of expertise with regard to complex educational
problems, and the shortage of time and resources necessary to oversee implementation.33
28 Ralph A. Rossum, "A Sweetheart Suit," National Review 33 (October 30,
1981): 1279.
29 Ibid., 1280.
30 Elizabeth L. Useem, "Desegregation in Northern Cities: Two Case Studies,"
Contemporary Sociology 11 (November 1982): 649.
31 Ibid., 650.
32 Howard I. Kalodner and James J. Fishman, eds., Limits of Justice: The Courts'
Role in School Desegregation (Cambridge, Mass.: Ballinger Publishing Co., 1978).
33 G. Alan Tarr, review of Limits of Justice, ed. by Howard I. Kalodner and James
J. Fishman, In Social Science Quarterly 59 (December 1978): 594.
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Elwood Hain, who was a co-chairman of the Metropolitan Coalition for Peaceful
Integration in Detroit, contributes the chapter on Milliken. Hain provides a detailed factual
account of the proceedings but, like Wolf, gives scant attention to the Supreme Court's
handling of the case. He states only that "The Supreme Court's decision has been widely
commented upon, a task that need not be repeated here. "'34 Hain is less interested in taking
sides on the issue than in describing how the various litigants responded to the Supreme
Court's ruling in terms of cooperating to desegregate within the city limits. Thus he does
present a side of the story--i.e., after the Court's decision--which otherwise tends to be
neglected. Here and there, one catches glimmers of Hain' s partiality, but for the most part
he reserves judgment for his two-paragraph summary, where he states flatly that "only
inclusion of the suburbs in a desegregation plan" can provide "truly desegregated education
for the black school children of Detroit. "35
For the Detroit case, one should also consult the scholarly journals; in this instance,
law, education, and sociology periodicals seemed to be the most fruitful sources. There are
numerous articles and angles to choose from, but two lengthy symposiums were
particularly helpful because they presented, in convenient locations, a variety of viewpoints
by noted authors and participants. Such writings are useful both as secondary and primary
sources, since they record the reactions of the academic community at various stages after
the Supreme Court's decision.
In the January, 1975 issue of the Journal of Law and Education, a symposium on
the Detroit decision includes articles written by some of the major players in the Detroit case
and in desegregation generally. Nathaniel Jones, for example, was one of the lead NAACP
attorneys who argued Milliken before the Supreme Court. He describes the case as "the
sad but inevitable culmination of a national anti-black strategy" practiced by the federal
34

35

Kalodner, 270.
Ibid., 306.
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government (the Nixon administration is strongly implicated in Jones' litany of
misdeeds).36 There is a contribution from Martin Sloane, former Civil Rights Commission
housing staff director and HUD staff attorney, who did voluntary research for the NAACP
and testified as an expert witness in the Detroit trial. He expresses his view that, for the
foreseeable future, Milliken has made black plaintiffs' burden "virtually insupportable;" yet
he is also hopeful that change will eventually come.37 Derrick Bell--civil rights litigator,
Deputy Director of the HEW Office for Civil Rights (during the creation of the first school
desegregation guidelines, no less), the first black law professor at Harvard, and a prolific
writer in the area of civil rights law--writes that the Supreme Court's decision has permitted
whites to "hide in the suburbs behind an impressive array of economic, social, and legal
barriers."38 At the same time, Bell concedes that, had the Court's decision gone the other
way, cross-district busing "would have made little headway against tremendous public
opposition. "3 9
The Wayne Law Review also features a symposium in its March, 1975 issue.
Subtitled, "Milliken v. Bradley and the Future of Urban School Desegregation," it includes
articles which focus upon implications and strategies for future desegregation efforts.
Again, many of the contributors are experts who were involved in the Detroit litigation.
Elwood Hain explores options for reorganizing school districts for purposes of integration,
including the consolidation of districts, the creation of "umbrella" districts, and the transfer
of pupils between districts.40 He concludes that district consolidation, while initially

36 Nathaniel R. Jones, "An Anti-Black Strategy and the Supreme Court," Journal
of Law and Education 4 (January 1975): 203.
37 Martin E. Sloane, "Milliken v. Bradley in Perspective," Journal of Law and
Education 4 (January, 1975): 210.
38 Derrick A. Bell, Jr., "Running and Busing in Twentieth-Century America,"
Journal of Law and Education 4 (January 1975): 214.
39 Ibid., 217.
40 Elwood Hain, "Techniques of Governmental Reorganization to Achieve School
Desegregation," Wayne Law Review 21 (March 1975): 781-82.
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traumatic, provides the best hope for long-term success. Bill Grant, a journalist who
closely followed the Detroit case from its beginning, provides a more backward-looking
"Historical Overview" of the case. Grant writes primarily from the perspective of District
Judge Stephen Roth, who presided over the trial and was deeply affected by the
overwhelming evidence of racial discrimination in Detroit. Grant maintains that "the story
of the evolution of the Detroit school case.. .is also the story of the evolution of the views
of Judge Roth," who suffered scathing personal attacks due to his stand on
desegregation. 41
In the Wayne symposium two of the contributors debate the question of whether a
different outcome could have been achieved at the Supreme Court level if the plaintiffs had
developed an inter-district theory of violation in the courts below. Louis Beer (one of the
lawyers for the Detroit Board) argues that in the higher courts the plaintiffs should have
presented Judge Roth's "macroscopic" view of the constitutional violations, featuring the
metropolitan-wide housing discrimination evidence: "If the primary cause of the unlawful
segregation in the schools was the metropolitan pattern of discrimination in housing, then
inherently the violation was metropolitan in nature. "42 In contrast, Douglas West (who
represented one of the suburban school boards) concludes that such an approach would
have produced essentially the same trial record that the plaintiffs presented anyway; neither
would it have affected the ultimate outcome.43 Had the Court been at all open to the
"macroscopic" view of the Detroit violations, it had "ample opportunity" to broaden the
theory of violation articulated in its earlier rulings.44
41 William R. Grant, "The Detroit School Case: An Historical Overview," Wayne
Law Review 21 (March 1975): 851.
42 Louis D. Beer, "The Nature of the Violation and the Scope of the Remedy: An
Analysis of Milliken v. Bradley in Terms of the Evolution of the Theory of the Violation,"
Wayne Law Review 21 (March 1975): 913.
43 Douglas H. West, "Another View of the Bradley Violation: Would a Different
Evolution Have Changed the Outcome?"Wayne Law Review 21 (March 1975): 917.
44 Ibid., 925-26.
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Norman Amaker's Hastings piece (cited above) provides an excellent discussion of
the constitutional implications of the Detroit ruling. He notes a fundamental difference
between the majority and the dissenters as to the nature of the right of black children to
equal protection of the laws. The majority's restrictive view of this right appears to
Amaker to be "a refutation of the historical concerns... from which the [Fourteenth
Amendment] flowed. "45 Under Milliken, "separate educational facilities, no matter how
'inherently unequal' may coexist within a state if the mode of their coexistence is a set of
lines labeled a 'school system. "'46 Insofar as the Milliken holding fails to require
authorities to ensure equal educational results, it is unsatisfactory.47
Two anonymously authored articles from the Harvard Law Review and the
Northwestern University Law Review are enlightening as well. The latter is a particularly
pithy account of the historical and theoretical context of Milliken, with the author
concluding, like Amaker, that the case turned on the fundamental "nature of the
constitutional right demanding protection. "48 In the end, the majority rejected the theory
that plaintiffs had a constitutional right to desegregation defined in terms of the actual racial
composition of schools.49 The Harvard piece gives an objective overview of the facts of
the case and offers some theories regarding the veiled reasoning behind the decision. It is
suggested, for example, that a different ruling in Milliken could not have been expected to
follow from Keyes due to the massive scale of the remedy involved in Detroit; the Supreme
Court must have determined that the benefits of desegregation would have been outweighed
by the "social and political costs of metropolitan relief. "50
45 Amaker, 356.
46 Ibid., 365.
47 Ibid.
48 "Milliken v. Bradley in Historical Perspective: The Supreme Court Comes Full
Circle," Northwestern University Law Review 69 (November-December, 1974): 817.
49 Ibid.
50 "Power of Federal Courts to Order Interdistrict Relief for lntradistrict
Segregation," Harvard Law Review 88 (November 1974): 69.
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Naturally, those who lost the Milliken battle were most inclined to comment upon
the situation, therefore the initial reaction to the decision--such as that found in the scholarly
journals--was bitter. Over time activists found reason to be hopeful that progress could be
made through other avenues, and this is reflected in the more moderate analyses of
Wilkinson and Hain. At the same time, authors such as Wolf and Graglia stepped forward
to defend the decision as a much-needed curb on busing. A decade after Milliken,
however, Dimond and Metcalf regretfully concluded that hindsight offered no comfortable
justification for the backlash against desegregation. For them, the Court had betrayed the
principles of Brown, and had yet to redeem itself.
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II
TOWARD MILLIKEN

Buried Treasure:
The Fourteenth Amendment, 1868-1896
How do you deliver an entire race from slavery to citizenship when the two are
separated by the angry waters of racism? During and after the Civil War American leaders
sought to build a legal bridge for blacks, buttressed by the Emancipation Proclamation, the
reconstruction amendments, and civil rights legislation. The Supreme Court remained
properly aloof from these political processes, but was necessarily drawn into the debate
when Congress's work was challenged in the South. Indeed, as blacks gained political and
economic strength, Southern whites reacted with fear-driven violence and oppression. It
was left to the Court to find some middle ground between the demands of the Constitution
and the wrath of an indignant South, while an increasingly apathetic North shrank from the
controversy.
The Thirteenth Amendment had abolished slavery but left freed blacks at the mercy
of any discriminatory legislation the former slave states were inclined to enact. The
Fourteenth Amendment, then, was designed to protect the rights of United States citizens-and the amendment specifically designated blacks as such--from infringement by the states.
(Heretofore the states had not been held in check because the Fifth Amendment's due
process clause applied only to the federal government.) More than this, the Fourteenth
Amendment demanded that blacks be accorded rights of state citizenship. Norman Amaker
elaborates:
What this meant in practical terms, as it relates to the problem [of school
segregation], is that state systems for educating children at public expense,
to the extent that they existed or were formed, were to be made available to
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blacks not as a matter of gift but, because they were now citizens, as a
matter of right.1
Further, the Amendment's equal protection clause mandated that, in interacting with their
citizens, states must afford the same treatment to blacks as to whites. This, according to
Amaker, implied more than "mere permission of attendance at schools;" it required "state

effort to assure 'equal protection of the laws.' "2
Yet the abstract meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment is far removed from the
reality of late nineteenth-century America: "By 1877, America had wearied of the Negro
and his problems," and the Court--still recovering from the dishonor of Dred Scott--was
unwilling to press the issue.3 The Court would allow blacks some sporadic advancement
over the next fifty years, but for the most part it was not a friend upon which they could
rely. Instead, the Fourteenth Amendment was the curious means by which the Court
became allied with the business man to promote laissez-faire capitalism. In the process, the
original promises of the Fourteenth Amendment were lost--buried by the rising tide of
industrialism. 4
Harvie Wilkinson points to three "watershed" cases which essentially "nullified the
Negro's Reconstruction gains. "5 The Slaughterhouse Cases (1873) involved a Louisiana
statute which granted a monopoly on the slaughter of animals. Those who were left out of
the deal argued that such a monopoly deprived them of the right to pursue their livelihood-this brought forth the question of whether the due process clause could be extended to
protect this and other rights not strictly associated with national citizenship. While giving

1 Norman C. Amaker, "Milliken v. Bradley: The Meaning of the Constitution in
School Desegregation Cases," Hastings Constitutional Law Quarterly 2 (Spring 1975):
354.
2 Ibid., 355, emphasis added.
3 J. Harvie Wilkinson, From Brown to Bakke: The Supreme Court and School
Integration: 1954-1978 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1979), 20-21.
4 Ibid., 21.
5 Ibid., 13.
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lip service to the grand purpose of the Civil War amendments--i.e., the protection of
blacks' rights--a sharply divided Court nevertheless refused to put the entire question of
civil rights into the hands of the federal government. The Court determined that only the
"few and limited" rights of national citizenship were constitutionally protected; the vital
privileges of state citizenship would not be guaranteed.6 In effect, the Court consigned
blacks "to the control of their former masters in the South. ''7 Because the Court was so
divided on this issue, others were encouraged to use the same argument in future cases, but
not generally on behalf of civil rights. Rather, business interests took the Fourteenth
Amendment as a protective cloak against governmental interference in economic matters.
A decade later, the Civil Rights Cases (1883) dashed hopes for civic equality for
blacks. Had the Court given its blessing, the Civil Rights Act of 1875 would have assured
equal access to public accommodations such as lodging, transportation, and theaters.
Instead the Court determined that the Fourteenth Amendment applied to states and not
private citizens; therefore discrimination by the owner of a private establishment--a hotel, a
railroad, a theater--was not subject to review.s The capstone of the Court's "counter
assault" on civil rights efforts was the infamous Plessy v. Ferguson ruling of 1896.9 The
State of Louisiana was before the Court again, this time for the enactment of a law which
stipulated racially separate, though ostensibly equal, accommodations for railway
passengers. The Court simply did not view this racial distinction as a violation of the rights
of black individuals, and so upheld the statute. Io According to the Court, the Fourteenth
Amendment could in no way be construed as establishing total equality of the races.11

6 Ibid., 14.
7 Ibid., 13.
8 Ibid., 16.
9 Ibid., 13.
10 Ibid., 17-18.
11 Ibid., 19.
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The South was thus given a free hand in dealing with its black citizens. Not
surprisingly, "the regime Plessy sanctioned became meticulous and complete"--so far as
racial separation was concemed.12 The "equal" side of the equation was something else
altogether. Nowhere was the separation and inequality of the races more apparent than in
schools. Blacks, being "unsuited for the kind of education the white man received," were
hardly viewed as a worthy investment, and this was reflected in the discriminatory
allocation of educational resources.13 The exclusion and neglect of black students was
only one facet of the systematic denigration of former slaves, but in 1954 school
segregation would become the focal point of the fight to reinstate the Fourteenth
Amendment as the protector of the disadvantaged.

Overthrow of Jim Crow:
The Fight to End Segregation in Education, 1934-1954
A young lawyer, Thurgood Marshall, led the early battles for school desegregation;
decades later, ironically, he would sit on the very Court which would curtail integration by
way of the Milliken ruling. In the early 1930s, Marshall was a promising law student at
Howard University. At that time the black university's first African-American president,
Mordecai Johnson, was attempting to cultivate an atmosphere of social consciousness on
the campus, assembling a faculty of like-minded men which included law professors
Charles Houston, William Hastie, and James Nabrit, Jr. These accomplished lawyers
were active in the fledgling civil rights movement as lawyers for the NAACP. Charles
Houston held a particularly strong belief "that Negro lawyers should be social engineers,
and he attempted to make Howard the production center for the new breed of Negro

12 Ibid., 18.
13 Ibid., 19-20.
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lawyer. "14 In so doing, he urged upon his students the strategy of using the existing legal
structure to undermine discrimination.1 s
In 1935 Charles Houston was named Special Counsel for the NAACP, and by

1936 he had surrounded himself with talented colleagues, including Marshall as Assistant
Special Counsel. Under the Association's newly-launched anti-discrimination program
Houston, Marshall, and William Hastie began the painstaking work of formulating a plan
to dismantle the doctrine of "separate but equal. "16 Houston believed that" 'the soft
underbelly' of Jim Crow" would be the segregated graduate schools.I 7 His hope was to
make such segregation "prohibitively expensive"--that is, it would be more trouble and
expense for states to maintain two separate aml, equal schools than simply to grant
admission of blacks to the white universities.ls
The first major step toward this end was taken in the 1938 case of Missouri ex rel.

Gaines v. Canada. Lloyd Gaines was denied admission to the University of Missouri Law
School despite his qualifications. Though Missouri did not have a separate black school, it
claimed that by providing financial assistance to educate blacks outside the state it was
satisfying the "separate but equal" requirement.19 The Supreme Court, on the other hand,
determined that the proposed financial assistance did not in fact constitute equal protection.
Regardless of whether other Missouri blacks demanded such an education, Gaines must be
afforded an equal opportunity for it; in the absence of equal facilities within the state, his
admission to the existing school was required. Missouri was forced to open a separate,

14 Randall W. Bland, Private Pressure on Public Law: The Legal Career of Justice
Thurgood Marshall, Publication of National University Publications Series in American
Studies, ed. James P. Shenton (Port Washington, N.Y.: Kennikat Press, 1973), 6.
15 Ibid.
16 Ibid., 10-11
17 Ibid., 10.
18 Ibid.
19 Ibid., 21.

23
comparable program for blacks, and the case prompted other litigants around the country to
demand equal educational opportunities.20
Ten years would pass, however, before the NAACP would again make significant
progress toward integration. Why the apparent hiatus from the issue of education? Randall
Bland suggests that "as of 1944 the Negro leadership, including Marshall, had not adopted
a positive strategy to deal with the problem, as it had with other areas of discrimination. "21
Their dilemma, it seems, was whether to continue demanding truly equal, though separate,
educational opportunities for blacks, or pursue the complete overthrow of the Plessy
doctrine which had prevailed for so long.22 Yet in the time that it took to carefully weigh
one option against the other, favorable changes took place in the nation and the world that
bolstered the viability of the latter, more radical strategy.
World War II had brought home to many Americans the hypocrisy of fighting racial
supremacy abroad while clinging to it at home. President Truman acted on just such a
conviction when he ordered the desegregation of the armed forces in 1945.23 The rise of
McCarthyism and the ensuing infringements on civil liberties also reminded citizens of the
importance of such freedoms for all Americans.24 And in 1953, leadership of the Supreme
Court passed from conservative Fred Vinson to Earl Warren, potentially tipping the balance
of the Court in favor of the NAACP agenda.25 Sensing a national climate that was ripe for
change, NAACP leaders decided late in 1945 to make the leap from demanding separate
equality to attacking the inherent inequality of segregation in education.26 The NAACP

20 Ibid.,
21 Ibid.,
22 Ibid.
23 Ibid.,
24 Ibid.,
25 Ibid.,
26 Ibid.,

22.
34.
38.
39.
37.
38.
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also decided that attempting to break down barriers at the elementary school level would be
a delicate matter--the colleges and professional schools should be conquered first.27
A great deal of preparation in the immediate post-war years was necessary,
including that of a new weapon called social science.28 Slowly, the Association's
argument against segregation took shape:
By demonstrating to the Supreme Court of the United States that it is
impossible for a state to provide equality in such intangible features as the
prestige of an institution, the quality of the faculty, and the reputation of
degrees for Negroes in separate schools, they hoped to prove the
inconsistency of the "separate but equal" doctrine itself.29
The opportunity to test that argument before the Supreme Court finally came in 1948, after
Ms. Ada Sipuel was denied admission to the University of Oklahoma School of Law. The
State explained that an alternative school for blacks would be available in the future, and the
state supreme court agreed that until such time as there was sufficient demand for a black
law school, the State had no obligation to provide one.
When Sipuel v. Oklahoma came before the United States Supreme Court, Marshall
et al argued that the State should be overruled on the basis of the Gaines decision--Ms.
Sipuel must be admitted immediately to the only existing law program.30 More
importantly, the NAACP presented its first direct challenge to the "separate but equal"
doctrine, asserting that it was "without legal foundation or social justification. '"31 Though
sidestepping this challenge to Plessy, the Supreme Court did rule that the State must
provide the same education to the petitioner at the same time as everyone else, so that
Oklahoma would either have to admit Ms. Sipuel immediately or delay admission of all
applicants until a black program was established.32 The University of Oklahoma regents
27 Ibid., 60-61; see also 69-70.
28 Ibid., 39.
29 Ibid., 61.
30 Ibid.
31 Ibid., 62.
32 Ibid., 64.
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responded by roping off an area in the State Capitol building and deeming it an equal
counterpart to the original law school. Ms. Fisher (formerly Sipuel) was unsatisfied, and
the issue was again taken before the Supreme Court in Fisher v. Hurst (1948). Here, the
Court rejected the NAACP's argument that the State could not possibly provide separate
equality in the intangible features of an institution. Despite losing the legal battle over
segregation within the law school, in the end Ms. Fisher was admitted to the law school on
a non-segregated basis.33
An important breakthrough came in 1950 with Sweatt v. Painter. Herman Sweatt
was denied admission to the University of Texas Law School solely because of his race.
Once again, there was no separate school for blacks in the state, and when the University
moved to establish one, the state courts ruled against Sweatt's claim that he was denied
equal protection.34 Before the Supreme Court the NAACP reiterated the argument that, in
addition to basic faculty, library, and accreditation shortcomings, the black facility could
not compare to the original one in such aspects as prestige and influence.35 This time, the
Court agreed with both contentions.36 Marshall and his colleagues had taken an enormous
stride by extracting an admission from the Supreme Court that there was more to equality
than comparable physical facilities. A companion case was decided the same day: In

Mc.La,urin v. Oklahoma, the admission of a black teacher to the University of Oklahoma
graduate school under segregated conditions was found to be insufficient in terms of equal
protection.37 An outright repudiation of "separate but equal" was yet to come, however.38

33 Ibid.,
34 Ibid.,
35 Ibid.,
36 Ibid.,
37 Ibid.,
38 Ibid.,
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Shortly after the 1950 decisions, the NAACP became involved in five suits filed in
federal district courts "at strategic points around the country. ''39 In each case black children
sought admission to white elementary or secondary schools; in each case the attorneys
called for abjuration of the "separate but equal" principle on equal protection or due process
grounds; and in each case their arguments were supported with copious sociological and
psychological documentation.40 Eventually four of the suits were consolidated as Brown

v. Board of Education, while the fifth, out of Washington, D.C., went before the Court as
Bolling v. Sharpe.41
Marshall put forth the same legal and sociological arguments before the Court as
had been presented in the recent higher education cases.42 Arguments from the opposition
were most significant for their emphasis on the original intent of the framers of the
Fourteenth Amendment; indeed, the Court called for reargument based on that issue. 43
Ultimately, the Court found the historical evidence to be inconclusive so far as original
intent was concerned.44 Instead, they focused upon the sociological evidence which the
NAACP had presented time and again in the previous decade. Even if segregated schools
were equal in every material regard, the Court concluded, segregation itself was an emblem
of inferiority for the oppressed black race, which was thereby deprived of equal protection
under the law. The unanimous 1954 ruling did not actually overturn the Plessy decision,
but rather prohibited its application to public education. The Bolling case came to a similar
conclusion shortly thereafter.45

39 Ibid.,
40 Ibid.,
41 Ibid.,
42 Ibid.,
43 Ibid.,
44 Ibid.,
45 Ibid.,
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A long road had been traveled. In summary, it began with demands for equality in
higher education within the confines of "separate but equal" (Gaines). Attempts to step
beyond those limits did not meet with immediate success, but states were prevented from
delaying fulfillment of the "separate but equal" promise (Sipuel). Changing times and the
NAACP's use of social science eventually brought the Court to a new view of the meaning
of equality, one which took into account its intangible qualities (Sweatt, McLaurin). And
finally, in Brown the Court invalidated the application of "separate but equal" to the public
education system, bringing the possibilities of integration to the controversial level of the
elementary and secondary schools.

Only Just Begun:
Enforcement of Brown, 1955-1973
At last, some twenty years after the fight had begun, victory seemed to be at hand.
Yet once the Brown ruling was achieved a myriad of unanswered questions remained:
How would integration be carried out? How long could this reasonably be expected to
take? Who might disobey or equivocate and how would that be handled?
The Court foresaw such problems and consequently called for the return of lawyers
late in 1954 for reargument regarding implementation plans. In what has become known as

Brown II, Marshall et al argued against the gradualist proposals of the opposition, insisting
that such a strategy would only make adjustments more difficult. The Court, however,
was inclined to take a more moderate stance:
In exercising its equity powers, the Court embraced the deliberate-speed
rule on the basis that it could secure the rights of the Negro litigants but, at
the same time, allow the federal district courts to facilitate a reasonable, yet
prompt, start toward compliance. It also presumed that the federal courts
would act firmly and with good faith.46

46 Ibid., 86.
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Thus the Supreme Court attempted, in Brown II, to give the problem of desegregation back
to the states and local courts, perhaps as a peace offering. With their precious local control
returned to them, the Court may have thought, Southerners would be more willing to
cooperate, and might even allow themselves to be caught up in the spirit of a new era.47
Critics have charged that the 1955 ruling actually invited resistance to the original
decision. All manner of evasive maneuvers were certainly employed by the Southern states
to avoid integrating their schools, but whether a more exacting mandate could have
prevented this evasion is obviously impossible to predict. Given the lack of support for
integration in the legislative and executive branches, and the widespread and deep-rooted
opposition of the South, perhaps Harvie Wilkinson reaches a more accurate conclusion
when he writes that "the Court later erred tragically in implementing and monitoring that
famous phrase ['all deliberate speed'], but not in formulating it. "48
What Wilkinson and others condemn, then, is the Court's scant involvement in the
enforcement of Brown and Brown II between 1955 and 1968. While it was arguably a
prudent course to avoid treading on Southern toes, the Court also failed to provide crucial
guidance in the execution of a broadly-phrased decree which would have far-reaching
consequences and profoundly alter the Southern way of life. 49 "The Court," Wilkinson
charges, "spoke mainly when it absolutely had to: at the point of crisis when obstruction
was so apparent, delay so prolonged, or violation of constitutional principle so manifest
that quiet was no longer feasible. "50 Thus the subtle means of segregation in the North and

47 Wilkinson, 65.
48 Ibid., 77; see also 75-76.
49 Ibid., 66.
50 Ibid., 79.
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West were ignored by the Court for nearly two decades after Brown, while the more overt
instances of Southern discrimination took center stage.51
With implementation now in the hands of the lower federal courts, and the
Supreme Court refusing to show the way, desegregation lurched forward in the South. As
could be expected, there was little uniformity in either dispatch or vigor. Varying judicial
temperaments were part of the problem. Moreover, "Brown II left federal district judges
much too exposed. "52 So much was left to their interpretation and discretion that judges
could easily incur the wrath of Southern communities by pushing too hard for integration.
"Only the Supreme Court could have promoted uniformity with frequent and specific
rulings, which it steadfastly declined to do," except in the most extreme circumstances.53
Extreme circumstances were certainly at hand when Little Rock, Arkansas
attempted integration in 1957. In this instance, resistance did not begin at the grassroots
level; rather, it was born of the political machinations of the state's governor, Orval
Faubus. In need of an issue on which to seek a third term, he deliberately chose to
capitalize upon the dramatic issue of segregation--"the great welder of white solidarity. "54
No one had anticipated that the integration of Little Rock Central High School
would be particularly eventful--desegregation had been taking place around the state at a
fair pace since Brown II. But on the night before the fall term was to begin the governor
suggested publicly that if the nine black students were brought in, disorder would be the
certain outcome.55 The next day, students were prevented from entering the high school
by National Guardsmen "called out by Governor Faubus to protect life and property against

51 George R. Metcalf, From Little Rock to Boston: The History of School
Desegregation, Contributions to the Study of Education Series, No. 8 (Westport, Conn.:
Greenwood Press, 1983), 130-31.
52 Wilkinson, 80.
53 Ibid.
54 Ibid., 89.
55 Ibid.
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a mob that never materialized."56 It was only the day after this that a crowd of citizens did
gather near the school, and troops turned the black students away.57
For three weeks the black schoolchildren were kept out of school. When the
federal district judge finally interceded and troops were withdrawn, integration lasted barely
half a day as tensions mounted and violence was threatened. It then took presidential
intervention to ensure safe entry, and by that time opposition to integration had been so
provoked that the entire school year was rife with racial turmoil.58 In February of 1958,
the despairing school board requested of the district court that the nine students be
withdrawn and the desegregation plan postponed for at least two years. The judge agreed,
was reversed on appeal, and the case was then taken to the Supreme Court as Cooper v.

Aaron.59
Just before the start of the 1958-59 school year, members of the Court, in unison,
denied the school board's requests and ordered desegregation to take place immediately.60
Once more, there was no attempt to lay down explicit guidelines for the lower courts to
work with, and after Cooper the Court "rehibernated," not to speak again on this issue for
another five years.61 The South continued to evade significant integration through "token
compliance" tactics (most notably, the meaningless pupil placement statutes which
effectively passed the burden of integration to black families), to which the Supreme Court
acceded.62
The Court made several segregation-related rulings beginning in 1963, but the most
significant again dealt with open defiance, this time in Prince Edward County, Virginia.

56 As quoted in Wilkinson, 90.
57 Wilkinson, 90.
58 Ibid.
59 Ibid., 91.
60 Ibid., 92.
61 Ibid., 93-94.
62 Ibid., 83-85.
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The county had actually been involved in Brown as a defendant, but not until 1959 had it
finally been directed to desegregate. Rather than comply with the order, it had shut down
its public school system altogether. The county's white children did not go without
schooling, however; on the contrary, the white community mustered considerable
resources in support of the private schools which were opened. Even the county and state
governments became involved, through public tuition grants and tax credits. Meanwhile,
most black children went without formal education.63
Such was the state of affairs for the next four years, until in 1963 government
authorities at several levels intervened to provide schooling for the black children in the
area.64 The following year, the Supreme Court finally heard Griffin v. County School

Board, after which Prince Edward was rebuked for closing its public schools and funding
its private schools out of public coffers. The county was ordered to reopen nondiscriminatory public schools; its only escape from desegregation would be in maintaining
two school systems, public and private.65
Increasingly, the Court vented its frustration with Southern obstruction by
bestowing greater and greater remedial powers on district judges. The Court, through

Brown II, had given the South its chance to change. 66 Now,
Determination to do whatever was necessary began to take hold of the Court
from deep frustration. In Prince Edward, in 1964, that meant reopening
public schools. In New Kent County, in 1968, it meant promptly
converting, by whatever means, to substantially integrated schools. In
Charlotte-Mecklenburg, in 1971, it meant, among other things, massive
compulsory transportation of schoolchildren.67
In addition, reinforcements were at hand in 1964, as Congress and the President threw
their weight behind integration with the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The strength of the
63 Ibid., 98-99.
64 Ibid.
65 Ibid., 100.
66 Ibid., 101.
67 Ibid.
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Department of Justice was thereby added to that of the NAACP in pursuing desegregation
through litigation.68
Most important, the new legislation brought the Department of Health, Education,
and Welfare (HEW) into play. The Court itself had been part of the problem of
desegregation in that "its decrees, even in the mid-sixties, were couched in the negative. "69
Everyone knew what was impermissible, but the Court never specifically outlined what
steps should be taken to avoid incurring the wrath of the judiciary.70 Now, HEW
desegregation guidelines were developed so as to provide specific standards and
procedures for school integration,71 and federal fund cutoffs threatened those who did not
comply.72
As more and more avenues of retreat were closed to them, Southerners clung to a
particular form of tokenism which seemed, for a while, as though it might satisfy the
courts. "Freedom of choice" plans were adopted which allowed students and their parents
to choose the school they would attend (these were essentially equivalent to the older pupil
placement statutes). On the surface these plans seemed to give everyone, including the
aggrieved black race, control over their education. What could not always be accounted for
were the unseen forces of community pressure--from employers, from school officials, and
from the average white citizen--which drained the "freedom" from "choice" for most
blacks.73 Then, too, "the South in the mid-sixties hurried to upgrade Negro schools" in
hopes of encouraging black attendance at black schools.74 Thus, the results of such plans
were rarely impressive in terms of the amount of integration which actually took place.7 5
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When freedom of choice was finally challenged before the Court in 1968, it was
viewed by the justices as another veiled ploy to preserve segregated schools.76 In Green v.

County School Board of New Kent County the Court not only declared such plans
unconstitutional, it took the bold step of assigning to school officials "the affirmative duty
to take whatever steps might be necessary to convert to a unitary system in which racial
discrimination would be eliminated root and branch. ''77 This time, the Court did offer
specific proposals for achieving the desired goal, including pairing of schools and
geographical zoning. 78 But mere plans to desegregate would no longer suffice; a school
board found in violation of the Constitution was expected to "come forward with a plan
that. .. promises realistically to work now. ''79 The Court wanted visible results--statistics
which showed clear progress. Green therefore raised the specter of desegregation-by-thenumbers; how far would this be taken?80 What racial mix would constitute a unitary
system? To what lengths would school boards have to go to reach statistical goals?81

Green left these important questions unanswered.
After Green, however, the Supreme Court "quickly warmed to its task. "82 In

1969, the Court approved "affirmative numerical goals" to achieve faculty integration in
United States v. Montgomery County Board of Education.83 That same year, in Alexander
v. Holmes County Board of Education, the Court thwarted a three-month delay in
desegregating a number of Mississippi school districts.84 When Mississippi again delayed
massive student integration, the Court in Carter v. West Feliciana Parish School Board
76 Ibid., 116.
Green v. School Board of New Kent County, 391 U.S. 430 ( 1968), at 437-38,
emphasis added.
78 Wilkinson, 117.
7 9 Green v. County School Board, at 439.
80 Wilkinson, 116-17.
81 Ibid., 122.
82 Ibid., 118.
83 Ibid.
84 Ibid., 119.
77
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( 1970) firmly insisted on immediate compliance with Brown, despite the prospect of a
disrupted school year. Two Court members, Burger and Stewart, could not abide this
harshness and filed dissents.85 And in the last of the Southern rural desegregation cases,

Wright v. City Council of Emporia ( 1972) all four of the Nixon appointees objected when
the Court refused to allow the city of Emporia to form its own school district, separate from
the county school system. The county had recently come under court order to desegregate,
and Emporia's withdrawal would have made desegregation more difficult. Once more,
empirical racial outcomes were a central concern.86

Green and the cases which followed in its wake brought desegregation to the South
as never before--swiftly and meaningfully. A mere three years after Green, HEW
estimated that 44 percent of Southern black students were in majority-white schools87--this
compared to 2.3 percent in 1964,88 and to 28 percent in the North and West in 1971.89
With the rural South now leading the nation in integration efforts, the Court's attention was
drawn to integration problems which had been developing in urban settings.
The North and West would soon lose the comfortable immunity from Court action
which they had enjoyed so far. With Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education
(1971), the Court began to explore issues which were not uniquely Southern. The Court
was awakening to the effects of residential segregation upon urban schools, for example,
and it also recognized the usefulness of the school bus as a tool for desegregation.90
Because busing had long been used to maintain segregation, it seemed logical to some that
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it could now be employed to undo past wrongs.91 This long-lived and essential feature of
modem education was about to become the most provocative facet of desegregation yet. 92
The Swann case arose when, after the Green ruling, a federal district judge
determined that Charlotte's desegregation plan--in effect since 1965--was now an
insufficient remedy.93 Several revised proposals by the school board failed to impress the
court, so an expert was consulted and his plan adopted. The new strategy would involve
considerable busing of students to achieve substantial integration, and community reaction
was, to say the least, unfavorable.94 But the Supreme Court unanimously upheld the plan,
and went on to present a formula with which the lower courts could evaluate future
desegregation cases: lf--and only if--a constitutional violation is found, a remedy which
corresponds to the magnitude of the violation must be administered;95 or, in the Court's
own words, "the nature of the violation determines the scope of the remedy. "96 If
concerted efforts were made by school officials to achieve and maintain a dual school
system, then busing on a massive scale might well be apropos. The Court now demanded
that school officials strive for "the greatest possible degree of actual desegregation"97 in
order to "eliminate from the public schools all vestiges of state-imposed segregation. ''98
But exactly how was a constitutional violation to be discerned in the first place?
The Court could have made a sweeping statement on this point. Segregation was, after all,
the cumulative effect of a wide range of state actions involving the distribution of political
power, economic opportunity, and housing.99 Instead, the Court determined that school
91 Ibid., 135.
92 Ibid., 134.
93 Ibid., 137.
94 Ibid., 138.
95 Ibid., 139.
96 Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education, 402 U.S. 1 ( 1971), at 16.
97 Ibid., at 26.
98 Ibid., at 15.
99 Wilkinson, 140.
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desegregation "cannot embrace all the problems of racial prejudice, even when those
problems contribute to disproportionate racial concentrations in some schools. "100 In
desegregation cases the conduct of school officials was the only relevant state action to be
considered by courts; in this way crucial issues such as discrimination in housing were
swept aside. In addition, the Court stated that "the constitutional vice... was a public
policy of segregation at the time of Brown;" this provided yet another loophole for most
Northern school systems, few of which had ever had official segregatory policies.101
Then, too, the Court restricted the use of busing remedies in Swann: Bus rides were not to
interfere with classes or student health and safety; rigid racial quotas were deemed
unnecessary; some one-race schools might be tolerated in the interest of practicality; and
once desegregation was accomplished, racial ratios need not be readjusted every school
year.102
The Court's approval of incidental one-race schools merits special attention,
because an important distinction was made. The Court noted "the familiar phenomenon
that in metropolitan areas minority groups are often found concentrated in one part of the
city;" it acknowledged that such residential patterns have consequences for schools, and
that those patterns are sometimes difficult to overcome with a reasonable amount of
busing.103 There was a difference, the Court alleged, between such de facto segregation
and the de jure segregation of the South, where segregation was planned and preserved by
school officials and sanctioned by law or official policy. Schools were to be held
responsible only for rectifying the latter, and this had important implications for Northern
school systems. In Southern schools, where courts could easily point to a protracted
history of state-engendered discrimination--de jure segregation--school systems were taken
100 Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg, at 23.
10 1 Wilkinson, 145, emphasis added.
102 Ibid., 148.
103 Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg, at 25.
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to task; Northern schools, on the other hand, had a much better chance of deflecting blame
by pointing to residential patterns beyond their control. I 04
Southern patience was tested by the differential treatment of the North and South;
the Court was criticized by many a Southern congressman for creating a judicial double
standard on the issue of segregation.105 With Keyes v. School District No. 1 (1973) came
the first segregation case involving a North/Western city, and the Court's first chance to
strive for equitable treatment of segregation cases. 106 Denver, Colorado had been a
relatively progressive community in terms of race relations until its initially small black
population grew and expanded into a previously white section of town. As the area became
less and less white, moderate but ultimately inadequate steps were taken to integrate the
local schools. When blacks pushed for more radical measures, which ultimately called for
busing, the white community balked, racial tensions mounted, and blacks sought redress in
the courts. I 07
The Supreme Court found, as had the lower courts, that Denver authorities were
guilty of using numerous subtle tactics to restrict integration: strategic school construction,
gerrymandered or "optional" attendance zones, and "feeder" patterns (where one-race
elementary schools feed one-race junior high schools, which similarly feed the high
schools).108 Denver attempted to minimize its transgressions: Only the one neighborhood
had been substantially affected, it claimed. The Court was not convinced.109 When
intentional segregation is found in a significant part of a district, nothing less than a districtwide remedy will do, because "racially inspired school board actions have an impact
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beyond the particular schools that are the subject of those actions. "110 The Court shifted
the burden of proof to the school board in such cases; school officials would have to prove
that segregation elsewhere in the system was not the result of intentional actions.111 The
Denver case was remanded to the district court, where a comprehensive busing plan was
eventually ordered into effect.112
The Keyes case made it easier for aggrieved blacks to prod the courts to order
busing, for now they were not required to prove that discrimination was present in each
and every school of a district. Still, plaintiffs in Northern districts bore a heavier burden of
proof than those in the South. The guilt of Southern defendants was easily proven by
pointing to official segregation policies, but Northern black plaintiffs were still required to
sift through mountains of school records just to prove intentional segregation in one part of
a district.113 The tedium and expense were "enough to discourage many potential black
plaintiffs from going to court at all."114 Go to court they did, though, and busing for
purposes of integration became more and more commonplace in the North. Denver
experienced a relatively untroubled transition period, but other Northern cities suffered
considerable opposition and unrest over busing.115
For well over a decade after Brown, the Court had chosen to remain in the
background, stepping forward only when its authority was blatantly defied. When the
Court did reclaim its leadership role, its forceful decisions were not accompanied by the
sort of practical guidance which could have set desegregation on a clear and even course.
The Court had also held the South to a higher standard of compliance with Brown than the
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rest of the nation. Now it remained to be seen just how far the Court would push the issue
of busing. Would it demand that the North confront its own racist traditions? Or would it
capitulate to the North's squirming and fretting as desegregation was finally brought home?
The case of Milliken v. Bradley would put the Court's fortitude to the test.
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III
MILUKEN COMES UP THROUGH THE RANKS

Zeitgeist: 1974
The year 1974 marked the anniversary of more than one civil rights achievement:

Brown was now twenty years old, and a decade had passed since the sweeping Civil
Rights Act of 1964. What had these measures actually accomplished, and what must be
done in 1974 to sustain black progress? The year certainly could not be described as a
stellar one for the United States as a nation. In many areas of American life, disintegration
and disenchantment seemed to abound: unstable families, a stalled economy, political
shame, a lost war. Where was the country headed, and how would civil rights fare under
such conditions?
The social fabric of America was of a much different pattern than a mere decade
before. Birth rates were generally reduced, 1 while illegitimacy was more and more
commonplace;2 marriages were down, and divorce was a growing trend.3 Women were
entering the work force4 and had taken control of their reproductivity as never before.5
Populations movements had culminated in a shift from the city-country distinction to a new
city-suburb distinction; the most dramatic change had taken place among blacks, who
migrated in large numbers from the rural South to the urban North. Between 1950 and
1980, the thirty-three largest metropolitan areas·saw their black populations increase by a
total of five million people. 6 Americans were beginning to take notice of a developing
1

William H. Chafe, The Unfinished Journey (New York: Oxford University
Press, 1991), 436.
2 Ibid., 441.
3 Ibid., 436.
4 Ibid., 434-35.
5 Ibid., 436.
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"inner-city underclass," and they did not like what they saw. 7 All of these social trends
had a disproportionate effect on minority families, whose stability and capacity to earn
income, while improving, still lagged behind whites considerably.s President Nixon's
"benign neglect" of these groups did not help matters.9
The economic picture in 1974 left much to be desired. Inflation had been a problem
from the beginning of the decade and was showing no signs of abating. Io The winter of

1973-74 had been especially difficult as Americans were hit hard by an "energy crisis. "11
Inflation and unemployment together were a rare phenomenon, but in 1974 the latter begin
to rise along with the former.12 White males were feeling the pressure in new ways: Since
it was now often necessary for their wives to supplement the family income, they were
competing against an influx of women into the job market. "Affirmative action" also
worked against them, though such measures were a great help to black families. Despite
the new opportunities for blacks and women, both groups struggled with the disparity
between their own wages and those of their white male counterparts.13 Finally, the
changing job market now featured fewer blue-collar jobs, which translated into diminished
security for working-class families.14 It seemed that very few people had reason to be
optimistic.
The political scene was probably the grimmest that most people could remember.
After four years of "Vietnamization"--Nixon's plan to transfer military responsibility to
South Vietnam15--the war there had ended only months ago, and the nation was still
Ibid., 176.
Chafe, 441-42.
9 J. Harvie Wilkinson, From Brown to Bakke: The Supreme Court and School
Integration: 1954-1978 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1979), 238.
1o Chafe, 446.
11 Ibid., 447.
12 Ibid., 447-48.
13 Ibid., 437-38.
14 Ibid., 448.
15 Ibid., 389.
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recovering from its first major military and foreign policy defeat in a long, long time.16
Deeper disillusionment would develop from within as Americans learned that their own
leader was not what he had seemed: 1974 saw, for the first time in American history, a
president forced to resign in disgrace. I 7
In some ways the country had become more conservati ve.1 s Nixon's "silent
majority"--mostly white, middle-class, middle-aged Protestants--were reacting to the
liberalism of the 196Os.19 Civil rights groups could take comfort that the Democraticallycontrolled Congress was pro-civil rights, but Nixon had been at best neglectful of the issue
and at worst a regressive force. A case in point was his appointment of four conservative
justices to the Supreme Court between 1969 and 1972.
The first change Nixon made to the Court was especially significant because he
named Warren Earl Burger as chief justice of the United States, following Earl Warren's
retirement in June of 1969. A Northerner, Burger had practiced law extensively before
serving in the Eisenhower administration as Assistant Attorney General. He had a
generally conservative record on the U.S. Court of Appeals, filing frequent dissents in
response to liberal decisions made by his colleagues. But he was considered a moderate on
the issue of civil rights; both integrationists and anti-integrationists were satisfied with his
nomination. Burger was quickly confirmed by the Senate and took his seat in June
1969.20
Nixon had not had as easy a time with the next Supreme Court appointment,
necessitated by Abe Fortas's resignation in the spring of 1969 amid charges of "financial

16 Ibid., 401.
17 Ibid., 427.
1s Ibid., 376-77.
19 Ibid., 837.
20 George R. Metcalf, From Little Rock to Boston: The History of School
Desegregation, Contributions to the Study of Education Series, No. 8 (Westport, Conn.:
Greenwood Press, 1983), 61.

43

improprieties. ''21 After two controversial attempts at nominating a Southern conservative
to fill the seat, Nixon had finally chosen a scholarly Northern judge from the Eighth
Circuit, Harry Andrew Blackmun.22 In keeping with his reputation as a man who "did not
seem destined for controversy,''23 Blackmun did not generate resistance in the Senate and
went to work in May of 1970 after being unanimously confirmed.24 Blackmun was a close
friend of the Chief Justice, and proved to be a moderate with conservative tendencies.25
In the fall of 1971, the Court again required the attention of the President when
Justice Black--only weeks away from death--left his position, and Justice Harlan was
forced to retire due to terminal cancer.26 Nixon's final two appointees, then, went through
the confirmation process together, though not with comparable ease. After considering
several candidates who provoked strong negative reactions, Nixon submitted the names of
Lewis Franklin Powell, Jr. and William Hubbs Rehnquist.27 Neither had served in any
judicial capacity. Powell, a distinguished Virginia lawyer, described himself as an
"independent Democrat. ''28 His position on various issues was sometimes difficult to
predict;29 for example, his "conservative instincts" did not deter him from taking a stand
against Southern resistance to integration.30 Rehnquist, on the other hand, was more of a
judicial activist than Powell, and held decidedly conservative views.31 He was serving as
Assistant Attorney General at the time of his nomination,32 and had shown great loyalty to

21 Ibid., 170.
22 Ibid., 170-71.
23 Ibid., 171.
24 Ibid., 172.
25 Ibid., 171.
26 Ibid., 170.
27 Ibid., 173.
28 As quoted in Metcalf, 174.
29 Metcalf, 175.
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31 Ibid., 175-76.
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the Nixon White House.33 The highly respected Powell was easily confirmed, but
Rehnquist, despite an attempt to "backpedal" from his anti-civil rights views, was fought
by liberals in the Senate.34 In the end, however, he took his place on the Court in January
of 1972, as did Powell.35
The justices appointed by previous presidents were more "liberal" than those
chosen by Nixon. Still, with the Nixon appointees the balance of the Court in 1974 tilted
toward the conservative side. Franklin Roosevelt had placed the liberal William Orville
Douglas on the Court in 1939; he could certainly be expected to support the civil rights
agenda.36 So could Eisenhower's 1956 choice, William Joseph Brennan, Jr., also a liberal
constructionist.37 But Eisenhower's 1958 appointee was less predictable: Potter Stewart
had cast enough conservative votes to keep civil rights leaders guessing.38 And Kennedy
appointee Byron Raymond White, on the Court since 1962, had demonstrated a more
conservative inclination than was anticipated.39 Finally, there was Thurgood Marshall,
brought to the Court in 1967 by Johnson as a staunch defender of civil rights.40 He, of
course, would be most troubled by the tum of events in Milliken.
By 1974 observers noted the significant ideological shift which was taking place on
the Court. The New York Times reported that during the 1973-74 term the Nixon four had
voted together on 103 occasions--75 percent of the time--and in all but one of these cases
they had "formed the nucleus of a majority. "41 Justice Powell apparently strayed from the
other three most often, while Potter Stewart and Byron White--the "swing" voters--were
33 Ibid., 176.
34 Ibid., 177-78.
35 Ibid., 178.
36 Kermit L. Hall, ed., The Oxford Companion to The Supreme Court of the
United States (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992), 234.
37 Ibid., 87.
38 Ibid., 837.
39 Ibid., 927.
40 Ibid., 527.
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most likely to join the conservative bloc.42 Meanwhile, the Court's "Democrats,"
including White, were voting together only 43 percent of the time; excluding White, the
three solid liberals stuck together 74 percent of the time. 43
The changes in the Court had practical consequences for desegregation, as
unanimity on the issue gradually broke down.44 In the 1970 Carter case Burger and
Stewart had dissented; in 1972 Nixon's men went their own way in a five-to-four vote in
Wright;45 and a year before the Milliken decision, the Court split four-to-four (with Justice

Powell disqualifying himself from participation) over metropolitan desegregation in
Richmond, Virginia. The turmoil on the Court matched that in the nation as a whole, for
by 1974 the controversy had reached the boiling point among voters. Nine Supreme Court
justices would finally be asked to resolve the struggle between the clashing interests of
America's urban-dwellers.

Detroit: City Divided
In 1978 Elwood Hain, a co-chairman of the Metropolitan Coalition for Peaceful
Integration at the time of Milliken, described Detroit as "a city much maligned by public
opinion, local and national. It is known as a dirty factory town, the scene of bitter strikes
and race riots. "46 Detroit certainly had its share of racial problems, which erupted in
deadly riots twice within a twenty-five year period. In 1943, thirty-four people were killed
when racial tensions exploded into "open warfare between the Detroit Negroes and the

42 Ibid.
43 Ibid.
44 See generally New York Times, July 28, 1974, Section IV, p. 3.
45 See Part II of this paper for details of these two cases.
46 Howard I. Kalodner and James J. Fishman, eds., Limits of Justice: The Courts'
Role in School Desegregation (Cambridge, Mass.: Ballinger Publishing Co., 1978), 223.
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DetroitPoliceDepartment."47 In July of 1967 the violence was even worse: Forty-three
people perished and the city sustained fifty million dollars in property damage. 48
The strains of industrialization--rapid expansion, demographic instability, urban
hazards--were an underlying factor: Thanks to the automotive industry the city had
undergone enormous growth since the turn of the century. By 1960 its burgeoning
suburbs surpassed the city itself in population, and the metropolitan area stretched out over
Wayne, Oakland, and Macomb counties. When World War I placed greater demands on
heavy industry, Southern blacks migrated northward to fill jobs. Still, the small black
community had grown to only four percent of the population by 1920.49 By 1950,
however, blacks accounted for 16 percent of the city population, and by 1970 the figure
was 44 percent. 50 This dramatic change reflected not only the substantial post-World War
II in-migration of blacks, but also the simultaneous out-migration of whites; in fact, whites
left the city at a significantly faster rate than blacks moved in. Since migration for both
races was greatest among families with young children, changes in the racial composition
of Detroit's student population were even more striking.51
Over decades, the black population was "channeled" into "an expanding core area"
of the city, with white neighborhoods receding to the outermost parts of town.52 In 1970,
"indexes of dissimilarity" showed residential segregation to be quite extensive in Detroit
proper, and even more so in the suburbs: 97,000 blacks comprised only four percent of
the suburban population, and they remained strictly segregated from white populations.53
The residential segregation of the metropolitan area was reflected in its schools--again, even
47 As quoted in Metcalf, 157.
48 Ibid.
49 Kalodner, 224.
50 Reynolds Farley, "Population Trends and School Segregation in the Detroit
MetropolitanArea,"WayneLaw Review 21 (March 1975): 870.
51 Kalodner, 225.
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more so in the suburbs than in Detroit. In 1970, the Detroit School District (the boundaries
of which are coterminous with the city limits) was 63.6 percent black, with most of its
students attending racially identifiable schools.54 Suburban schools, meanwhile, generally
served student bodies which were 98 percent or more white.55
The Detroit School Board did not pursue a uniform policy of segregation: It was
sometimes guilty of active segregation, sometimes of segregation by default, and
sometimes it was quite progressive in its policies--depending upon the inclination of its
members and school administrators. In several instances the board took strong measures
against personnel found guilty of discrimination. It also took aggressive steps to screen
textbooks for "human-relations sensitivity. "56 Between 1957 and 1966 study commissions
were established, the recommendations of which eventually led to nondiscriminatory
placement of teachers.57 When a liberal board majority took office in 1965, they replaced
the school superintendent with pro-integrationist Norman Drachler.58 Affirmative steps
were then taken to integrate faculties, recruit black teachers, and promote black
administrators.59 In addition, pupil assignments, open enrollment guidelines, and busing
policies were revised to promote student integration.60
Unfortunately, "these policies of the board were not always implemented as
written. "61 Elwood Hain explains that "most of the citizenry, including school officials,
... operated on the assumption that the racial separation of pupils was a fortuitous result of
residential segregation. "62 People did not easily recognize the discriminatory effects of
54 Ibid., 226.
55 Brief for Respondents, Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717 ( 1974), at 4.
56 Kalodner, 227.
57 Ibid., 228.
58 Jbid., 229-30.
59 Ibid., 229.
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their actions and inactions, and therefore saw no reason to change their behavior. Perhaps
it was the checkered history of the school district's efforts which frustrated blacks the
most. In any event, by 1968 blacks had grown impatient and sought to transform, by one
means or another, a school system which was now majority-black.63

Choosing Up Sides
After the 1967 race riots in Detroit, a number of local civil rights activists--black
and white--abandoned the goal of integration and began demanding black control of
Detroit's segregated black schools.64 In 1969, the Michigan legislature responded by
passing Act 244, which decentralized the Detroit system so as to assure greater local
control. Blacks would have greater influence over their neighborhood schools, and for the
most part whites would only exercise power over the predominantly white schools.65 The
legislature favored this course of action over a proposal by Detroit's school board president
to decentralize the entire metropolitan area and integrate Detroit with its suburbs. In fact,
the new legislation pointedly reaffirmed the city limits as the boundary for the Detroit
district. 66
Thus the heavily black Detroit school system was left to itself. Toward the end of
the 1969-70 school year, as the Detroit Board of Education moved to implement
decentralization, they also drafted a small-scale integration plan as a first step toward
"maximizing the limited potential for desegregation within the city. "67 The plan involved
changing attendance zones for some 12 of the city's 21 high schools, with a relatively small
number of students actually affected (less than three percent of Detroit's total student
63 Ibid., 229-230.
64 Paul R. Dimond, Beyond Busing: Inside the Challenge to Urban Segregation
(Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 1985), 26.
65 Kalodner, 231.
66 Dimond, 27.
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population).68 The plan also proposed, "for the first time in the history of the system," the
assignment of white students to black schools.69 The new arrangement was to take effect
in the fall semester of 1970. 70
Prior to the board's next regular meeting, one of the board members who opposed
the plan provided his copy to the press. He then led a rally of angry whites on the day of
the board meeting.11 Still, the plan was approved by the board and became known as the
April 7, 1970 Plan.72 White citizens groups demanded intervention from the state
legislature and moved to recall those board members who voted for the plan.73 Within two
days the Michigan House, responding "with unusual dispatch," mandated that students be
assigned to the neighborhood schools closest to them.74 The Senate, for its part, voted to
repeal the entire decentralization program. In order to avoid jeopardizing both
decentralization and integration, black and white liberal legislators sought a compromise.75
Two months later, on July 9, 1970, the legislature passed Public Act 48, which fully
neutralized the desegregation effort: The legislation reorganized the Detroit School District,
establishing racially distinct sub-districts; specifically nullified the April 7, 1970 Plan; and
imposed segregatory "free choice" and "neighborhood" student assignment programs.76
Both the local branch of the NAACP and Detroit's progressive school
superintendent were affronted by the tum of events, and sought help from Nathaniel Jones,
general counsel for the NAACP's national organization. Superintendent Norman Drachler
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sent school board attorney George Bushnell to meet with NAACP officials in secret.77 The
school administration wished to challenge Act 48 so as to push forward with the original
integration plan, but the NAACP leaned toward bringing suit against the school board as
well in order "to insure actual desegregation. ''78 Initially the board and the NAACP
cooperated in preparations to file suit against the State: District staff provided information
to Association lawyers and identified students and their parents as potential plaintiffs.79
But in the mean time the recall process continued, despite the neutralization of the April 7
Plan by Act 48. On August 4, in a special election sharply divided along racial lines, antibusing citizens pulled off "the first successful recall campaign in the 128-year history of the
school district. "80 Since the board no longer had a majority in favor of integration, the
NAACP decided to list it as a defendant.81 Upon learning of this, school board attorney
Bushnell resigned his position on the Board of Directors of the Detroit NAACP.82
Bushnell, himself an activist, had apparently become so involved in the board's
progressive efforts that he was "emotionally involved in any judgment passed on it. "83
On August 18 the local branch of the NAACP, along with a number of students and
parents, and on behalf of all students and their parents in the Detroit School District,84 filed
a motion for a preliminary injunction to prevent enforcement of Act 48 so that integration
could take place as planned.85 In addition to challenging the constitutionality of the statute,
plaintiffs also claimed that the Detroit Public School System was racially segregated, in
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both the student body and faculty,86 due to official policies, actions, and inactions of the
state's governor, attorney general, board of education, and superintendent, as well as
Detroit's board of education and former superintendent.87 The complaint filed by plaintiffs
asked for immediate implementation of the April 7 Plan and for the eventual elimination of
racially identifiable schools, but made no mention of relief beyond district boundaries.
"Given the extreme difficulty of the case under existing law," states Paul Dimond, "there
was little inclination among the NAACP legal staff to include a plea for city-suburban
integration at the outset. ''88 At this point in time, the Supreme Court had not yet made its
Swann ruling applying the principles of Green to urban school systems.89
The attorneys for plaintiffs went immediately to the District Court to request prompt
implementation of the April 7 Plan pending a hearing. They found themselves before
Judge Stephen Roth, a Hungarian immigrant who had worked his way through law school
and the Michigan political scene to serve as state attorney general and then state trial judge.
Appointed to the federal bench by President Kennedy, he had a reputation as "a hardworking but conservative jurist who demonstrated little sympathy for minority
grievances. ''9o Roth turned the attorneys away without the requested injunction and
scheduled a preliminary hearing for August 27.91 Because the plaintiffs did not present
substantial evidence of a dual school system at that hearing, an openly hostile Judge Roth
again refused, on September 3, to grant an injunction. After dismissing the governor and
attorney general as defendants, he scheduled a trial on the merits of the case for November
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12.92 That same day (September 3), a group of white Detroit homeowners were granted
intervention as defendants.93
The plaintiffs, meanwhile, decided to appeal the District Court's decisions. On
September 8, 1970, school began in Detroit, with no remedy in place for its black
schoolchildren.94 That day the Court of Appeals held an emergency hearing, expedited the
appeal process, and subsequently heard arguments on October 2.95 On October 13 a threejudge panel again denied injunctive relief, but did rule that the State, via the legislature, had
unconstitutionally interfered with a legitimate desegregation plan.96 The governor and
attorney general were reinstated as defendants,97 and the matter was remanded to the
District Court for an expedited trial on the merits of the case.98
In a November 4 hearing back in District Court, the plaintiffs sought execution of
the April 7 Plan beginning the second semester of the academic year. Judge Roth
postponed the upcoming trial and on November 6 ordered the Detroit Board to submit a
high school plan along the lines of the April 7 Plan.99 However, a board-sponsored public
hearing to consider various plans was interrupted by white protesters who continued to
oppose the assignment of white children to black schools.100 Behind closed doors, the
school board drafted two alternative plans for integration--"The Campbell Plan" and "The
MacDonald Plan"--and presented those to the court for review.101 On December3 the
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MacDonald "Magnet" Plan (a more extensive plan where academic excellence would attract
students to schools) was approved by the District Court.102
The plaintiffs were dissatisfied, however, because several similar programs had
already failed to achieve integration in the past. I 03 There were also more delays: The
"Magnet" Plan would not be implemented until the fall of 1971, and the trial was postponed
indefinitely.104 The plaintiffs appealed once again. Though the Court of Appeals refused
to consider the matter of the "Magnet" Plan, it did remand the case to the District Court for

immediate trial concerning the charges of de jure segregation which had been leveled by the
plaintiffs.105

The District Court Trial
Suing the fifth largest school district in the nation required "unprecedented effort"
on the part of the NAACP.106 In the process of preparing their case, plaintiffs' lawyers
found Detroit to be "a community long divided along racial lines. "I 07 Paul Dimond reveals
that their strategy was to present evidence of widespread housing discrimination coupled
with purposeful segregatory actions by school officials:

If we could show that the housing segregation resulted from racial
discrimination and was part of a community custom of racial caste, then we
might be able to move any judge to see that school authorities should not get
off scot-free by arguing that they only incorporated residential segregation
through an allegedly neutral system of neighborhood pupil assignments. It
would not take much proof of school board manipulation designed to take
advantage of, or to exacerbate, such housing segregation to show that
school authorities were willing partners--not neutral observers--in the
process of segregation. I 08
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Despite evidence that segregation was not limited to Detroit, the NAACP legal team lacked
the resources to tackle metropolitan integration. Dimond explains that, at the time, a case
developing in Richmond, Virginia showed greater promise for successfully breaching
district lines and, "if successful, might eventually provide the legal building block
necessary to raise the issue at a subsequent stage in the Detroit case. "109
The trial began on April 6 and went through July 22 of 1971. With boldly colored
maps and overlays the plaintiffs demonstrated the extensive residential segregation of
Detroit and the manner in which school boundaries "neatly coincided" with uniracial
neighborhoods over time.11 o Numerous Michigan Supreme Court cases were introduced
showing that restrictive covenants were enforced throughout the Detroit area until the

Shelley v. Kramer ( 1948) case precluded state complicity.111 Witness after witness
testified to the development and perpetuation of black "containment" through various
mechanisms, including
rock-throwing mob action; real tor and neighborhood association "point
systems," "codes of ethics," and discriminatory marketing of homes and
apartments to exclude "undesirables," particularly blacks; FHA promotion
of racial restrictions and whites-only housing; racially dual public housing
with black projects in designated black tracts and white projects in
neighborhoods reserved for whites.112
Experts also explained that higher incomes rarely propelled blacks over the color line, nor
did segregation of other ethnic groups compare to that of blacks.113 The most moving
testimony came from a seasoned black realtor who described his harrowing experience with
the entrenched system of housing discrimination.114
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By the time plaintiffs wrapped up the housing discrimination portion of their case,
several extraordinary developments had transformed the atmosphere of the trial. First, the
possibility of metropolitan relief arose when, during the cross-examination of a witness,
Alex Ritchie (attorney for the white anti-busing group) suggested that desegregation in
Detroit would be "an exercise in futility. "115 Judge Roth initially shied away from the
subject of area-wide desegregation.116 Over time, however, Judge Roth appeared to be
deeply affected by the evidence he confronted, particularly the testimony of the black
realtor. That testimony also rattled Alex Ritchie, who experienced such a dramatic
"conversion" that he announced that he would push for cross-district relief of
segregation.I 17 Finally, on April 20, in the midst of the plaintiffs' case, the favorable

Swann decision came down, bringing hope to the plaintiffs that their case would be viewed
with more sympathy by the courts.118
The plaintiffs concluded with evidence and witnesses attesting to actions and
inactions by the Detroit Board and the State which incorporated housing patterns to produce
one-race schools.I 19 Plaintiffs contended that, in spite of recent efforts by a liberal board,
past segregation had not been remedied; generally speaking, the board had continued to
capitulate to community pressure for segregation. 120 The plaintiffs still proceeded with
great caution where metropolitan relief was concerned, for fear that haste would jeopardize
success in the higher courts.121
When the plaintiffs rested their case, the State defendants (including the state's
governor, attorney general, board of education, and superintendent) announced that they
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did not intend to present a defense, and asked to be dismissed. Apparently offended at the
State's default, Judge Roth refused to dismiss them from the case; still, the State did not
participate in the remainder of the trial. On June 25, by way of messenger, Roth warned
the State defendants that they should be prepared for the possibility of a metropolitan-wide
remedy, as he was now skeptical that Detroit could desegregate on its own.122
George Bushnell--a man tom between his own liberal beliefs and his duty to defend
the Detroit Board123--attempted to spotlight the board's recent progressive policies,
particularly in the area of faculty integration.124 But he also added to the case against the
State by providing evidence that the State had discriminated against the Detroit School
District through various funding policies.125 Moreover, the defendant board's own
education expert testified in favor of area-wide integration.126
On July 16, Alex Ritchie (counsel for the white Detroit homeowners group) moved
to join as defendants all other school districts in the tri-county area; Ritchie also submitted
his own findings as to the lily-white complexion of the suburbs. The anxious plaintiffs'
attorneys backed away from this, arguing to delay consideration of the motion until
desegregation plans had been evaluated.127 Roth agreed, and took Ritchie's request under
advisement.128 The trial ended on July 22.
On September 27, the court announced that it had found both government and
private institutions to be involved--actively or passively or both--in the creation and
maintenance of residential segregation in the Detroit area; this, combined with significant
discriminatory conduct on the part of state and local school officials, had resulted in a
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thoroughly segregated school system.129 Specifically, the court determined that attendance
zones had been drawn from north to south, rather than east to west, in order to minimize
racial mixing.Bo Attendance lines were gerrymandered or optional attendance zones
established strategically so as to frustrate integration.131 The optional zones occurred in
neighborhoods in the midst of racial transition, for example, or between schools of
opposite racial character, giving white students the "out" they so often sought.132
School construction decisions, too, almost always resulted in schools being built in
one-race neighborhoods so as to achieve one-race schools. The district's busing program
had been used to the same effect: Buses carrying black students bypass~ white schools
with plenty of space in favor of predominantly black schools. White students, on the other
hand, were rarely bused to black schools. And while many white suburban districts had
enjoyed full state funding for school transportation, inner-city schools were not provided
for during the same time frame. In addition to the Act 48 and state funding issues, all of
the actions, or inactions, of Detroit school officials were deemed to be extensions of state
action.133 The complicity of the State in segregating Detroit brought the full weight of the
Constitution to bear upon the State defendants, and might indeed justify a court order
demanding that the State now use its power to desegregate across district lines.134
Due to relatively sparse media coverage of the trial, Judge Roth's ruling was a
shock to the Detroit community. At an October 4 conference the courtroom was filled to
overflowing with interested parties and members of the media.135 The Detroit Board was
ordered to submit a plan to desegregate within the city limits, while the remaining State
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defendants were asked to plan desegregation for the entire metropolitan area. 136 Roth
again shelved the matter of joining suburban districts until a more appropriate time. When
that meeting ended, organized opposition began: rallies, petitions, bumper stickers,
scathing editorials. Most significant was the sudden conversion of many politicians to the
anti-busing ranks. Michigan's Republican senator, Robert Griffin, went so far as to
introduce a constitutional amendment banning forced busing.137
While the ordered desegregation plans were under construction, various other
developments took place: After the segregation ruling was issued, a local newspaper
revealed that school board representatives, including the board attorney, had approached
the NAACP before the case started. Tensions mounted between George Bushnell and the
new, conservative board.138 When in November the board decided to appoint co-counsel-an apparent "vote of no confidence in Bushnell "--the long-time board attorney resigned.139
Also, in January of 1972, Richmond was ordered to desegregate with two adjacent county
school systems, and plaintiffs monitored the case expectantly as it made its way to the
Fourth Circuit. Meanwhile, an attempt by the Milliken defendants to appeal Roth's
segregation ruling and planning orders was unsuccessful: On February 23, 1972, the Sixth
Circuit deemed them unappealable.140
All of the requested desegregation plans had been submitted by the first week of
February, 1972.141 The plaintiffs, unsatisfied with the two Detroit-only plans submitted
by the school board, drew up their own proposal for desegregation of the district.142 They
also submitted a multi-district plan, as did Alex Ritchie and the Detroit Board.143 As multi13 6 Brief for Petitioners, at 14.
137 Dimond, 75-76.
138 Kalodner, 252.
139 Ibid., 253.
140 Dimond, 77.
141 Brief for Petitioners, at 14.
142 Dimond, 76.
143 Ibid., 77.
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district relief became a real possibility, many suburban school districts were increasingly
anxious to be party to the proceedings.144 Some districts could not afford to do so; some,
on the other hand, abstained precisely because they could later claim that they were not
properly represented in the proceedings.145 In the end forty-three districts sought
intervention,146 On March 14, 1972, hearings began for the Detroit-only plans, and the
next day the court granted the motions for intervention. As new defendants, the suburban
school districts would only be allowed to participate in the proceedings with regard to
remedy, and only as advisors to the court. They would have one week to submit legal
arguments on the matter of multi-district relief.147
On March 24, two days after briefs were submitted, the court made its ruling with
regard to the propriety of a multi-district plan: It rejected the intervening districts' argument
that such a plan would not be justifiable unless all districts were shown to have acted in
violation of the Constitution; nor did it accept the State's claim of blamelessness.148
Meanwhile, hearings for the Detroit-only plans had taken place (which the suburban
intervenors failed to attend).149 The two "free transfer" plans submitted by Detroit school
officials had little potential for success; they were nothing more than variations on the
MacDonald "Magnet" Plan which was put into effect in the fall of 1971, and which had
actually worsened the segregation problem.150 The Detroit School Board urged that, due
to the probable exodus of whites, real integration would call for a plan reaching beyond
district boundaries.151
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Lawyers for the plaintiffs, on the other hand, argued for immediate Detroit-only
desegregation: "City-only relief, although inadequate, was far better than leaving the
existing school segregation in place for years while waiting for metropolitan relief. "152 On
March 28, the court determined that the most promising of the three intra-city plans--a pupil
reassignment plan submitted by plaintiffs--was still unsatisfactory because it would likely
produce a "white flight" reaction by creating a greater number of predominantly black
schools. The sanctity of school district lines, the court contended, did not outweigh
constitutional rights: It would be necessary to seek a solution outside the city limits.153
The next couple of weeks were spent in hearings to evaluate metropolitan-wide
plans. The suburban districts refused to offer suggestions for achieving successful areawide integration; rather, their attorney simply argued that because violations had been
found only in Detroit proper, any remedy must be contained within the city limits.154 The
State defendants, for their part, had failed to submit a practical plan for metropolitan
desegregation. Rather, the six "plans" which were presented amounted to piecemeal
discussions of alternative concepts, methods, and administrative structures. Thereafter, the
State continued to resist assisting the court in its remedial efforts. Because there was no
substantial desegregation plan to work with, these initial hearings were largely spent
haggling over the new desegregation area and outlining procedures for future planning.155
In mid-June of 1972 the court issued a ruling which "adopted the plaintiffs'
proposed perimeter, the most conservative proposal that would effectively eliminate racially
identifiable schools. "156 Fifty-three of the original 85 outlying districts were to be included
in plans for integration, producing a desegregation area with a student population that was
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25 percent black.157 A panel was appointed and directed to design a plan that would result

in maximum integration by pairing portions of the city with districts in the suburbs. The
goal would be schools, grades, and classrooms which reflected the racial composition of
the entire student population.158 Although there had not been findings of discrimination
with regard to faculty placement, the court also ordered that each school's faculty be at least
ten percent black.159 Finally, Roth required that the State begin making practical
arrangements for short- and long-term desegregation.160
During the remedy hearings "the politics of desegregation had reached a boil. "161
On March 14, anti-busing presidential candidate George Wallace won a "smashing victory"
in the Florida Democratic primary--a race in which the busing issue was key. 162 The
political implications of Wallace's triumph were not lost upon President Nixon; in a
televised speech just two days later, Nixon expressly equated busing with racial balance
and called for a congressional moratorium to restrain the courts.163 That June, Congress
passed the Broomfield Amendment to thwart implementation offederal busing orders until
all litigation was complete.164 Some members of the Detroit community also continued to
react belligerently, but others--including religious, civic, and labor groups in the city and
suburbs--moved to embrace Roth's efforts by forming the biracial Metropolitan Coalition
for Peaceful lntegration,165
On July 11, 1972, Judge Roth acted on the recommendations of the appointed
panel: The State defendants were ordered to shoulder the cost of acquiring nearly 300
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school buses with which to carry out an interim metropolitan-wide transportation program
for the 1972-73 school year.166 When the defendants indicated that the necessary funds
would not be released, the District Court responded by joining the State Treasurer as a
defendant to the proceedings.167 With the State defendants continuing to dig in their heels,
it looked as though another school year would be lost to litigation.

The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals
The defendants made a predictable appeal to the Sixth Circuit. Pending appeal, the
order requiring purchase of buses was stayed, as were all further proceedings save for
planning by the panel.168 The plaintiffs would have to face another conservative court: In
a 1969 case, Dealv. Cincinnati Board ofEducation, the Sixth Circuit had determined that
neighborhood schools provided free choice because parents could choose schools through
their choice of residence; at the same time, proof of housing discrimination had been
deemed irrelevant and was disallowed.169 In plotting their strategy, therefore, the plaintiffs
decided to downplay their housing discrimination evidence in order to "avoid a direct
confrontation with Deal. "170
The State, for its part, attempted to refute Roth's findings of state complicity. The
new attorney for the Detroit School Board, George Roumell, did not strive to challenge the
segregation findings but instead argued that the suburban districts were as culpable as the
Detroit district. Paul Dimond comments that "[Roumell's] strategy was clear: if you must
affirm the constitutional violation, then give us a metropolitan remedy. "171 Finally, the
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suburban defendants complained that they had not been "given their day in court," and
again argued that the scope of the remedy must be limited by the actual findings. I 72
While Detroit awaited yet another court decision, President Nixon was reelected on
November 4, 1972. That same day, Judge Stephen Roth suffered a major heart attack.I 73
In December, while he was still recuperating, the three-judge panel of the Sixth Circuit
unanimously affirmed Roth's segregation findings as well as his judgment that inter-district
relief was required. Some of Roth's minor rulings, including his determination of the
desegregation area, were vacated in the interest of allowing the state legislature to correct
the situation voluntarily. The court also directed Roth to accord a full hearing to all affected
suburbs.174
The decision was heartening for the plaintiffs, but they also watched with
trepidation as Richmond's multi-district desegregation order went before the Supreme
Court. In that case, metropolitan relief had been rejected by the Fourth Circuit on the
grounds that local school districts were autonomous and the Tenth Amendment prevented
federal courts from restructuring a state's school system. Meanwhile, on January 16,
1973, the Sixth Circuit agreed to an en bane (full court) review of the panel's decision in
the Detroit case.175 While awaiting that verdict, plaintiffs were disappointed to learn that
the Supreme Court had split four to four over the Richmond case (Justice Powell had
excluded himself from participation). A tie vote meant that the Fourth Circuit's ruling
would stand, and that neither an opinion nor the justices' votes would be made public. The
plaintiffs speculated that "one of the five remaining members of the Warren court, probably
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Justice Stewart or Justice White, had joined the Nixon appointees in rejecting cross-district
relief. "176
Despite this ominous development, on June 12, 1973, the en bane Court of Appeals
affirmed, by a six to three vote, the District Court's finding of constitutional violations on
the part of both the Detroit Board of Education and the State. It agreed that those violations
were a direct cause of segregation both in Detroit and between Detroit and the suburbs, and
that other metropolitan districts could and should be involved in order to rectify the
situation effectively.177 On procedural grounds the court vacated the planning and
desegregation area ruling, declining to comment on the substance of those arrangements.
The court-appointed panel would still be allowed to continue its planning activities, but all
affected districts would have to be made party to the case on remand.! 78 Lastly, the court
vacated the order regarding the purchase or lease of buses, leaving open the option of
reissuing the order at a later date.179 Significantly, the court declined to consider any proof
of housing discrimination, and expressly refused to base any part of its decision upon that
evidence.180
In accordance with the court's instructions, the plaintiffs on August 6 moved for
joinder of all tri-county school districts not already involved in the suit; this was so ordered
by the District Court one month later. On September 4, 1973, plaintiffs also amended their
original complaint "to conform to evidence. "181 The complaint now alleged segregation
both within Detroit and between Detroit and its suburbs, and sought nothing less than interdistrict relief.182
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IV
TO THE HIGHEST COURT

Raising the Stakes
As the various parties to the Detroit case were assessing the Court of Appeals
decision, the Supreme Court issued its Keyes ruling, which focused on the intent of school
authorities in making student assignments. Because the Milliken plaintiffs had shown
segregatory intent on the part of defendants, they felt that Roth's segregation ruling would
not be in jeopardy; they could concentrate their efforts on defending inter-district relief.
The Detroit Board came to a similar conclusion, and so did not pursue Supreme Court
review of the rulings against it.I
But the Keyes decision had another, less welcome, implication: Justice Powell,
who had declined to hear the Richmond case, filed a partial dissent in the Denver decision.
He qualified his support of the Keyes majority by stating that he did not believe in massive
busing for purposes of integration. Because the Richmond case had crucial implications
for the Detroit case, Powell and "swing" voters Stewart and White had been the focus of
much speculation. Unfortunately for the plaintiffs, it was now ''widely expected" that
Powell would not be receptive to Roth's order calling for widespread busing in the Detroit
metropolitan area.2 The plaintiffs would have to pull off a Roth-like conversion of Powell
or convince one other "swing" justice--they knew not which--that multi-district relief was
necessary and proper.
On September 6, 1973, a petition for certiorari was filed in the Supreme Court by
the State defendants, by Allen Park Public Schools, et al., and by the Grosse Pointe Public
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School System.3 The petitioners sought review of the decisions of the Court of Appeals
regarding the State's constitutional violations, desegregation outside of Detroit proper, and
the timely joining of the affected suburban school districts.4 The State defendants' petition
pressured the Court for a "definitive" ruling on the proper use of metropolitan remedies.s
They insisted that, should Roth's order be upheld, the Court would be obligated to explain
to Michigan students and their parents "why the result in this cause must be different than
the result in [Richmond]. "6 And they reminded the Court that "this hotly disputed issue
influences local, state and national elections and, as this Court is aware, has spawned
serious attempts to amend the Constitution. ''7 The Detroit School Board joined the original
plaintiffs in opposing the petitions on the ground that the proceedings below must be
allowed to play out before a conclusive ruling could be made.s
On November 19, the justices voted on the petitions: Justices Brennan, Douglas,
and Marshall, not surprisingly, voted to deny certiorari in each case. Justices Blackmun,
Powell, Rehnquist, Stewart, and Chief Justice Burger voted to grant certiorari for each.
Most interesting was Justice White's vote to grant, as he would later vote to uphold the
lower court rulings: Given his reputation as a "swing" voter, perhaps this was not
unexpected; he would have wanted a full hearing before making a commitment to either
side. Certiorari having been favored six to three, the three cases were then consolidated as

Milliken v. Bradley, and time was allotted for oral argument--one and one-half hours, total.
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The briefs and accompanying records which were submitted in due course were
detailed and extensive, with appendices that took up several lengthy volumes.9 Indeed,
there would later be some dispute over who would bear the cost of printing such materials,
which ran up a bill of nearly $90,000. Io Thurgood Marshall complained that with such an
extensive record to review, he felt hard-pressed to complete his dissent in a timely
manner.II

The Petitioners' Brief: Desegregation Has Run Amok
The brief submitted by petitioners posed three basic questions to the Court for
review: Did defendants Milliken, et al., commit acts having a racially segregatory effect
either within the Detroit School District or between Detroit and surrounding districts?
Could the majority-black Detroit School District achieve a constitutional, unitary system
under a Detroit-only desegregation plan? And finally, absent allegations, evidence, or
findings that any district boundaries in the tri-county area were established or maintained
with purposeful segregatory effect, or that acts of dejure segregation were committed in
any district other than Detroit, was a multi-district remedy constitutional?l 2
Having outlined the questions for consideration, the brief was thereafter directed
toward several obvious objectives: minimization of the effects of the violations committed

by the State; minimization of the remedial requirements of the Constitution; emphasis of the
inconvenience and difficulty of a multi-district remedy; and emphasis of the possibility of
error in the lower courts. The first two objectives were most crucial: State involvement in

9 Oral Arguments, Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717 (1974), at 1202-03.
10 Memo to William 0. Douglas dated September 25, 1974, Papers of Justice
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Papers of Justice Thurgood Marshall, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress, Box No.
131.
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area-wide segregation would have to be downplayed since it could easily serve as a
foundation for area-wide desegregation. At the same time, the petitioners wanted to
highlight the fact that no other districts were found in violation, while urging that under
such circumstances the Constitution could not be read as requiring an inter-district remedy.
Every argument in the brief was geared toward avoiding the ultimate defeat: multi-district
desegregation.
The petitioners, as defendants below, had been charged with a number of misdeeds
which would have to be refuted. With regard to specific acts of segregation in Detroit, the
State officials insisted that it was in fact the local school boards which directly handled
issues such as school construction, attendance zoning, pupil assignment, and
transportation.13 On these matters, then, the State defendants pleaded ignorance of or
powerlessness over the actions of the local board. Nor, they contended, could the
vicarious liability theory of Keyes be applied here. In that case the Supreme Court held that
a finding of dejure segregation in one part of a school district could be used to infer a
school board's intentions with regard to the entire school system. In the present case,
however, the intentions of the local school board could not automatically be equated with
those of the State.14
Further, although the defendant Governor Milliken had in fact signed into law Act
48 (which specifically targeted Detroit's desegregation effort), no executive officer had ever
been held liable for signing legislation later deemed unconstitutional. Indeed, Act 48 had
been invalidated by the Court of Appeals in short order, so that it had the limited effect of
delaying one small-scale, intra-district desegregation plan for all of one semester. After
October 13, 1970, failure to implement the April 7, 1970 Plan rested squarely with the

13 Ibid., at 19.
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Detroit Board and the District Court. In the view of petitioners, Act 48 did not constitute
grounds even for intra-district relief, much less multi-district relief.IS
The more far-reaching allegations against the State were the most troubling, thus the
assertions involving state actions with inter-district effects received special attention. The
petitioners' brief frequently emphasized that no trial evidence had shown indiscretions to
have occurred in any district other than Detroit. Moreover, there had never been
accusations or offers of proof that any state agency had undertaken to manipulate district
boundaries or influence demographic patterns in order to shape school attendance. Indeed,
the petitioners claimed, despite many allegations, no solid connection had ever been
established between actions of the State and racial disparity between Detroit and its
suburbs.
The first such charge was that during the 1950s black students had been bused from
the Carver School District across district lines to a black Detroit high school, rather than to
a closer, white suburban high school. "The reason that the [students] were [bused] past
Mumford to Northern was that 'Mumford was [much] more crowded,"' the petitioners
maintained.16 The brief did not state whether Mumford was so overcrowded as to be
unable to handle the students at all; it only argued that the white school was more crowded
than the black one. Furthermore, petitioners claimed that neither the State Board of
Education nor even Detroit's own superintendent, initially, had knowledge of the situation.
In addition, any segregatory effect was "negated" by the subsequent annexation of Carver
by the predominantly white Oak Park School District in 1960.17
As to any financial disparities between Detroit and suburban districts (due to
limitations on bonding and state aid), the brief swept this aside as a non-issue in light of the

15 Ibid., at 40-41.
16 Ibid., at 25.
17 Ibid., at 19.
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recent Rodriguez ruling.1 s (The year before, in San Antonio Independent School District

v. Rodriguez, the Court had determined that states were not constitutionally compelled to
equalize funding among school districts.) 19 The petitioners further indicated that no
evidence of discriminatory allocation between black and white schools within the city could
be found.20 Moreover, the specific lack of transportation funds for Detroit arose not from
race-based discrimination, but from legislation which allocated funds based on an urbanrural residency distinction.21 At any rate, petitioners argued, how could lack of
transportation funds have had an additional segregatory impact since Detroit was allegedly
using its transportation system to segregate in the first place?22 Finally, neither lower court
had found that the transportation funds issue had a segregatory effect between city and
suburb.23
The final allegation was that construction of schools throughout the metropolitan
area was calculated to produce one-race schools. Site selection and attendance zoning, the
petitioners explained, were solely in the hands of the local boards. The State's only
involvement came after actual site selection was final, when the State Superintendent
approved building plans only with regard to fire, health, and safety criteria.24 Again, no
proof had been taken as to school construction in the suburbs, but even so there could be
nothing unconstitutional in the building of much~needed schools to serve either the
expanding inner-city populations or the suburban neighborhoods. The growth of the inner-
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city black population and the tendency of suburbia to remain white were factors well
beyond the State's control.25
The petitioners expressed confidence that the State was not to blame for segregation
either in Detroit or beyond the city's borders. Moreover, even if Detroit officials had
fostered segregation (and petitioners did not concede that they did),26 the Constitution and
case precedent placed only limited demands on school officials in terms of remedy:
The holdings in Swann . .. are clear. A school district operating as a dual
school system must dismantle its dejure segregated system so that it
operates a unitary system wherein no pupil of a racial minority shall be
excluded from any school, directly or indirectly, on account of race or
color. There is no constitutional right to a particular degree of racial balance
or mixing within such school district. The Constitution does not require
that every school must always reflect the racial composition of the school
district. Nor does it mandate that federal judges make annual adjustments in
the racial compositions of schools because of demographic changes.27
Thus, school boards were under no obligation to undo residential segregation through
racially balanced schools.28 All that was required was the establishment of a unitary school
system--one in which no child could be excluded from attending any school on the basis of
race. This, petitioners claimed, a Detroit-only plan could deliver.29 The fact that a unitary
system in Detroit would inevitably be majority-black was of no moment: There were plenty
of precedents for majority-black unitary systems, such as in Wright v. City Council of

Emporia (1972), United States v. Scotland Neck City Board of Education (1972), Raney
v. Board of Education of Gould School District (1968), and Bradley v. School Board of
City of Richmond ( 1973).30
Not only was a multi-district remedy uncalled for, the petitioners alleged, it was
impractical to the point that it could not be justified under the equity principle. Aside from
25 Ibid.,
26 Ibid.,
27 Ibid.,
28 Ibid.,
29 Ibid.,
30 Ibid.,

at 37-38.
at 47.
at 56.
at 58.
at 62-63.
at 58-61.
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the unreasonable cost (350 buses at $10,000 each would mean an initial outlay of threeand-a-half million dollars, with an estimated yearly operating cost of seventeen million),31
the necessary restructuring would impose undue administrative hardship and disruption
upon the districts involved.32 Just as the petitioners had pointed to the independence of the
local school districts in order to deny State responsibility for segregation, here as well they
emphasized "the integrity of local political subdivisions" and the importance of local
control.33 Parents would almost certainly be reluctant to approve the necessary tax
increases since the money would only be used to send their children to distant schools,
making interest and participation in school events more difficult.34
Should any of these arguments fail to persuade the Court, perhaps evidence of a
flawed judicial process might form a basis for reversal. First, the reasoning of the courts
below was attacked, particularly that underlying rejection of the Detroit-only plans. The
petitioners reiterated the argument that a majority-black school system was not
unconstitutional per se; in fact, it was rather racist of the courts to imply that a majorityblack school system was unacceptable, as though a school system was somehow
inadequate unless there was a substantial number of whites.35 The courts' projection of a
massive "white flight" reaction, moreover, was based on pure conjecture.36 Secondly, the
petitioners reiterated that the decision to turn to multi-district relief was made without
having taken proof of any violations by the districts it proposed to involve, thus denying
those districts their due process rights.37 Finally, all of these drastic actions were taken, it
was alleged, because the court had improperly deemed itself a social reformer, with

31 Ibid., at 85-86.
32 Ibid., at 79.
33 Ibid., at 82.
34 Ibid., at 87.
35 Ibid., at 60.
36 Ibid., at 52.
37 Ibid., at 67; also at 88.
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universal racial balance as its goal.38 The only reason that Detroit was not presently
operating under the original April 7 Plan was because the lower courts had refused to order
its implementation.39
The "racial balance" theme reverberated throughout the brief and oral argument.
The petitioners were playing upon the reservations of the Court, as expressed in Swann,
that desegregation could be taken too far, that it was not a cure-all for racial separation, that
there were limits to what the Court could hope to accomplish in the face of widespread
opposition. In the climate of near-hysteria over busing, this well-chosen strategy would
present a difficult challenge for the respondents.

The Respondents' Brief: Let Justice Be Served
For the respondents, review of this case by the Supreme Court could be reduced to
one major question: Would states now be allowed to use school district lines to undermine
desegregation, thereby avoiding their Fourteenth Amendment obligation to provide equal
education to schoolchildren?40 The brief submitted by the original plaintiffs would have to
defend, step by step, the conclusions reached and the actions taken by the lower courts.
Sufficient record evidence and valid reasoning would have to be evident at each stage of the
prior proceedings. It would be most critical for the respondents to defend the decision to
pursue multi-district relief. The question as to whether district lines could be breached for
the sole purpose of providing effective relief for Detroit "need not necessarily be reached,"
the respondents insisted; they believed there was a case'against the State involving

metropolitan-wide segregation, calling for metropolitan-wide relief.41

38 Ibid., at 71, and throughout the brief.
39 Ibid., at 40-41.
40 Brief for Respondents, at 1-2.
41 Ibid., at 40-43.
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Their argument began with a litany of acts of de jure segregation on the part of both
local and state school officials geared toward "confin[ing] Negro children to a core of black
schools separated... from outer-area schools. "42 Ample evidence had shown, they
asserted, that Detroit officials had used not just one or two, but a number and range of
common mechanisms to create and maintain segregated schools: selective school
construction to achieve one-race schools, usually signaled by initial faculty assignments
which reflected the anticipated racial composition of the student body;43 gerrymandered
attendance zones, especially along north-south lines so as to take full advantage of
residential patterns;44 strategically located optional attendance zones and dual overlapping
zones, "to serve as emergency exits for white stragglers;"45 and segregatory busing
programs, feeder patterns, and grade structures, as well as in-school segregation.46
Actions and inactions on the part of the State had contributed to segregation as well,
albeit in subtle, complex fashion. State officials, by their ignorance of events in the
subordinate districts, had condoned the Carver-Detroit inter-district busing situation (in
which black students were bused past not one, but several, closer white high schools) for
over a decade. And after Carver was split and magnanimously annexed by Ferndale and
Oak Park, segregation of students continued at the elementary level. Indeed, only a year
earlier the Court of Appeals had upheld the HEW's withholding of funds after a finding of
state-imposed segregation in the Ferndale district.47
Furthermore, with city and suburbia becoming more racially distinct, the
implementation of transportation funding regulations based on an urban-rural classification
could no longer be viewed with the same nonchalance. Indeed, claimed the respondents,
42 Ibid.,
43 Ibid.
44 Ibid.,
45 Ibid.,
46 Ibid.,
47 Ibid.,

at 44.
at 45.
at 47.
at 45.
at 19-20, n. 14.
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these policies had the effect of discriminating against the predominantly black Detroit
system in a significant and sophisticated way: The dearth infunds contributed to the
aforementioned construction of walk-in schools in segregated city neighborhoods, while
new, appealing schools went up in suburbia, where transportation was available, and to
which only whites had the means and the freedom to migrate, thanks in large part to
pervasive housing discrimination.48
Most recently, the State had attempted to interfere with Detroit's desegregation plan
and impose segregatory pupil assignment, through Act 48. This, the respondents urged,
had two profound implications. First, it discredited the State's claim of impotence with
regard to the workings of the individual districts. Second, it exposed the State's true
colors, so to speak, with regard to the segregation practiced under its supervision. As long
as the local districts carried out the bulk of segregatory policy, the State could stand aloof
and claim no responsibility. But when in April of 1970 a district "strayed" by attempting
even limited desegregation, the State acted swiftly and effectively to restore the status quo.
"It is in this context," stated the respondents, "that the other state-level contributions to
racial dualism in Detroit area schools ... must be judged. "49
Evidence of the increasingly segregatory effect of these actions and inactions could
be found in school attendance figures:
In 1960-61, of 251 Detroit regular (K-12) public schools, 171 had student
enrollments 90% or more one race (71 black, 100 white); 61 % of the
system's 126,278 black students were assigned to the virtually all-black
schools. In 1970-71 (the school year in progress when the trial on the
merits began), of 282 Detroit regular public schools, 202 had student
enrollments 90% or more one race (69 white, 133 black); 74.9% of the
177,079 black students were assigned to the virtually all-black schools.so

48 Ibid., at 51.
49 Ibid., at 52-53, including n. 45.
so Ibid., at 16, n. 9.

76
Working "in lockstep" with widespread public and private housing discrimination, state
and local officials had effectively confined the city's black student population to a growing
core of black schools separated from a receding ring of virtually all-white schools
surrounding it. This ring of white schools extended past the borders of the Detroit district,
so that the outlying suburbs had pupil populations that were 98% or more white.SI
Based on the established and pervasive nature of segregation in Detroit, then, the
lower courts had properly determined that substantial desegregation efforts were called for.
However, careful review of several Detroit-only plans (submitted by both sides) led them
to the conclusion that the most that could be accomplished was a majority-black school
system. Given the longstanding atmosphere of segregation in Detroit, the likely result
would be an acceleration of the exodus of whites and the complete separation of the races
along the Detroit district line.52 The respondents emphasized that, contrary to what the
petitioners had implied, neither they nor the courts below had ever subscribed to the idea
that majority-black schools were inferior or unacceptable per se; state-enforced segregation
of black and white children, they argued, was the condition for which they sought relief.53
The courts reasoned that a metropolitan solution might be the only means to
effective desegregation. In exploring this possibility, the courts properly consulted
Michigan law and practice in order to determine the relationship of the State to its school
districts. They discovered that, according to law and precedent, school districts were in
fact subordinate to the State, which had the power to withhold funds.54 The State had
routinely exercised its "plenary powers" to directly control school districts, as through Act
48 in 1970.55 Moreover, there was an established history of crossing and altering district

51 Ibid., at 4.
52 Ibid., at 5.
53 Ibid., at 10-11, n. 6.
54 Ibid., at 6.
55 Jbid., at 12; also at 6.
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boundaries for a number of purposes, including segregation, as with the Carver district.56
Indeed, the administration of such changes had been provided for by state law.57 The
respondents noted the refusal of petitioners to participate in this inquiry into the "local
practicalities" pertinent to consideration and eventual implementation of an inter-district
remedy.58
As further evidence of judicial caution, the respondents could also point to the
courts' consideration of the relationship of Detroit to its satellite communities. They found
that Detroit and its suburbs were very much bound together by social, economic, political,
and practical interests. These ties ran across racial lines except, significantly, in the areas
of housing and schools.59 Thus, an inter-district remedy to an area-wide problem would
be in keeping with the community of interest which had evolved between Detroit and its
neighbors. Additionally, the court could minimize disruption of both school and
community structures by deferring planning and implementation to the State and the
affected parties. 60
All of the courts' considerations, then, supported their ultimate conclusion: Since
states were ultimately responsible for providing a constitutionally sound educational
system; since, also, Michigan's educational system was a state system wherein school
districts were clearly subordinate units; since Detroit represented a significant portion of
that system and had been found to have committed acts of segregation; and since, further,
the State had been actively involved, as much as was necessary, in establishing and
maintaining segregation in Detroit and between Detroit and the suburbs, it was logical that
the State had both the obligation and the power to remedy segregation in and around Detroit

56 Jbid., at 19-20, n. 14; also at 6.
57 Ibid., at 6.
58 Ibid., at 56; also at 57-58.
59 Ibid., at 7.
60 Ibid., at 9; also at 33-35 including n. 31; also at 58, 62, 69, and 71.
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through a metropolitan-wide desegregation effort. Whether or not the outlying districts had
been active participants in segregation, circumstances in Detroit had certainly affected them
"in an opposite and equal way;"61 that is, the confinement of the black population in Detroit
had preserved the suburbs as a haven for retreating whites.62
Indeed, the respondents insisted, the inclusion of surrounding districts in a final
remedy, regardless of their complicity, was no more unreasonable than the involvement of
certain electoral districts in the reapportionment of other over- and under-represented
districts. In addition, Brown II had clearly approved the redrawing of school districts as
part of the remedial process, and Emporia had as clearly enjoined the use of school districts
to impede desegregation. 63 Ultimately, the right of children to attend desegregated schools
could not be limited by the organizational framework of a state's education system.64

It was certainly necessary, at some point, to answer the petitioners' complaints
regarding due process. The respondents' brief explained that those who were accused of
wrongdoing and who, more importantly, had the power to provide relief--namely, the
Detroit and State defendants--were before the court.65 Not at any time had the original
plaintiffs leveled charges of any kind against the outlying districts.66 In addition, once the
District Court had decided that a metropolitan remedy was justifiable, to the greatest extent
possible it left planning and implementation to the parties involved. For example, the
court-appointed panel which was to develop the remedy represented both sides of the
dispute, and outlying districts were also joined in the proceedings so as to offer their
recommendations. 67 Furthermore, any restructuring of school districts would be left to the

61 Ibid., at 60.
62 Ibid., at 47.
63 Ibid., at 59.
64 Ibid., at 58.
65 Ibid., at 70.
66 Ibid., at 62-63, n. 51.
67 Ibid., at 35.
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legislature, as would interim desegregation strategies, pending a finalized plan.68 In any
case, these matters were still "poised below" for further action, where all parties involved
would be heard, and difficulties could be addressed before any plan was actually
implemented. 69
The plaintiffs' position, as argued before the Supreme Court, was precarious in a
sense. Paul Dimond admits that the "black containment" argument had not been
consistently articulated in the courts below:
In the trial court, we originally avoided the cross-district aspects of the case
and then watched in awe as Judge Roth tried to articulate the reality of
containment within the expanding color line that he had come to recognize.
In the Sixth Circuit, we were so concerned about prevailing on the legal
standard and proof of intentional segregation in the North that we failed to
focus on this understanding of the violation and downplayed some of its
important supports, particularly the proof of areawide community
discrimination and housing segregation. 70
Indeed, the petitioners did not attempt to challenge the containment theory, but instead
argued that plaintiffs had failed thus far to make a clear case for metropolitan-wide
"containment" of blacks. The respondents could only hope that the Court would not be so
easily distracted from the deeper issues at hand.

The Oral Arguments
Oral argument took place on Wednesday, February 27, 1974, in a Court crowded
with reporters and spectators. There was not a vacant seat to be found; even the wives of
the justices took keen interest in the proceedings and filled the private seats reserved for
them. Anti-busing congressmen--who had been quite busy collaborating with Nixon to
undercut the tide of desegregation--were on hand to demonstrate presidential and

68 Ibid., at 9; also at 33-35 including n. 31; also at 58, 62, 69, and 71.
69 Ibid., at 39.
70 Dimond, 102.
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congressional support for the defendants.71 In the opinion of Paul Dimond, "No Court
could be blind to this political backlash to what had become the Roth Case. ''72 Judge
Roth's law clerk also attended; Roth himself was recovering from surgery after a second
heart attack in 1973. 73
Speaking before the Court on behalf of the petitioners were Frank J. Kelley,
Attorney General of Michigan, and William M. Saxton, attorney for Allen Park Schools, et
al. Attorneys J. Harold Flannery and Nathaniel R. Jones argued for the respondents. Two
days before, the attorney for the Detroit School Board was denied leave to speak.74
Elwood Hain explains that
although they were allied at this point of the case, the Detroit board and the
NAACP were still adversaries. For this and possibly other reasons, the
NAACP, which controlled the allocation of time for respondents' oral
argument, refused to allot time for the attorney for the Detroit School Board
to make an oral argument. 75
Solicitor General Robert H. Bork was also present, the Court having recently granted him
fifteen minutes to speak on behalf of the United States as amicuscuriae. 76
Despite the intense public interest and the protracted, complex, and controversial
nature of the case, the oral arguments were undramatic in the sense that very little in the
way of new information or novel theories was presented by either side. Perhaps the most
captivating speaker would have been Solicitor General Bork, who "cut an odd figure in his
formal tails, flaming red hair and beard, and booming voice. "77 Beginning with Justice
Powell, various members of the Court asked for details or clarification with regard to the

11 Ibid., 103-04.
72 Ibid., 104.
73 Ibid.
74 William 0. Douglas, Docket Entry No. 73-434, Papers of Justice William 0.
Douglas, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress, Box No. 1663.
75 Kalodner, 270, n. 252.
76 Douglas, Docket Entry No. 73-434.
77 Dimond, 105.
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workings of school finance in Michigan.78 There were some factual disputes over this
matter, with Saxton (for the petitioners) devoting a third of his rebuttal to getting in the final
word.79 For the most part, however, the attorneys attempted to emphasize the most
important points of their briefs, so as to make clear the issues at stake.
The Court, at this stage, was obviously concerned with potential applications of
multi-district remedies. Justice Blackmun, for example, posed the hypothetical situation of
a segregated city whose borders or suburbs crossed over into another state, as would be the
case with Kansas City or the District of Columbia. Flannery (for the respondents)
expressed the view that there would certainly be problems of jurisdiction, since states are
autonomous in a way that school districts are not; nevertheless if two states cooperated to
segregate schoolchildren, the rights of those children would have to be protected, with the
federal courts as the proper forum.so Later, Justice White asked Jones (also for the
respondents) about the possible necessity of taxing the suburban districts in order to defray
the extra costs of desegregating Detroit. Jones replied that, as citizens of the State of
Michigan, which had allowed discrimination in a significant part of its school system, those
in the outlying school districts could reasonably be expected to bear some tax burden in
order to rectify past injustice.SI
Perhaps the most interesting contribution to the argument was made by the Solicitor
General on behalf of the federal government. Bork communicated the administration's
dismay at the prospect of a remedy which was, in the first place, disproportionate to the
violation, and in the second place, a harbinger of governmental disruption at the local
level.82 He reiterated the charge that the lower courts had abandoned the proper goal of a
78 Washington Post, February 28, 1974, p. B4. See also Oral Arguments, at 1206
and 1232-34.
79 Oral Arguments, at 1236-37.
so Ibid., at 1228-29.
81 Ibid., at 1234-35.
82 Ibid., at 1214.
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unitary school system in their pursuit of racial balance. An inter-district remedy could only
be had, he maintained, with a proper finding, on remand, of inter-district segregative
effect.83
The Solicitor General's comments prompted a significant discussion of just what
would qualify as an inter-district violation. Bork began with a definition of an inter-district
violation as "a violation that results in altering the racial composition of two districts, so
that blacks tend to be confined to one and whites confined to another. ''84 With prompting
from the Court, he was able to refine that definition to the following effect: A multi-district
violation would be one which alters the racial composition between two or more districts as
a result of either action by the State or actions by two or more districts acting cooperatively,
using such tactics as the shifting of boundaries or cross-district busing to accomplish
segregation between districts. It would not do, apparently, to show only that two districts
had violated the Constitution; inter-district effects resulting from official conduct would
have to be proven.85
Later, Flannery referred to a portion of the government's brief where there was
discussion of inter-district violations. The government itself, he claimed, had recognized
the possibility that even actions by only one district could have multi-district ramifications if
the racial composition of schools in other districts were significantly altered. This was
obviously the case with Detroit and the surrounding suburbs.86 Whether this concept of
multi-district violation would ultimately be accepted by a majority of the Court remained to
be seen.

83 Ibid., at
84 Ibid., at
85 Ibid., at
86 Ibid., at
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V

THE DECISION

Opinions in the Making
On March 1, 1974, two days after oral argument, the Court was in conference.I It
was a Friday, and the matter of Milliken v. Bradley was up for discussion. Justice
Douglas, in his conference notes, recorded the views enunciated by each Court member
during this private meeting. Because most Americans see only the finished, composite
result of the Court's deliberations and opinion-writing, these conference notes, though
cryptic, are a rare source of insight into the evolution of the Court's position.
According to Douglas, the Chief Justice opened the discussion by commenting that
"each [school] district is a separate entity," and that "outlying districts keep a unitary
system. "2 Already his position was clear: Local control would concern him, as would the
imposition of a remedy on presumably innocent districts. From Burger's perspective,
multi-district relief could only be justified on a "'racial balance' theory"--a signal that the
petitioners' arguments on that point were rather effective.3 Douglas summed up Burger's
views with the statement that "D Ct [District Court] went way beyond what he [Burger]
could do & Ct of A [Court of Appeals] erred in affirming--reverses. "4 Douglas's final
entry regarding Burger's monologue reads, "it's like Richmond," indicating that the Chief
Justice saw nothing in the Detroit case which would persuade him to vote differently than
he had in 1973.5

1

William 0. Douglas, Conference Notes dated March I, 1974, Papers of Justice
William 0. Douglas, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress, Box No. 16.56, at 1.
2 Ibid.
3 Ibid.
4 Ibid.
5 Ibid.

84

Douglas spoke after the Chief Justice. He intended to vote to affirm the Sixth
Circuit Court. He declared that there were "no due process questions" in this case; the
State's "several districts... are homogeneous" and the "D Ct [District Court] can deal with
them as a unit. "6 His words were an apt summary of the views he would express in his
opinion. For Douglas, district lines were simply arbitrary and could in no way serve as a
justification for limiting desegregation efforts. Brennan spoke next, adding his vote to
affirm. He drew attention to the fact that matters were still unresolved below: "Suburban
districts still have hearings to decide their fates," he reminded the brethren. 7 He had voted
to reverse in the Richmond case, and obviously had no intention of changing course.8
Justice Stewart's comments were apparently quite brief--Douglas recorded only that
Stewart "agrees with SG [Solicitor General] & vacates & remands. "9 But this position is
noteworthy in light of Stewart's final vote to reverse and his support of the Chief Justice's
majority opinion, which invalidated cross-district desegregation. Stewart was clearly the
most ambivalent member of the Court in this case: He could not bring himself to support
the majority unequivocally, and, according to one commentator, his concurring opinion
served only to "muddle" the message of the Court. Io
Justice White agreed with the decisions of the lower courts; he "[had] not changed
his mind since Richmond. "11 This comment sheds light upon the tie vote in the 1973
Richmond case--the case in which no opinion was issued and the votes of the justices
remained undisclosed. Here we learn that White voted with the liberal block in that case,
therefore it had to have been Stewart who "swung" to the conservative side. White

Ibid.
Ibid.
8 Ibid.
9 Ibid., at 2.
10 Gary Orfield, Must We Bus? Segregated Schools and National Policy
(Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1978), 34.
l l Douglas, Conference Notes, at 2.
6

7
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maintained that in the Milliken case the State was indeed "guilty of de jure segregation. "12
However, he also commented that "perhaps D Ct [District Court] has bad overtones" and
that he was "not for overall 'racial balance. '"13 It seems that the petitioners' emphasis of
this issue may have bothered him as well, though not enough to keep him from mounting a
vigorous defense of the District Court's actions in his dissent.
Judging from Douglas's notes, Thurgood Marshall had astonishingly little to say.
He clearly voiced his support for the courts below, but Douglas recorded only one
elaborative statement: "There are white schools in Detroit 1/2 mile from black schools in
Deerfield. "14 Marshall was probably referring to the fact that a metropolitan plan would in
fact be more convenient and effective than an intra-city plan, because the latter would likely
require that students be bused all the way from one side of town to the other, meaning
longer bus rides and greater expense. This was the first and only time during the
conference--again, judging strictly from Douglas's scribblings--that anyone compared
Detroit-only and metropolitan plans in a concrete, practical way.
Justice Blackmun was next. He reiterated that there was "some question that [this]
is not a final order."15 In his view "the case [was] weaker than Richmond where only 3
counties [were] involved & each was pro-segregationist. "16 He was "inclined to go along
with SG [Solicitor General]"--that is, he would be willing to remand the case--but in the
end he sided with the Chief Justice to reverse.17 Lewis Powell then spoke at some length
concerning the reach of a metropolitan remedy:
This is open-ended jurisdiction with as many as 84 districts--no remedy has
been as far reaching as this one--it's a monstrosity on its face--the plan

12 Ibid.
13 Ibid.
14 Ibid.
15 Ibid.
16 Ibid.
17 Ibid.
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would in operation be chaotic--it would destroy local government & power
to issue bonds & raise revenue.1 s
These concerns would be echoed in the Chief Justice's opinion for the majority. Douglas
concluded: "Lewis essentially in SG's comer;" thus Powell, too, would probably have
been willing to remand.19 Finally, Justice Rehnquist threw his support--apparently
without comment--behind "CJ [Chief Justice] PS [Potter Stewart] & LP [Lewis
Powell].''20
The final vote, as recorded on Justice Douglas's tally sheet, found five in favor of
reversal (Burger, Stewart, Blackmun, Powell, and Rehnquist) and four in favor of
affirming (Douglas, Brennan, White, and Marshall).21 One might venture to question why
the case was not simply remanded for further findings if Stewart, Blackmun, and Powell
would have supported this. Neither Douglas's nor Marshall's papers offer any clues, but
given the intense political debate over busing, the finality of the 1974 decision may have
been the result of a Dred Scott-like desire among certain Court members to bring about a
quick and definitive resolution to a painfully protracted issue.
It remained for the majority to justify its position and for the dissenters to decry it.

If Marshall had little to say in conference, he was nevertheless willing to put his thoughts
on paper. On the Monday following the conference, he sent a type-written note to Douglas
(who would have been the senior dissenting Justice) volunteering for the dissent in

Milliken and another case. A copy of that letter went to Justice Brennan as wen.22 But
Marshall's opinion, as well as those of his colleagues, would be a long time in coming; the
day after oral arguments the New York Times predicted that there would not be a decision
18 Ibid.
19 Ibid.
20 Ibid.
21 William 0. Douglas, Docket Entry No. 73-434, Papers of Justice William 0.
Douglas, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress, Box No. 1663.
22 Thurgood Marshall, Memo to William 0. Douglas dated March 4, 1974, Papers
of Justice Thurgood Marshall, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress, Box No. 131.
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until just before the summer recess at the end of June.23 Despite any desire to have the
case over and done with, the Court members undoubtedly weighed their words carefully.
Almost twelve weeks would pass before Justice Douglas would make corrections on the
original hand-written draft of his opinion.24 A week later, on May 31, the Chief Justice
finally circulated a rough draft of the majority opinion.2s Douglas's first, second, and third
drafts were completed during the first few days of June, with only minor changes to
each.26
By June 11 the Chief Justice's second draft was ready to view. Some significant
alterations had been made: Whereas the first draft made no mention of the issue of local
control of schools, the Chief Justice now added almost two paragraphs and a lengthy
footnote on the subject.27 In addition, Burger further developed his definition of interdistrict violations and appropriate corresponding remedies. Burger had first required "a
constitutional violation by all of the districts affected by the remedy;''28 but according to his
second draft multi-district relief could be predicated upon "racially discriminatory acts of
the State, or local school districts, or of a single local district" which "have been a direct

23 New York Times, February 28, 1974, p. 44.
24 William 0. Douglas, Unnumbered Draft of Opinion in Milliken v. Bradley dated
May 24, 1974, Papers of Justice William 0. Douglas, Manuscript Division, Library of
Congress, Box No. 1656.
25 Warren Burger, Unnumbered Draft of Opinion in Milliken v. Bradley dated May
31, 1974, Papers of Justice Thurgood Marshall, Manuscript Division, Library of
Congress, Box No. 131.
26 William 0. Douglas, First Draft of Opinion in Milliken v. Bradley, undated,
Papers of Justice William 0. Douglas, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress, Box No.
1656. William 0. Douglas, Second Draft of Opinion in Milliken v. Bradley dated June 5,
1974, Papers of Justice Thurgood Marshall, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress,
Box No. 131. William 0. Douglas, Third Draft of Opinion in Milliken v. Bradley,
undated, Papers of Justice William 0. Douglas, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress,
Box No. 1656.
27 Warren Burger, Second Draft of Opinion in Milliken v. Bradley dated June 11,
1974, Papers of Justice William 0. Douglas, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress,
Box No. 1655, at 20-22.
28 Burger, Unnumbered Draft of Opinion in Milliken v. Bradley dated May 31,
1974, at 24.
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and substantial cause of inter-district school segregation. ''29 Lastly, Burger elaborated
upon the violations of the State of Michigan, most notably on the issue of the State's
responsibility for Detroit's behavior.30
Douglas may have been responding to this last change when he sent out a
"Memorandum to the Conference" on June 13. It consisted of the most recent addendum to
his dissent, in which he insisted that it was not good enough for the majority to
acknowledge State responsibility merely for the sake of argument and then let the State off
the hook. Douglas reiterated his belief that the distinction between de jure and de facto
segregation was a false one: The State, via its districts, should not be allowed to build
upon residential segregation without facing the consequences.31 Douglas also added a
brief response to the "racial balance" charge appearing in the majority opinion.32
Douglas's full-length fourth draft, with these and a few other minor changes, was
circulated the next day.33
Marshall also distributed a memo on June 13. This document gives one a sense of
the time frame involved in the opinion-writing process, especially as the date for
adjournment approached. Indeed, the purpose of Marshall's memo was to inform his
colleagues that he would be unable to finish his dissent before the end of the 1973 term:
The issues in these cases are as complex as they are momentous, ultimately
requiring for their resolution, as the Court's opinion recognizes, extensive
review of a lengthy record which was somewhat haphazardly put together.
The great difficulties of these cases, both factually and doctrinally, are
evidenced by the amount of time required for the initial draft of the Court's
29 Burger, Second Draft of Opinion in Milliken v. Bradley dated June 11, 1974, at
26.

30 Ibid., at 27-28.
31 William 0. Douglas, Memorandum to the Conference dated June 13, 1974,
Papers of Justice Thurgood Marshall, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress, Box No.
131, at 1.
32 Ibid., at 2.
33 William 0. Douglas, Fourth Draft of Opinion in Milliken v. Bradley dated June
14, 1974, Papers of Justice Thurgood Marshall, Manuscript Division, Library of
Congress, Box No. 131.
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opinion, which was circulated in typewritten form on May 31, three full
months after the Conference voted on these cases on March 1. They are
also evidenced by the substantial changes, both as to the legal standard
which should govern the use of an inter-district remedy and with respect to
the extent to which the present record satisfies this standard, which have
been introduced into the second draft of the opinion which was circulated on
June 11, less than two weeks before the cases are scheduled to be handed
down .... And it still appears possible that further substantive changes may
be made before the majority agrees upon an opinion for the Court.34
This tells us that the Court originally planned to hand down the decision sometime during
the week of June 24, or possibly late the week before. Marshall went on to outline the
issues he intended to address in his opinion, including the autonomy of Michigan's school
districts, past manipulation or crossing of district lines, disparities in state aid, and housing
patterns, to name but a few.35
Marshall ended the three-page memorandum with the following pointed remarks:
As the Court's opinion recognizes, the District Court's primary findings in
the case were made at a time when the focus of the case was solely the city
of Detroit. Rather than vacate and remand for additional hearings on interdistrict segregation, with the participation of all interested parties, the Court
has evaluated the record on its own. This, in tum, requires on my part an
in-depth examination of the present record.3 6
He therefore requested that the decision be delayed until the following term.37 Certainly
Marshall was not the only one behind schedule; Justice White had yet to circulate his first
draft, and Douglas and Burger were still making changes in late July. But the Court was
apparently unwilling to put off the decision for as long as Marshall would have liked. The
Court members continued to work apace after the term officially ended, and a special
session would be called in order to hand down the decision.

34 Thurgood Marshall, Memorandum to the Conference dated June 13, 1974,
Papers of Justice Thurgood Marshall, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress, Box No.
131, at 1.
35 Ibid., at 1-2.
36 Ibid., at 2.
37 Ibid., at 3.

90

On June 21, a Friday, Burger's third draft was distributed. The last two-thirds of
Part II of the opinion (the heart of the majority's argument), though containing basically the
same points, had undergone major reconstruction resulting in a more logical flow of ideas.
To the issue of local control the Chief Justice added a long list of potential problems
associated with district consolidation which might diminish community influence upon
schools, and he expressed concern that there would be a corresponding expansion of
judicial power over education.3 s A significant deletion had been made in this section as
well: Burger had originally included a lengthy quote from the Swann case pertaining to the
interplay between segregated schools, segregative school construction, and residential
pattems.39 The passage was such an excellent summary of the argument put forth by the
respondents (indeed, Marshall would use most of that same quote in his opinion)40 that it is
no wonder Burger omitted it. Finally, Burger cut Part IV of the opinion by two-thirds.
Whereas the Chief Justice had initially included an analysis of due process issues which
would have favored the petitioners, the entire matter was now deemed immaterial given the
Court's verdict on cross-district desegregation.41
The overall effect of Burger's revisions must have pleased the majority, because on
the following Monday Powell, Rehnquist, and Stewart sent brief memos to the Chief
Justice indicating that they were prepared to join in the opinion.42 Justice Blackmunjoined
38 Warren Burger, Third Draft of Opinion in Milliken v. Bradley dated June 21,
1974, Papers of Justice Thurgood Marshall, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress,
Box No. 131, at 22-24.
39 Burger, Second Draft of Opinion in Milliken v. Bradley dated June 11, 1974, at
24-25.
4 o Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717 (1974), at 805-06.
41 Burger, Second Draft of Opinion in Milliken v. Bradley dated June 11, 1974, at
31-33.
42 Lewis F. Powell, Memo to Warren Burger dated June 24, 1974, Papers of
Justice Thurgood Marshall, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress, Box No. 131.
William H. Rehnquist, Memo to Warren Burger dated June 24, 1974, Papers of Justice
Thurgood Marshall, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress, Box No. 131. Potter
Stewart, Memo to Warren Burger dated June 24, 1974, Papers of Justice Thurgood
Marshall, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress, Box No. 131.
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the following day, on June 25.43 Powell's memo alluded to some "word changes" he
planned to suggest at a later date, and he also proposed that Burger cite Spencer v. Kugler
"at an appropriate place" in the opinion.44 In Spencer--a 1972 case out of New Jersey--the
Court had affirmed a lower court ruling that school officials were under no constitutional
obligation to compensate for residential segregation through racially balanced schools.45
On June 26, the last day of the 1973-74 term, the New York Times described a
Court packed with "a throng of lawyers and newsmen" who were expecting a decision in
the case.46 They were disappointed, of course. Though Court officials apparently
declined to project when the announcement would come, the Times speculated that the
decision might be rendered on July 8, the scheduled date for the Watergate arguments; or
perhaps it would be handed down along with the Watergate ruling, which was expected a
short time after argument. Then, too, the case might be postponed until the next term, and
the Court might ask for reargument. The anxiety over the Detroit case--"probably the
single most important controversy of the term" --was apparent, and would become more so
as the summer wore on. 47
Two weeks later, on July 8, the Court heard oral arguments on the matter of the
Nixon tapes.48 Justice White finally circulated his first draft as well.49 Douglas was quick
to join White's opinion the very next day.so On Wednesday, July 10, Douglas distributed
43 Harry A. Blackmun, Memo to Warren Burger dated June 25, 1974, Papers of
Justice Thurgood Marshall, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress, Box No. 131.
44 Powell, Memo to Warren Burger dated June 24, 1974.
45 Brief for Petitioners, Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717 ( 1974), at 20.
46 New York Times, June 27, 1974, p. 39.
47 Ibid.
48 Paul R. Dimond, Beyond Busing: Inside the Challenge to Urban Segregation
(Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 1985), 109.
49 Byron R. White, First Draft of Opinion in Milliken v. Bradley dated July 8,
1974, Papers of Justice Thurgood Marshall, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress,
Box No. 131.
so William 0. Douglas, Memo to Byron R. White dated July 9, 1974, Papers of
Justice Thurgood Marshall, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress, Box No. 131.
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copies of his fifth draft, which featured lengthy footnotes addressing demographic changes
among black populations, the quality of black schools, financial disparities among school
districts, and the problems of inner cities.51 On Friday of that same week, Marshall's first
draft was presented52 and was joined by Douglas before the day was over.53 On Monday,
July 15, a flurry of memos went back and forth between the dissenting justices as Brennan
and White joined Marshall, and Marshall and Brennan joined White.54
The same day (July 15) a second draft of Stewart's concurring opinion came out.
Neither Marshall nor Douglas had copies of Stewart's first draft among their papers, but
judging from the opening statement of the opinion,55 one can deduce that his first draft was
written in response to White, and that the second draft probably added the long footnote
responding to Marshall's opinion. Specifically, Stewart challenged Marshall's claim that
state-sanctioned segregation in Detroit also contributed to inter-district segregation.56
Among Douglas's papers is a memo circulated by Justice Stewart on July 16,
drawing the Court's attention to the death of Judge Stephen Roth the previous Thursday,
51 William 0. Douglas, Fifth Draft of Opinion in Milliken v. Bradley dated July 10,
1974, Papers of Justice Thurgood Marshall, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress,
Box No. 131, at 3-4.
52 Thurgood Marshall, First Draft of Opinion in Milliken v. Bradley dated July 12,
1974, Papers of Justice Thurgood Marshall, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress,
Box No. 131.
53 William 0. Douglas, Memo to Thurgood Marshall dated July 12, 1974, Papers
of Justice Thurgood Marshall, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress, Box No. 131.
54 William J. Brennan, Memo to Thurgood Marshall dated July 15, 1974, Papers
of Justice Thurgood Marshall, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress, Box No. 131.
Byron R. White, Memo to Thurgood Marshall dated July 15, 1974, Papers of Justice
Thurgood Marshall, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress, Box No. 131. Thurgood
Marshall, Memo to Byron R. White dated July 15, 1974, Papers of Justice Thurgood
Marshall, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress, Box No. 131. William J. Brennan,
Memo to Byron R. White dated July 15, 1974, Papers of Justice Thurgood Marshall,
Manuscript Division, Library of Congress, Box No. 131.
55 "In joining the opinion of the Court, I think it appropriate, in view of some of the
extravagant language of the dissenting opinions, to state briefly my understanding of what
it is that the Court decides today" (Milliken v. Bradley, at 753).
56 Potter Stewart, First Draft of Opinion in Milliken v. Bradley dated July 15,
1974, Papers of Justice Thurgood Marshall, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress,
Box No. 131, at 4-5, n. 2.
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July 11; attached is a copy of an undated Detroit Free Press article reporting the death. The
Judge had suffered a third and fatal heart attack only two weeks before the long-awaited
decision came down; thus he never learned the fate of the case in which he had become so
deeply involved both professionally and personally.57 Roth had become the target of
unmitigated public wrath, but upon his death even the most severe of his critics, the Detroit

News, "had the grace to credit Roth with 'authoring one of the most discussed questions of
law in modem judicial history. "'58
On Thursday, July 18, Marshall answered Stewart's criticism by way of a footnote
in his second draft which blasted the majority for requiring plaintiffs to show State
responsibility for the fact of a predominantly black school district.59 The next day, the
Chief Justice distributed a memo indicating further changes he planned to make to the
majority opinion. The most significant was his direct response to the White and Marshall
dissents at the end of Part II. The added text clearly evinced the constrictive outlook of the
majority: They were simply unwilling to deal with desegregation outside of the familiar
context of a single, independent school district.60
In his fourth draft the Chief Justice also took Powell's advice and included a
reference to the Spencer case.61 The complete draft was circulated on July 22. In a memo
with the same date, signed "AA" (presumably by a law clerk), Douglas was advised of
57 Potter Stewart, Memorandum to the Conference dated July 16, 1974, Papers of
Justice William 0. Douglas, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress, Box No. 1656.
58 George R. Metcalf, From Little Rock to Boston: The History of School
Desegregation, Contributions to the Study of Education Series, No. 8 (Westport, Conn.:
Greenwood Press, 1983), 188.
59 Thurgood Marshall, Second Draft of Opinion in Milliken v. Bradley dated July
18, 1974, Papers of Justice Thurgood Marshall, Manuscript Division, Library of
Congress, Box No. 131, at 19-20, n. 19.
60 See generally, Warren Burger, Memorandum to the Conference dated July 19,
1974, Papers of Justice Thurgood Marshall, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress,
Box No. 131.
61 Warren Burger, Fourth Draft of Opinion in Milliken v. Bradley dated July 22,
1974, Papers of Justice Thurgood Marshall, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress,
Box No. 131, at 21.
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Burger's alterations. The author of this memo was satisfied that Douglas's opinion already
answered Burger's challenges. He or she was more concerned with Justice Stewart's
"emphasis on equities" and attached a suggested response which would downplay the
importance of equitable factors, especially as compared to the constitutional rights of black
children.62
Justice White passed around a virtually unchanged second draft on July 23 along
with a memorandum/addendum. It expressed his skepticism of the majority's concern for
restoring lost opportunity to the victims of discrimination, recently expressed in their fourth
draft.63 Douglas, meanwhile, had his sixth draft ready the same day; he simply included
his clerk's proposed modifications regarding equitable considerations.64 Only minor
changes were made in the opinions after July 23.
With the Detroit and Watergate decisions both pending, it was with great
anticipation and uncertainty that the New York Times announced on July 24 that the Court
had given "special advance notice" that it would convene that day.65 Reporters expected
that the Court would make an important ruling, but could only guess whether one or both
of the cases would be resolved.66 Later that day, Nixon was handed a sound defeat, and
when the Court announced that its last session would be held Thursday, July 25, there was
little doubt that Detroit's moment of truth was at hand.67 The next day, desegregation met
the same fate as the President, with a five-to-four ruling against multi-district relief.

62 Memo to William 0. Douglas dated July 22, 1974, Papers of Justice William 0.
Douglas, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress, Box No. 1656.
63 See generally, Byron R. White, Memorandum to the Conference dated July 23
1974, Papers of Justice William 0. Douglas, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress,
Box No. 1656.
64 William 0. Douglas, Sixth Draft of Opinion in Milliken v. Bradley dated July
23, 1974, Papers of Justice Thurgood Marshall, Manuscript Division, Library of
Congress, Box No. 131.
65 New York Times, July 24, 1974, p. 30.
66 Ibid.
67 Washington Post, July 25, 1974, p. A3.
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Among Justice Marshall's papers is a copy of an abridged version of his opinion, dated
July 25, 1974, with the words "Read in Court by Justice Marshall" typed in the upper right
comer of the front page.68 This speech, composed of the most compelling arguments in
his dissent, must surely have brought an uneasy quiet to the packed courtroom.
The fact that no fewer than five opinions were filed in this case was an indication of
the contentious nature of the busing issue. The controversy was not limited to legal and
academic circles; it was very much on the minds of Americans everywhere. Inter-district
busing cases were pending in several large cities around the country--Hartford,
Indianapolis, Louisville, Atlanta, Wilmington, Grand Rapids, Cincinnati, Cleveland,
Dayton, and others--thus the Court's ruling would affect millions of students and their
families.69 Indeed, the case came as close to rivaling the much-anticipated Watergate ruling
as anything could have.

The Majority's Verdict
Justice Stewart, in his relatively brief concurring opinion, summarized the Milliken
case as follows:
In the present posture of the case, ... the Court does not deal with questions
of substantive constitutional law. The basic issue now before the Court
concerns, rather, the appropriate exercise of federal equity jurisdiction.70
It is true that the Court did not dispute previous findings of constitutional violation in the

Detroit school system.71 The obvious question to be resolved was whether the effects of
those violations justified multi-district relief. But as Norman Amaker points out, and as the

68 Thurgood Marshall, Abridged Opinion in Milliken v. Bradley dated July 23,
1974, Papers of Justice Thurgood Marshall, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress,
Box No. 131.
69 Washington Post, July 30, 1974, p. A19.
70 Milliken v. Bradley, at 753.
71 Ibid., at 738, n. 18.
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Chief Justice himself states, the essential nature of the constitutional right involved here
was very much at issue. 72
After laying out the facts of the case in the first section of his opinion, the Chief
Justice turned to a theoretical foundation for the majority's position. With the Brown,

Brown II, and Swann rulings as essential premises, Burger echoed the refrain of the
petitioners' brief: The District Court had "abruptly''73 changed the course of the
proceedings by rejecting Detroit-only relief on the sole ground that "total desegregation of
Detroit would not produce the racial balance which they perceived as desirable.''74 Swann
had made it clear, Burger insisted, that "any particular degree of racial balance or mixing"
was an improper judicial pursuit.75

If the District Court's quest for racial balance was its first mistake, then its second
transgression, according to Burger, was its mischaracterization of district boundaries as
"arbitrary lines on a map 'drawn for political convenience. "'76 The Chief Justice extolled
the virtues of the long-valued tradition of local control which, in the majority's estimation,
would be pillaged by an integration plan such as the lower courts proposed. 77 Nor were
the Court members convinced that Michigan's educational system could be described as a

state system; on the contrary, the innumerable functions which were carried on
independently by the various districts would be disrupted and distorted as considerable
restructuring took place. 78

72

Norman C. Amaker, "Milliken v. Bradley: The Meaning of the Constitution in
School Desegregation Cases, Hastings Constitutional Law Quarterly 2 (Spring 1975):
363.
73 Milliken v. Bradley, at 738.
74 Ibid., at 740, emphasis added.
75 Ibid., at 740-41.
76 Ibid., at 741.
77 Jbid., at 741-43.
78 Ibid., at 742-43, especially n. 20.
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Indeed, Burger listed a whole series of obstacles which would arise, from
transportation logistics to the finance and operation of this new educational conglomerate.79
Apparently, the majority's confidence in the District Court to resolve these difficulties was
no greater than it's confidence in the court's motives:
It may be suggested that all of these vital operational problems are yet to be
resolved by the District Court, and that this is the purpose of the Court of
Appeals' proposed remand. But it is obvious from the scope of the interdistrict remedy itself that absent a complete restructuring of the laws of
Michigan relating to school districts the District Court will become first, a de
facto "legislative authority" to resolve these complex questions, and then the
"school superintendent" for the entire area. This is a task which few, if
any, judges are qualified to perform and one which would deprive the
people of control of schools through their elected representatives.80
Justice Stewart, too, expressed the view that issues of local control and administrative
hardship were overriding concerns. He believed that, given the limited nature and extent of
the present findings, a multi-district remedy was plainly inequitable.81
In this particular case, clearly, the predicate for taking such "drastic" remedial action
had not been established to the satisfaction of the Chief Justice and his like-minded
colleagues.82 What, then, would have persuaded the majority to endorse an order for
multi-district relief? Both Burger and Stewart attempted to address the applicability of
inter-district remedies. Burger, for his part, provided the following criteria for a finding of
inter-district violation:

It must first be shown that there has been a constitutional violation within
one district that produces a significant segregative effect in another district.
Specifically it must be shown that racially discriminatory acts of the state or
local school districts, or of a single school district have been a substantial
cause of inter-district segregation.83

79 Ibid.,
80 Ibid.,
81 Ibid.,
82 Ibid.,
83 Ibid.,

at 743.
at 743-44.
at 755.
at 747.
at 744-45.
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Justice Stewart, in his concurring opinion, enumerated the various mechanisms by which
such inter-district segregation might be accomplished, including the gerrymandering of
district lines, the "transfer of school units between districts," or the intentional use of
housing or zoning laws in a discriminatory manner.84
In the view of the majority, the use of even one of these tactics had not been
evidenced in the present case.85 And while the majority acknowledged improper conduct at
the local level,86 and even the involvement of the State in the maintenance of Detroit's
segregated system of education, they discerned nothing in the way of multi-district
segregatory effect resulting from either Detroit's actions or the disputed actions of the
State.87 Where the majority "part[ed] company''88 with the dissenters, then, was in their
reading of the constitutional right in question:
The view of the dissenters, that the existence of a dual system in Detroit can
be made the basis for a decree requiring cross-district transportation of
pupils .... can be supported only by drastic expansion of the constitutional
right itself, an expansion without any support in either constitutional
principle or precedent.89
For five years, the Court had established relatively aggressive remedial precedents; in

1974, however, the complexion of the Court allowed no more expansive an interpretation
of the rights of minorities than had already been accorded. A Detroit-only plan, in their
view, would guarantee everything the respondents had a right to: a unitary system of
education--in the narrowest sense--within Detroit.90 Strict construction was the order of
the day.

84 Ibid., at 755.
85 Ibid.
86 See especially ibid., at 738, n. 18.
87 Ibid., at 745-46.
88 Ibid., at 746.
89 Ibid., at 747, emphasis added.
90 Ibid., at 746-47.
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Burger thus established a theoretical framework which focused upon the interdistrict segregative effect of the actions of a state or district. He then devoted the third
portion of the opinion to an analysis of the actions of the State in precisely those terms-discussion of the possible inter-district effects of Detroit's segregatory practices was
conspicuously absent. In his dissent, Justice Marshall would level harsh criticism at the
majority for their failure to acknowledge the "rippling effects" of systematic segregation
inside the city limits.91
The Chief Justice first characterized the District Court's findings with regard to the
State as "incidental" and "isolated;" ultimately, he contended, only one allegation could
potentially qualify as an inter-district violation.92 Burger then declared the Court's
acceptance, for the sake of argument, of the respondents' theory that the State was
"derivatively responsible" for the actions of its local school boards.93 He did not probe the
issue of whether the actions of the Detroit Board.for which the State was admittedly
responsible, had cross-district segregatory effects upon the suburban districts. Rather,
Burger simply reiterated that there had been no showing that the State itself had taken any
action with substantial inter-district ramifications.94
Burger was willing to concede possible inter-district effect only with regard to the
Carver-Detroit issue. While there was no evidence that the Carver students were forced to
attend a black Detroit high school due to the refusal of white school districts to accept them,
the majority did admit that such an arrangement, "whether with or without the State's
consent, may have had a segregatory effect on the school populations of the two districts
involved. ''95 Nevertheless, Burger continued, an "isolated" incident such as this could in

91 Ibid., at 806.
Ibid., at 748.
93 Ibid.
94 Ibid.
95 Ibid., at 750.
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no way be used as the foundation for a far-reaching remedy such as that considered by the
lower courts.96
In one very brief paragraph, the Chief Justice also dispensed with the State's
enactment of Act 48, which nullified the April 7 desegregation plan: "That plan... affected
only 12 of 21 Detroit high schools and had no causal connection with the distribution of
pupils by race between Detroit and the other school districts within the tri-county area. "97
In short order, then, Burger moved on to the problem of school construction, which
allegedly had area-wide consequences. Because the trial below had not included evidence
with regard to construction in any district other than Detroit, inter-district effects were not
apparent. Finally, as to disparities in state aid, Chief Justice Burger maintained that no
satisfactory connection had been made by the lower courts between lack of funds and the
racial composition of any district.98
All that remained to be said was that, given the Court's conclusions regarding the
propriety of multi-district relief, the due process claims of the petitioners were a moot
point. The courts below never had reason to question the actions of the suburban school
districts in the first place; their inquiry should have been confined to the original complaint,
that is, constitutional violations within Detroit. The Chief Justice's concluding statements
indicated only that the suburban districts had done nothing to abet segregation in Detroit;
the possibility of a reverse effect was not mentioned.99 The decision of the Court of
Appeals was vacated and the case remanded "for further proceedings consistent with this
opinion leading to prompt formulation of a decree directed to eliminating the segregation
found to exist in Detroit city schools, a remedy which has been delayed since 1970. "1 oo
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The Dissenters' Rebuke
Justice Stewart's concurring opinion had ended with the assurance that Brown was
alive and well; the Court was "in no way turning its back on the proscription of stateimposed segregation" articulated in that landmark case.I 01 To Thurgood Marshall, for
whom this must have been a very personal defeat, these words were small comfort. He
had helped precipitate the recent tide of civil rights achievement, but all too soon that tide
was turning, just when truly significant integration might have been possible. His dissent
in Milliken was, to say the least, one of the most vigorous of his career.
The two other members of the solid liberal bloc, Brennan and Douglas, joined
Marshall in that stinging dissent, with Douglas authoring his own brief protest as well.
Observers had labeled both White and Stewart as "swing" voters, but in this case White's
spirited dissent did not equivocate.102 He also had joined Marshall's dissent, and in turn
Marshall, Douglas, and Brennan joined his. In the discussion that follows, Marshall's
opinion will be the central focus, along with the most crucial elements of the others'.
Throughout his commentary, Marshall blasted the majority for failing to ground their
arguments in a realistic assessment of the nature of racism and segregation.
Marshall's opening statements underscored the futility of taking the unconstitutional
Detroit situation, applying a remedy which would essentially do nothing to change it, and
then deeming it constitutional.103 The Fourteenth Amendment duties of the state, as
compelled by precedent, would not be achieved without cross-district relief, and in this
instance, neither legal nor practical considerations could justify denying black
schoolchildren their constitutional rights. Indeed, those rights should have been the

101 Ibid., at 757.
102 New York Times, July 1, 1974, p. 10.
103 Milliken v. Bradley, at 782.
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unqualified top priority, for they carried with them a special significance in light of the
country's racist past.104
Marshall's lengthy opinion was thereafter divided into three sections, the first of
which defended procedure in the lower courts. Having found purposeful segregation in
Detroit, and having correctly determined that the State of Michigan bore responsibility for
local conduct, the District Court had given due consideration to Detroit-only
arrangements.105 Based on the realities of a predominantly black student population and
the phenomenon of white flight, the court recognized the ineffectiveness of creating a
system which would be perceptibly black and likely to trigger an adverse white reaction.106
The majority, however, had misrepresented the District Court's purpose entirely:
The essential foundation of interdistrict relief in this case was not to correct
conditions within outlying districts which themselves engaged in purposeful
segregation. Instead, interdistrict relief was seen as a necessary part of any
meaningful effort by the State of Michigan to remedy the state-caused
segregation within the city of Detroit.107
Moreover, Burger's professed concern with the involvement of innocent bystanders was
wholly inconsistent with his own statement that where one district's actions affected
another, inter-district relief would be called for, in which case an unoffending district
would in fact be required to participate in the remedial process. I 08
The majority, Marshall challenged, had utterly failed to refute the District Court's
finding that Detroit-only relief would not accomplish meaningful integration. I 09 Moreover,
the District Court's timely consideration of inter-district relief was wrongfully characterized
by the majority as an "abrupt"l 10 and "improper" shifting of focus from desegregation in

104 Jbid., at 782-83.
10s Ibid., at 786-87.
106 Ibid., at 787.
107 Ibid., at 789.
108 Ibid., at 789, n. 2.
109 Ibid., at 784.
110 Ibid., at 738.
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Detroit to racial balance throughout the metropolitan area.I 11 "The issue," urged Justice
Douglas, "is not whether there should be racial balance but whether the State's use of
various devices that end up with black schools and white schools brought the Equal
Protection Clause into effect. "112 In Marshall's estimation, the message of Keyes was that
a finding of such intentional segregation "justifies 'all-out desegregation.' "113
Marshall ended his defense of the District Court with sharp criticism of the Chief
Justice's disparaging tone in the majority opinion:
With all due respect, the Court, in my view, does a great disservice to the
District Judge who labored long and hard with this complex litigation by
accusing him of changing horses in midstream and shifting the focus of this
case from the pursuit of a remedy for the condition of segregation within the
Detroit school district to some unprincipled attempt to impose his own
philosophy of racial balance on the entire Detroit metropolitan area....
Unlike the Court, I perceive my task to be to review the District Court's
order for what it is, rather than to criticize it for what it manifestly is not.I 14
In Marshall's view, the majority's accusations not only maligned the integrity of the District
Court, but also obscured the issue of state-sanctioned segregation in Detroit. Once the
majority was convinced of some plot to achieve racial balance, the possibility that multidistrict relief might be a genuine exigency was eclipsed.115
Marshall's second segment was devoted to analysis of the District Court's
conclusions themselves. Specifically, Marshall focused on the court's assignment of
ultimate responsibility to the State, and its judgment that a multi-district remedy was
necessary for effective desegregation.116 The former conclusion had rested on three
relevant considerations, Marshall argued: The State's own contributions to segregation; the

11 1 Ibid.,
112 Jbid.,
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status of the Detroit Board of Education as an agency of the State; and the organization of
Michigan's schools as a state system, both in law and in practice.117
Enumerating the school construction, transportation funding, Carver-Detroit
busing, and Act 48 issues one after the other, Marshall fully approved the lower courts'
conclusion that the State was an active accomplice in segregating Detroit's students.118 But
even without such evidence, the district's status as a state agency was firmly established in
law and precedent; both Marshall and White cited several sources in support of this,
including the recent Keyes decision.119 It was in Keyes, claimed Marshall, that intentional
segregation carried out by government agencies was placed at the same level with
segregation mandated by state statute.120
Marshall gave particular emphasis to Michigan's state education system and its
power over the districts within that framework, again citing a number of state cases as
precedent.121 In fact, he suggested, the majority's concern with local control was quite
inappropriate given the reality of State authority over education in Michigan: In addition to
its potent "power over the purse," the State also controlled, influenced, or approved teacher
certification and tenure standards, curriculum, school terms, bus routes, textbooks,
discipline procedures, and removal of school board members.122
Most significantly, the State could (and did) consolidate and merge districts, as well
as transfer property between them, all witlwut the consent of either the districts or their
citizens. Marshall demonstrated that, in truth, the State and its districts were increasingly
accustomed to administering consolidations: "Whereas the state had 7,362 local districts in
1912, the number had been reduced to 1,438 in 1964 and to 738 in 1968. By June 1972,
11 7
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only 608 school districts remained. "123 Given all of the above facts, the suggestion that
the State could be absolved of responsibility for segregated conditions, or that it was
powerless to intercede, was simply unsupportable. Detroit, a substantial portion of
Michigan's state system of education, had been found guilty of segregation, and the State
had both the obligation and the power to integrate.124
Marshall next turned to the District Court's determination that a cross-district
remedy would be required to achieve substantial integration. The directives in Green,

Wright, and Swann would have been most compelling for the District Court in this
situation: Future racial distinctions, as well as past vestiges of them, would have to be
eliminated through a remedy which promised to work realistically and immediately.12s
Justice White emphasized that maximum desegregation and the elimination of one-race
schools were crucial, for that' was the only way to eradicate the stigma associated with
segregation--this had been the reasoning in Swann.126
But White also indicated that there were practical limits to remedial efforts. In a
large geographical area such as the Detroit district, where there were a large proportion of
blacks and clear residential segregation, the elimination of one-race schools would be a
challenge.127 In light of the guidelines set forth in case precedent, the Detroit-only plans
would need to be evaluated in terms of their chances for success given the nature of
segregation in Detroit.128
Thus, according to Marshall, factors such as pervasive residential segregation, the
predominantly black student population, and the likelihood of white flight were appropriate
considerations. The existence of residential segregation would have to be taken into
123 Ibid.,
124 Ibid.,
125 Ibid.,
126 Ibid.,
127 Ibid.,
128 Ibid.,

at 796.
at 797-98.
at 798.
at 779-80.
at 764.
at 799.
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account when evaluating the practicability of any remedy: For example, if most blacks
were on one side of town and most whites on the other, it might be quite inconvenient or
even impossible to effectuate the massive transportation necessary to desegregate.129 The
fact of a high black-to-white ratio was also relevant for purposes of determining whether
racially identifiable schools--the vestiges of state-imposed segregation--could effectively be
eliminated.130 Finally, the white flight element, which had been substantiated by expert
testimony and was considered by the Court in Wright, would have to be reckoned with in
light of the first two factors.131
The District Court's evaluation of circumstances in Detroit led to the inevitable
conclusion that a Detroit-only plan might provide a future free of racial distinctions, but
could not possibly eliminate the vestiges of past discrimination.132 Marshall elaborated:
The continued racial identifiability of the Detroit schools under a Detroitonly remedy is not simply a reflection of their high percentage of Negro
students. What is or is not a racially identifiable vestige of dejure
segregation must necessarily depend on several factors .... Foremost
among these should be the relationship between the schools in question and
the neighboring community.133
Since the metropolitan area was plainly a community of interest, connected and integrated
in a variety of ways, a Detroit-only plan would not conceal the fact that, compared to most
other facets of metropolitan life, the schools in the city and the suburbs were racially
identifiable.134 Justice White added that, in addition to resulting in an all-black school
system, any intra-city plan would actually be more costly and more complex than the interdistrict plan which was proposed.135

129 Ibid.,
130 Ibid.,
131 Ibid.,
13 2 Ibid.,
133 Ibid.,
134 Ibid.,
13 5 Ibid.,

at 799, n. 19.
at 802-03.
at 801-02.
at 798-99.
at 803-04.
at 804.
at 767.
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It was Marshall's view that the State had also been responsible for residential
segregation, if for no other reason than that the segregation of its schools had influenced
housing choices made by both blacks and whites--an effect which did not necessarily stop
at the Detroit city limits.136 But he insisted that whether or not the government was in any
way responsible for the state of affairs in Detroit in terms of residential segregation or the
concentration of blacks, it was nevertheless responsible for implementing an effective plan
that would take these factors into account.137 Thus, the shortcoming of a Detroit-only plan
was not racial imbalance per se; rather, it was the fact that it essentially changed nothing,
and instead promised a worse scenario than was already the case. 138
In past cases the Court had never specifically mentioned the possibility of multidistrict remedies; and yet, urged Justice White, in both Brown II and Swann the
gerrymandering of district lines--even "drastic" restructuring--had been mentioned as a
permissible tactic.139 In this case, declared White,
there is no acceptable reason for permitting the party responsible for the
constitutional violation to contain the remedial powers of the federal court
within administrative boundaries over which the transgressor itself has
plenary power.140
Quoting from Swann, White reminded his colleagues that when a right is established and a
violation of that right demonstrated, a district court has broad equitable powers at its
dispense, "for breadth and flexibility are inherent in equitable remedies."141
Furthermore, both White and Marshall urged that
the permissible revision of school districts contemplated in Brown II rested
on the State's responsibility for desegregating its unlawfully segregated
schools, not on any segregative effect which the condition of segregation in

136 Ibid., 805-06.
137 Ibid., at 799, n. 19.
138 Ibid., at 803.
139 Jbid., at 772-73; also at 775.
140 Ibid., at 772.
141 Ibid.
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one school district might have had on the schools of a neighboring
district.142
Indeed, both justices compared the inclusion of the outlying districts in a desegregation
plan to the common practice of including multiple voting districts in reapportionment: "No
finding of fault on the part of each electoral district and no finding of a discriminatory effect
on each district is a prerequisite to its involvement in the constitutionally required
remedy."143 The State, Marshall commented, had the same obligation to its children as to
its voters; it should not be allowed to avoid its constitutional duties through the drawing,
redrawing, or maintenance of school district lines.144 Justice White observed that in

Wright and Scotland Neck the Court had not allowed the creation of new districts precisely
because they would have hindered desegregation.145 Nor, he added, should the State's
delegation of its authority to the school districts be an acceptable excuse for allowing
segregation to take place.146
The State itself, asserted Marshall, was responsible for the fact that effective
desegregation could no longer be had from within Detroit. School segregation had not only
sent a message to blacks concerning their supposed inferiority; it had sent a message to
whites, too: The State had fostered an environment in which the races were not
accustomed to living and learning together--hence, the white flight reaction. Now, through
the Milliken ruling, a Detroit-only plan would allow the State's unconstitutional goal to be
realized as blacks were confined to the city, whites fled to the suburbs, and the separation
of the races was assured.147

142 Ibid., at 773; see also 799, n. 19.
143 Ibid., at 807; see also 777.
144 Ibid., at 808.
145 Ibid., at 776.
146 Ibid., at 763.
147 Ibid., at 806.
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Justice Douglas took the scenario a step further: A solidly black Detroit, he
suggested, had even more profound implications when one took the poverty factor into
account. Since blacks were likely to be poorer, and since Rodriguez had sanctioned
financial disparities between school districts, the Detroit schools would not only be
separate, but almost certainly inferior as well. The Court, he announced, was "in a
dramatic retreat from the 7-to-1 decision in 1896," for even Plessy had purported to
guarantee equality for the separated races.148 The combined effect of Milliken and
Rodriguez was separation and inequality.
The Court, according to White, had not disputed the finding of segregation in
Detroit, nor the necessity of a remedy;149 neither had it rebutted the finding that a Detroitonly plan would be less effective and less efficient than a multi-district plan.150 Yet the
Court had severely limited remedial possibilities through a harshly narrow reading of the
Swann proviso wherein "the nature of the violation determines the scope of the remedy."
In the hands of the majority, Marshall charged, that principle had produced twisted results:
Desegregation would apparently be disabled under the unrealistic and erroneous theory that
the effects of segregation automatically stopped at arbitrary boundaries--there and no farther
could a remedy go.151 On the contrary, Marshall instructed, the scope of a remedy was
properly determined by its actual effectiveness in "curing" the original violation:
No more is necessary, but we can tolerate no less. To read this principle as
barring a district court from imposing the only effective remedy for past
segregation and remitting the court to a patently ineffective alternative is, in
my view, to turn a simple commonsense rule into a cruel and meaningless
paradox.152

148 Ibid.,
149 Ibid.,
150 Ibid.,
151 Ibid.,
152 Ibid.,
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The third and final section of Marshall's opinion addressed issues of equity; that is,
the practicability of implementing area-wide relief, which was of great concern to the
majority. Marshall, of course, viewed the majority's catalog of potential logistical
problems as a "flimsy" excuse for denying inter-district relief. 153 Justice White further
remarked that it was inconceivable that intentional segregation should go unremedied
simply because it would make things difficult for the State.154 The Court's focus on
inconvenience to the State, he claimed, was not in keeping with "the usual criteria
governing school desegregation cases,"155 such as the distance, time, and hazards involved
with busing plans.156
Nevertheless, the dissenting justices felt compelled to address some of the problems
anticipated by the Court. The consolidation of districts, for example, had been depicted as
an administrative nightmare. Marshall countered that the State not only had the power to do
so, but plenty of practice as well, as indicated by the growing trend of school district
mergers. If consolidation was that distasteful, he offered, Michigan had a long-established
practice of contractual agreements between districts to facilitate nonresident education.157
Additionally, Douglas observed that metropolitan solutions for problems were
"commonplace;" the State would not have hesitated to resolve a water or sewage problem in
such a manner.I 58
As to the expediency of busing students, Marshall noted that the practice had been
approved in Swann, and all indications were that the District Court intended to follow the
guidelines established in that case.159 The rough draft of the metropolitan plan compared

153 Ibid.,
154 Ibid.,
155 Ibid.
156 Ibid.,
157 Ibid.,
158 Ibid.,
159 Ibid.,

at 809.
at 763.
at 777.
at 811-12.
at 758.
at 812.
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well with busing programs already in place throughout the tri-county area in terms of the
number of students bused and time and distance traveled.160 Moreover, the cross-district
plan would not require the purchase of as many buses as would an intra-city plan, and with
the pairing of segments of Detroit with contiguous suburban districts, busing programs
would likely be less complex.161
Therefore, a multi-district plan was not only possible, it was preferable. According
to the majority's reasoning, in contrast,
the District Court will be forced to impose an intracity desegregation plan
more expensive to the district, more burdensome for many of Detroit's
Negro students, and surely more conducive to white flight than a
metropolitan plan would be--all of this merely to avoid what the Detroit
School Board, the District Court, and the en bane Court of Appeals
considered to be the very manageable and quite surmountable difficulties
that would be involved in extending the desegregation remedy to the
suburban school districts.162
To Justice White, then, it was highly unlikely that administrative strain could outweigh the
benefits of a plan which was more efficient and more effective than a plan confined to
Detroit.
White also acknowledged the problem of local control, particularly the very crucial
issue of parental participation and interest in schools. Yet it was unclear to him why such
participation could not continue through a restructuring of local authority which would
parallel restructured attendance areas. Nor was it apparent that such adjustments would be
any more traumatic in a multi-district situation than in an intra-district scenario.163
Finally, Marshall dealt with the problem of District Court supervision of the
remedial process. In his mind there was no reason to think that the District Court would
have to get heavily involved in implementing relief. To date it had properly required the

160 Ibid.,
161 Ibid.,
162 Ibid.,
163 Ibid.,

at 812-13.
at 813-14.
at 781.
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parties involved to do as much of the planning as possible, except where the State
defendants had failed to carry their burden in designing a remedy. Even then the court had
made use of a panel representing both sides to carry out further planning duties. Moreover,
it was left to the State to make its own interim arrangements pending a finalized plan.164
On the whole, then, the District Court had success[ully limited itself to an "approval" role.
The Court of Appeals, for its part, had assured suburban participation in the process by
ordering the joinder of affected districts.165 Justice Douglas stated in his opinion that "the
task of equity is to provide a unitary system for the affected area where, as here, the State

washes its hands of its own creations."166 In Douglas's estimation, the courts below had
demonstrated their commitment to that task by acting responsibly and with proper
restraint.167
Justice White, for his part, scoffed at the majority's suggestion that district judges
were somehow unqualified to deal with such administrative problems as might be
confronted in the present case:

It is precisely this sort of task which the district courts have been properly
exercising to vindicate the constitutional rights of Negro students since

Brown I and which the Court has never suggested they lack the capacity to
perform.168
On the contrary, White found great irony in the fact that the least local court in the land was
professing to know better about the feasibility of inter-district relief than the local courts
which were "on the scene and familiar with local conditions. "169 Indeed, the unique
situation in Detroit and the novel problems it presented were the best reasons for allowing
the District Court that flexibility referred to in Brown JJ.170
164 Ibid., at 809-10.
l65 Ibid., at 810.
166 Ibid., at 762, emphasis added.
167 Ibid., at 757.
168 Ibid., at 778.
169 Ibid., at 768; see also 769.
170 Ibid., at 772.
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Marshall urged that the courts below should be allowed to follow through with final
planning. The majority's basis for deeming the plan unworkable, absent a complete picture
of what would actually be required, was shaky at best.171 Justice White added the
compelling argument that
whatever difficulties there might be, they are surmountable; for the Court
itself concedes that had there been sufficient evidence of an inter-district
violation, the District Court could have fashioned a single remedy for the
districts implicated rather than a different remedy for each district in which
the violation had occurred or had an impact.172
Ultimately, contended Marshall, there was going to be some disruption, regardless of
which desegregation plan was finally adopted--why not strive for results that would truly
be worth the effort?l 73
Justice Marshall's concluding statements were an open indictment of the Court's
abandonment of African-Americans:
Just as the inconvenience of some cannot be allowed to stand in the way of
the rights of others, so public opposition, no matter how strident, cannot be
permitted to divert this Court from the enforcement of the constitutional
principles at issue in this case. Today's holding, I fear, is more a reflection
of a perceived public mood that we have gone far enough in enforcing the
Constitution's guarantee of equal justice than it is the product of neutral
principles of law.174
On the Court of 1974, Marshall's perspective with regard to such matters was truly unique.
His words carried with them the weight of decades of very personal experience with racism
and resistance to integration. This time his point of view did not prevail, but his forceful
protest could hardly be ignored.

171 Ibid., at 810.
172 Ibid., at 669-70.
173 Ibid., at 814.
174 Ibid.
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Public Reaction
On July 25, 1974, Verda Bradley had taken her television to work in anticipation of
some news about the case which borrowed her son's name. When she heard the outcome,
"My mouth just fell open in a state of shock for a few minutes."175 The decision was
equally "stunning" to Alex Ritchie (attorney for the white Detroiters): "I'm sad and
disappointed. I really thought Judge Roth made a sound statement of law. I believed in
it."176 When a local reporter spoke to Judge Roth's widow, Evelyn, "she responded with
the same iron resolve that had come to grip Judge Roth in the face of personal vilification
and public outcry":
I can't know for sure what Stephen would have thought, but I know how I
feel. I'm proud and I'm sad. My heart is heavy but I'm very proud of my
husband's dedication to the law and the courage he displayed in defending
the Constitution. Someone must now step forward and continue my
husband's efforts. How sad it is that our troubled times demand such
sacrifices.I 77
For others, the decision came as no surprise. William Raspberry of the

Washington Post commented that "it has been clear for some time now that busing for
purposes of racial integration was in its terminal stages; the only question was whether the
courts or the Congress would administer the coup de grace. "178 Nor was the outcome
bemoaned by all blacks. Harvard law professor Derrick Bell charged that "the insistence
on integrating every public school that is black perpetuates the racially demeaning and
unproven assumption that blacks must have a majority white presence in order to either
teach or learn effectively." And Detroit Mayor Coleman Young, a black separatist leader,
declared,

175 As quoted in Metcalf, 192.
176 As quoted in Dimond, 118.
177 As quoted in Dimond, 118.
178 William Raspberry, "Busing and the Court: 'A Giant Step Backward'?"
Washington Post, July 29, 1974, p. A27.
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I shed no big tears for cross-district busing ... .I don't think there's any
magic in putting little white kids alongside little black kids on a school
bench if the little white kids and little black kids over here have half a dollar
for their education and the little black kids and little white kids over there are
getting a dollar. I 79
Most suburbanites, meanwhile, "revelled" in their renewed security.180 They could
"relax" now that their children were "safe. "181 One suburban mother explained, "You've
got your good colored and your bad,just like white... .I've lived with the good ones, and
I've lived with the bad. Colored as such doesn't bother me. But you put me in with the
bad ones, and I'm going to run. "182 The Milliken case might have forced these privileged
Americans to confront the consequences of abandoning the disadvantaged. Instead,

Milliken v. Bradley was an act of absolution. Segregated Detroit schools
were not the suburbs' creation and thus not their burden....The impetus
for progress in Civil Rights in the 1960s had been white America's
recognition of its part in creating the black' s degraded state. Milliken
foretold a time of greater innocence, of freer conscience; there were limits, it
said, to assigning guilt and shame.183
Thus many were deaf to the Washington Post's call for a renewed commitment
from communities and individuals to pursue equal opportunity.184 One commentator flatly
rejected the idea that such commitment was possible:
During the busing controversy politicians kept saying the issue was not
busing but quality of education. Will the leaders ... who jumped on the
antibusing bandwagon ... fight for more money for Detroit? No. Will
school tax revenues be apportioned on the basis of need, so that Detroit and
other poor children will get the money they deserve? No. Will Detroit's
housing and unemployment problems be addressed? No. Will suburban
housing segregation be combated, so blacks can move to suburbs? No.
Will artificial boundaries be ended? No. Will wealth assume its
responsibilities? No.185
179 As quoted in New York Times, July 26, 1974, p. 17.
13o Dimond, 118.
181 New York Times, July 27, 1974, p. 60.
182 As quoted in New York Times, July 27, 1974, p. 60.
133 J. Harvie Wilkinson, From Brown to Bakke: The Supreme Court and School
Integration: 1954-1978 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1979), 224.
184 Washington Post, July 29, 1974, p. A26.
135 William Serrin, '"Detroit, Where Life Is Worth Living,"' New York Times,
August 1, 1974, p. 29.
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Indeed, lead counsel Nathaniel Jones summed up the disheartening message of the decision
this way:
To whites it says that if discrimination against blacks is on a vast enough
scale, remedies will prove too awesome to invoke and thus the evil can be
perpetuated; and to Negro Americans it says that they have only those rights
that the white majority finds convenient to concede.186
Jones was "deeply wounded by losing, for black children and their parents, the first
school segregation case decided on the merits by the Supreme Court in a full opinion since
long before Brown. "187 He vowed that he would continue to pursue inter-district remedies
wherever they would do some good and where cases could be made which would "meet
the loopholes" in Milliken. 188 Realistically speaking, though, most civil rights lawyers
were of the opinion that opportunities for substantial integration would be few and far
between.189 Thus, Maynard Jackson, the first black mayor of Atlanta, best summarized
the feelings of pro-integrationists when he commented, "This is a helluva way to celebrate
the 20th anniversary of the Brown decision. "190

186 As quoted in Metcalf, 193.
187 Dimond, 117.
188 As quoted in Dimond, 116.
189 Orfield, 35.
190 Washington Post, July 26, 1974, p. A9.
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VI
THE DECISION EXAMINED

Court Under Pressure
In a review of Harvie Wilkinson's From Brown to Bakke, Leslie Dunbar states that
"one of the great flaws of reform-by-litigation is that courts stumble from step to step, case
to case, seldom able to see beyond the supposed logic of judicially definable wrongs and
judicially available remedies. "1 Indeed, one of the few things that can be said of Milliken
with confidence is that, at the time of the case, no one involved seemed to have a clear view
of the issues. Racial discrimination has been a particularly long-lived, intractable problem
because it is so maddeningly mutable--notorious for continually outwitting the law, always
seeming to be one step ahead of the Court's understanding of the problem.
Clearly we do not want judicial principles to fluctuate at the breakneck pace of
everyday modem life. The trouble is that in everyday life African-Americans get left
behind in many ways and have few allies to call upon. Though the Court has traditionally
been one of those allies, it has also been relatively slow to come to the rescue of blacks
who find themselves victims of the latest in a long and fast-evolving line of discriminatory
tactics. For a few brief years it seemed as though the Court might catch up to--and
possibly overtake--the problem, but in 1974 it stopped short.
In part this was due to the failure of the Court to deal with some of the complex
realities of racism. In the cases prior to Milliken, the Court had attacked urban school
segregation without effectively confronting the problem of residential segregation: In
Green the Court demanded unitary school systems now, with racial ratios as guides to
progress; but the Court did not indicate just how far this would have to be taken, and
1 Leslie W. Dunbar, "We Shall Overcome?" The Virginia Quarterly Review 56
(Winter 1980): 144.
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housing patterns were not even mentioned. In Swann, the Court recognized the existence
of residential segregation, but it also backed away from the use of racial ratios, and
declined to probe the conduct of officials other than school officials. Thus the reciprocal
ties between segregated schools and neighborhoods went unrecognized. The Court had
artificially separated what is in fact inextricable; unfortunately, it would continue along that
path in 1974.
Then, too, the novel idea of crossing school district lines added to the confusion.
Both sides scrambled to formulate arguments that would yield the desired outcome, but
neither knew what would ultimately sway the Court one way or the other. As a result, both
sides advanced any argument that might conceivably make a difference. The Court itself
became preoccupied with superficial issues raised in the briefs and was diverted from
reaching and resolving the complex root of the problem.
The introduction of an enigmatic and unprecedented problem is not the whole story,
of course, for in this case one cannot overlook the issue of expediency. The political heat
in Milliken was blistering, even for the heavily-insulated Supreme Court. Though it did
not have a solid, coherent justification for doing so, the Court decided that it had to put
limits on busing or risk losing its authority and prestige among the politically powerful
suburban middle class.2 Thus, confusion and pressure account for the contradictory and
tangential arguments found in the various opinions.
The case could be reduced to a single question, the question that lay at the heart of
the respondents' brief: Would the Court consider the broader reality of racial
discrimination--housing discrimination in particular--as it affected school segregation? In
concrete terms this meant going beyond Swann by considering the actions of officials other

2 George R. Metcalf, From Little Rock to Boston: The History of School
Desegregation, Contributions to the Study of Education Series, No. 8 (Westport, Conn.:
Greenwood Press, 1983), 190-91.
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than school officials. In addition, it involved expanding the "affirmative duty" of school
boards described in Green so as to forbid the passive incorporation of residential
segregation into metropolitan schools. This approach directly confronted the nature of
segregation in the North, for while attention was focused on the South, the rest of the
nation had established residential segregation as the new and improved underpinning for
school segregation.3
Instead of giving a straightforward response to the respondents' question,
however, the Court spoke only to the surface issues delineated in the petitioners' brief, and
in many instances simply adopted the views and reasoning therein.4 In so doing, the Court
placed arbitrary limits on desegregation and based its decision on hollow principles. In
order to buttress its conclusions, the majority included arguments which were not only
unnecessary, but also contradictory, and which thus served to weaken its position.

Double Binds
In Milliken the majority reaffirmed Keyes by requiring district-wide desegregation
in Detroit, thereby conceding that acts of segregation affecting particular Detroit schools
also had reciprocal effects in schools throughout the district. However, the Court was not
yet willing to carry that logic across district lines.5 This reluctance may be attributed to the
fact that, before Milliken, the Court dealt almost exclusively with cases of segregation
which were confined to single, isolated districts. With sprawling, multi-district cities like
Richmond and Detroit, things were not so simple.

3

J. Harvie Wilkinson, From Brown to Bakke: The Supreme Court and School
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4 Paul R. Dimond, Beyond Busing: Inside the Challenge to Urban Segregation
(Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 1985), 110.
5 Gary Orfield, Must We Bus? Segregated Schools and National Policy
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The Court was venturing into unexplored territory: It was now confronting largescale segregation among admittedly independent districts which were, nonetheless, parts of
a larger, interconnected community. The Court was justifiably unwilling to infer
segregatory intent on the part of one district based on the segregatory acts of another

independent district. The plaintiffs themselves recognized this; indeed, they never did
argue that the suburban districts did anything wrong per se. For them, suburban
participation in segregation (besides being almost impossible to prove in this case) was
irrelevant to the need for area-wide relief, since the underlying causes and ultimate effects
of segregation were not confined to Detroit proper.
What the plaintiffs struggled to articulate was that, in the context of an
interconnected metropolitan community, the actions of one district did in fact have
consequences in other districts: By building upon the discriminatory metropolitan housing
market, Detroit had contained blacks in certain of its schools. This fostered additional
residential segregation throughout the area, making it progressively easier to maintain
segregated schools--particularly for the suburbs. As long as residential segregation was a
valid excuse for school segregation, suburban school officials could simply incorporate the

reciprocal effects of black containment into their own neighborhood schools, without
engaging in overt wrongdoing.6 Meanwhile, according to Swann, the actions of housing
authorities could not be challenged in the context of school desegregation cases.
It was clear to the plaintiffs that the white suburban schools were, in part, the

reciprocal result of events in the central city. But given the lack of precedent for interdistrict remedies, proof of segregation in Detroit would achieve nothing more than intraDetroit relief. In order to prompt the Court to do more, plaintiffs would have to show a
tangible connection between circumstances in Detroit and circumstances in suburbia. Their

6 Wilkinson, 223.
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options were limited: They could attempt to prove that each of the suburban districts had
engaged in intentional segregation as well; or, they could convince the Court of the critical
role of area-wide residential segregation in creating and maintaining area-wide school
segregation. The predicament of the plaintiffs is readily apparent: How do you "catch"
suburban officials at discrimination when the black population is almost nonexistent there?
The tedious process of showing discrimination in Detroit was child's play compared to the
task of taking on the numerous suburban districts. 7 Under these circumstances proof of
housing discrimination was not only the best hope for procuring significant relief, it was
the only hope.
For this reason, Paul Dimond explains, "All of the proof about areawide housing
segregation... was marshalled in the [respondents'] brief.''8 But that evidence was swept
aside by the Supreme Court in a mere footnote: Based on the Court of Appeals' refusal to
consider proof of housing discrimination, Burger determined that "in its present posture,
the case does not present any question concerning possible state housing violations. "9 The
Court disregarded the plaintiffs' amended complaint, the evidence and arguments in the
respondents' brief, the respondents' oral argument, and even the government's suggestion
that the case be remanded for further findings. Io "This ruling," Dimond contends,
"directly contradicted traditional Supreme Court practice which permits the party that
prevails in the lower courts to urge any ground in support of the judgment, including those
either rejected or ignored below. "11
Had the Court been dissatisfied with the quality or quantity of the housing
evidence, Dimond suggests, it might have sent the case back for reconsideration; it did not

7

Metcalf, 255.
Dimond, 101.
9 Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717 (1974), at 728, n. 7.
10 Dimond, 110.
11 Ibid., 111.
8
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opt to do so.12 Instead the Court determined that if a district boundary was to be crossed a
very high standard of proof would have to be met: Plaintiffs would indeed have to show
misconduct on the part of school officials in each district before that district could be
included in a remedy; alternatively, plaintiffs would be forced to delve into the nebulous
and ill-defined "inter-district effects" of segregation. In light of the fact that the Court was
unimpressed by clear evidence of black containment and the reciprocal effects of that
containment, civil rights attorneys were left to wonder what proof could possibly have
swayed even one member of the majority.13 Given the limited resources of typical
plaintiffs and their lawyers, the Court essentially asked the impossible.14
Potter Stewart's concurring opinion seemed less stringent, but was ultimately of
little help. He came closer to confronting the housing issue than did the Chief Justice, yet
in the end he attributed residential segregation to "unknown and perhaps unknowable
factors. "15 Likewise, his willingness to consider the actions of non-school officials
(specifically, the "purposeful, racially discriminatory use of state housing or zoning laws"
by state authorities)l 6 was of little consequence since he remained oblivious to the very
arguments and evidence which called attention to such discriminatory activities.17 Says
Paul Dimond of Stewart,
Only a justice intent on ignoring the substantial proof and the trial judge's
express findings could purport to make such statements based on a review
of the extensive record of housing discrimination. To Stewart, it was as if
plaintiffs' overwhelming housing evidence, which converted even an
unsympathetic judge and hostile adversary counsel in the trial court,
vanished.18

12 Ibid.
13 Ibid., 113.
14 Orfield, 393.
15 Milliken v. Bradley at 756, n. 2.
16 Ibid., at 755.
17 Howard I. Kalodner and James J. Fishman, eds., Limits of Justice: The Courts'
Role in School Desegregation (Cambridge, Mass.: Ballinger Publishing Co., 1978), 271.
18 Dimond, 113.
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While some civil rights activists viewed Stewart's opinion as an "invitation" for plaintiffs to
try a new angle, NAACP leadership and the lawyers involved in Milliken viewed it as "a
largely meaningless effort to tone down the harsh impact of the Detroit decision. "19
"Ironically," Dimond states, "the Court's opinion nevertheless made the causal
interconnection between school and housing segregation a key element in future cases. "20
Burger held that remedies should reinstate blacks to the position they would otherwise have
occupied sans discrimination, but this "led plaintiffs and defendants in subsequent cases
back into the battles over... residential segregation. "21 Thanks to Milliken, plaintiffs were
now at a distinct disadvantage going into such battles, due to the Court's failure to apply to
the State the same burden it had applied to school boards in Keyes:
Where segregation existed, residentially or educationally, was there not a
presumption of prior state complicity which it, not black plaintiffs, was
obliged to explain? ... Had the Court's insistence in Detroit on interdistrict
violations done no more than set up a fool's search for evidence of the
obvious? And then, by ignoring housing, limited the search so the obvious
might remain obscure?22
Wilkinson's rhetorical questions highlight the inconsistency and lack of resolution which
characterized the Court's decision in this case.
The Court not only ignored housing, but also considered the State's violations
piecemeal and divorced from context--i.e., exactly as they had been presented by
petitioners in their brief. Viewed in isolation, none of the State's transgressions would
likely form the basis for an inter-district violation. But as part of a larger picture (involving
containment of blacks by Detroit, exclusion of blacks by the suburbs, and, when
necessary, the cooperation of the State in both of these endeavors) these violations took on
added pattern and substance. Further, the Chief Justice stated repeatedly that neither the

19 Orfield, 35.
20 Dimond, 111.
21 Ibid.
22 Wilkinson, 224.
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State nor the suburbs had committed acts with inter-district effects, but he seemed
determined to avoid any discussion about whether the Detroit violations might have
influenced the racial composition of the suburbs. In short, the majority opinion dealt flatly
with the facts and findings, outside of any meaningful context. The Court could not hope
to formulate a lasting resolution to a complex problem like segregation by handling it in
such a manner.
Dimond points out that, while the Court proved unwilling to consider critical
contextual issues such as housing, it nevertheless focused upon the supposed logistical
shortcomings of Judge Roth's proposed remedy, the specifics of which were in fact

vacated by the Court of Appeals (because the suburban districts had not been heard).23
Justice White dismissed the majority's complaints about feasibility thusly:
Whatever difficulties there might be, they are surmountable; for the Court
itself concedes that had there been sufficient evidence of an inter-district
violation, the District Court could have fashioned a single remedy for the
districts implicated.24
Lino Graglia, who opposes busing under any circumstances, also recognizes the
irrelevance of the majority's arguments on this point. Graglia's reasoning is, of course,
diametrically opposed to White's: "Since 'dejure segregation' had been found only in
Detroit, a metropolitan plan would not have been constitutionally required even if it had
presented no administrative problems. ''2 5 From either point of view, the result is the same:
Whether or not a multi-district remedy was constitutionally required, in this case the
feasibility of such a remedy was not really at issue.
By throwing obstacles of feasibility and local control into the path of inter-district
desegregation, the Court only succeeded in opening itself up to contradiction and criticism.

23 Dimond, 111.
24 Milliken v. Bradley at 669-70.
25 Lino A. Graglia, Disaster by Decree: The Supreme Court Decisions on Race and
the Schools (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1976), 235.
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On the one hand, the Court acknowledged the State's responsibility for correcting
segregated conditions; on the other, it offered every possible pretext for not requiring the
State to do so: Whereas the Court had accepted the upheaval of single-district remedies as
par for the course, Southern arguments concerning the trauma of desegregation suddenly
had validity now that suburbs were involved. Consolidation was deemed too great an
inconvenience for the various districts, despite the fact that such consolidations had, over
several decades, reduced the number of districts in Michigan by some ninety percent.
District judges, moreover, were now unfit to handle the intricacies of cross-district
desegregation, though for years the Court had been content to let them tend to the details of
Southern desegregation with little guidance from above.
Further inconsistencies abounded: The metropolitan community had voluntarily
cooperated to solve numerous and varied problems, including educational questions, but in
this case it seemed that the community's school districts could not possibly be expected to
relinquish their autonomy in order to deal with desegregation. Voting district lines had
fallen in the interest of reapportionment, but here school district lines were defended as the
bulwarks of local control. District judges could not be allowed to jeopardize that control,
but it was apparently of no consequence that the State, through Act 48, had seen fit to
usurp power over student assignments in Detroit.
When the Court championed community control, it championed the power of the
suburbs to maintain the status quo. By leaving that control intact, the Court was
demonstrating the limits of minority rights vis-a-vis majority rights.26 This, Gary Orfield
suggests, was the Court's most glaring contradiction:
In the 1950s and 1960s, southern opponents of racial change seldom argued
in favor of segregation, claiming instead that they were opposed to the idea
of federal infringement of "states' rights." In the 1':f?Os in metropolitan
areas where there is a history of unconstitutional segregation, opponents
26 Wilkinson, 232.
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defend "local control." In Brown and succeeding cases, the courts rejected
the southern defense. In the Milliken decision the Supreme Court accepted
the northern argument.27
Just as the Court had adopted the petitioners' version of their own actions, the
Court also adopted their view of the trial judge as being preoccupied with racial balance. In
the first place, it was the Supreme Court itself, in Green, which first began to use racial
ratios to gauge progress in desegregation. The Court in 1968 had not turned to racial
quotients out of some malevolent lust for control of schools; it turned to them reluctantly
and tentatively and only because a significant number of whites refused, at every turn, to
recognize the rights of blacks. Given the storm of opposition which had gathered by the
time remedies were considered in 1972, the lower court's concern with results was
similarly well-founded. The use of racial ratios by Judge Roth was, in fact, closely akin to
the Court's use of ratios in the Swann case.28 Roth's use of statistics would ensure both
that the remedy would be responsive to the findings of school and residential segregation,
and that the remedy would be properly implemented so as to yield reasonable results.
Nevertheless, the District Court was now being scolded for following the lead of the
Supreme Court.
In the second place, the Court's accusations put the judge in a no-win situation.
Burger criticized Judge Roth for "abruptly''29 changing the focus of the case, at the
remedial stage, from Detroit desegregation to racial balance and metropolitan relief:
The theory upon which the case proceeded related solely to the
establishment of Detroit city violations as a basis for desegregating Detroit
schools and ... , at the time of trial, neither the parties nor the trial judge
were concerned with a foundation for interdistrict relief.30

27 Orfield, 417-18.
28 Graglia, 233.
29 Milliken v. Bradley, at 738.
30 Ibid., at 752.
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The Court then penalized the plaintiffs because the judge had not taken evidence with
regard to districts other than Detroit. Apparently Judge Roth should somehow have known
from the beginning that evidence would show residential and school segregation to be
present and Detroit-only remedies to be ineffective; yet if Roth had proceeded on an initial
assumption that the suburbs should be involved--absent supporting charges or evidence-the petitioners and the Court would have had all the more reason to brand him a racial
balancer.
In the third place, it would seem that constitutional issues are subject to review by
the Court, and that the motives of a judge are a questionable topic for discussion in a
majority opinion. The Court's use of the petitioners' racial balance charge ensured the
success of the petitioners' strategy: The focus was no longer on the possible inter-district
effects of the segregation which had been proven to exist in Detroit. Instead, the decision
of the lower courts to pursue multi-district relief was wholly attributed to their reformist
zeal, and further probing was unnecessary. The possibility that segregation in Detroit had
affected the surrounding districts was not even addressed in the Court's opinion--any
chance for inter-district relief was thus swept away.
The dispute over racial balance signified an unresolved issue: the validity of the de

jure/defacto distinction. Lino Graglia criticizes both the majority and the dissenters for
failing to discuss the problem candidly. In his view the majority, in a mere footnote,31
used the Keyes ruling to sidestep the question of de jure segregation in Detroit, so that "an
issue of the greatest magnitude--the constitutionality of school racial imbalance or of
majority-black schools--was apparently resolved ... without being anywhere expressly
considered. ''32 Graglia believes that, had they reviewed the lower court findings and
applied a simple "plain error" test, the majority would have concluded (as does Graglia)
3 1 Ibid., at 738, n. 18.
3 2 Graglia, 231.
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that "the lower courts ... had in effect held that it was racial imbalance itself that was
unconstitutional. ''33 Indeed, Graglia describes the dissenting opinions as
inexplicable except as a simple condemnation of racially imbalanced or...
predominantly black schools, yet. .. they resolutely purport to accept and
apply the "desegregation" rationale of Green, Swann, Keyes, and the
present Court: that racially balanced or majority-white schools are not
constitutionally required as such but only to remedy "de jure segregation. ''34
Gary Orfield grasps what Graglia seemingly cannot:
The fundamental social insight of the 1954 Brown decision by the Supreme
Court was that a system in which minority children were forced to attend
segregated schools was "inherently unequal." It was unequal not because
there was something wrong with black children but because there were deep
social prejudices about the inferiority of black institutions. This meant that
the dominant society would not treat the minority schools equally and would
assume that the children who attended them were inferior and would
devalue their education, both by expecting less during the educational
process and by assuming that graduates had had inferior training.35
Though Graglia completely misses the point of the respondents' brief and the dissents, he
is nevertheless right about one thing: The Court as a body failed to address this issue in a
manner which was at all helpful either to plaintiffs seeking relief or lower courts seeking to
provide it.

If the Supreme Court majority was responsible for injecting various irrelevancies
into the debate, the dissenters did their part by allowing themselves to be overly distracted
by such arguments. Justices Marshall and White (White in particular) were preoccupied
with problems of equitability,36 and all three dissents devoted significant space to the
matter of State responsibility for desegregation, a fact which the majority never disputed.37
While the dissenters' passionate reactions to these issues are understandable, their positions

33 Ibid.
34 Ibid., 241.
35 Orfield, 405.
36 Ibid., 243.
37 Ibid., 250.
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might have been better served by more elaborate treatment of the respondents' containment
theory.

Opportunities Lost
Given an outcome favoring the status quo, the implications of this case are often
couched in terms of might-have-beens. Had the respondents prevailed, integration would
finally have been required in all regions of the country--urban and rural, North and South-on equal terms. One would hope that once the initial shock and turmoil had been worked
through, unprecedented massive integration would actually have taken place, bringing
further growth in racial understanding. The acceleration of white flight and the
proliferation of private segregated schools might have been avoided, and the decay of
inner-city schools slowed and eventually reversed. Author William Serrin observed:
No one was happy with the idea of busing. It would have been
accompanied by great traumas. But busing would have forced suburban
communities to become interested in Detroit's schools. White wealth and
power could not have ignored Detroit's schools without ignoring white
suburban children. Money would have been forced into Detroit. Busing
was no magic cure. But it was something.38
Indeed, Serrin's comments serve to highlight the fact that greater class interaction was
inevitably implied in any plan to bring city and suburb together. In Harvie Wilkinson's
view, this possibility is especially intriguing.
The Court, Wilkinson says, could have guaranteed both class and racial integration,
thus softening the effects of Rodriguez. The urban poor--black and white--would have
benefited from the influx of middle-class suburban students, because better funding would
have accompanied them. The status of schools was not all about race: Poor schools, even
when integrated, carried a lower status. Wilkinson explains:

38 William Serrin, "'Detroit, Where Life Is Worth Living,"' New York Times,
August 1, 1974, p. 29.
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The poor of whatever race or ethnicity often brought to school the same
educational deficiencies and the same limited home backgrounds ....
Deprived home backgrounds created educational deficiencies in minority
students that were expensive to overcome. Yet urban school systems
possessed paltry funds with which to do so, primarily because public
health, welfare, housing, sanitation, and safety costs badly drained
municipal budgets. Due to this overburden, the average city devoted about
30 percent of its budget to schools, the average suburb, about half. Beset
also by white exodus and declining property values, urban school finance
was in desperate shape.39
At long last, the middle class might have been required to carry their share of the burden of
integration. Milliken, then, had the potential for realizing unprecedented equality of
educational opportunity in terms of race and socioeconomics.
This was not to be. Yet not everyone had placed all their hopes in busing. Some
believed that "the only durable solution to the school problem lay not in such artificial,
court-imposed remedies, but in the black man's natural, inevitable rise. "40 That is,
continued legal progress and increasing political leverage would guarantee economic
improvement and better housing opportunities for blacks, so that eventually suburban
neighborhoods and schools would be penetrated and significantly integrated. But
Wilkinson points out that integration through better housing is an individual remedy, while
integration through busing is a class remedy. One requires individual achievement, while
the other provides a safety net:
Integrated schools through integrated neighborhoods will benefit those
individual blacks determined and prosperous enough to escape the ghetto
and buy into white areas. Busing, on the other hand, seeks to aid those
whom fate has left stranded. Integrated neighborhoods largely await those
blacks who have already made it in other ways--in employment, for
instance, or education. Busing was to provide an opportunity for those
deprived in other ways to make it still.41

39 Wilkinson, 220-21.
40 Ibid., 236.
41 Ibid., 242.
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Thus Milliken v. Bradley crippled prospects for "mass betterment of America's blacks. "42
Rather than facilitate a shortcut to equality, the Court left minorities to endure the long haul.
The Court gambled that black achievement and white tolerance had developed enough to be
weaned from judicial activism.43
Various commentators have suggested that social reform does indeed belong in the
hands of legislators, not judges and justices.44 This notion does not account for occasions
such as that in Detroit, where the aspirations of the majority--to whom those legislators are
accountable--and the aspirations of the minority were mutually exclusive. The economic
and political power of middle- and upper-class white Americans was successfully mustered
against metropolitan solutions; as long as those groups remained opposed, elected officials
were unlikely to respond to minority pleas.45 Under such circumstances, the courts were
the only hope.46 But for one vote, the members of the Supreme Court might have
awakened to the realities of racism and done something about them. Logic, evidence, and
the rulings below would have been on their side. The decision they did make demonstrates
that the Court is perhaps not as far removed from public wrath as the founders would have
hoped.
The Court ruled in favor of a new form of tokenism: State and local officials could
allow residential segregation to do its work, then throw up their hands in apparent
helplessness. Cities, with their poor and minority populations, were left to bear the brunt
of reform while affluent suburbs stood aloof and impregnable.47 And yet, the Court's

42 Ibid.
43 Ibid.
44 See, for example, Nathan Glazer, "In Uplifting, Get Underneath," National
Review 28 (October 15, 1976).
45 Orfield, 196-97.
46 Wilkinson, 229
47 Orfield, 407.
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decision merely reflected the real problem: the tendency of many whites to reject
responsibility for the deeply discriminatory condition of American society:
The failure of white America to bear its responsibility for the welfare of all
children regardless of color.... shows itself in the parent who places his or
her child in a private school rather than uniting with other citizens-neighbors--to build a better school for the entire community. It shows itself
in the family who flees the city to get away from the school that is
increasingly black. In both instances, the family is unconcerned over what
happens to another's child through its action. It is their own, theirs alone,
that counts. That pulling out reduces the quality level in the school left
behind causes little regret. 48
There is a collective responsibility that, like it or not, requires the kind of sacrifice from
each white individual that has already been made by every African-American.
In 1974 it did not seem so easy to keep the promise of Brown as when the nation
had first started. The causes of segregation were harder to identify, easier to excuse--the
issues were no longer so clear-cut. To their credit, Americans had decided that it would not
do to have segregation in their law books; nor could they accept the defiance of the rural
South. But when it came to the tangled web of discrimination which separated
schoolchildren in the urban areas, the problem became too complicated to deal with. When
it came to overcoming the inertia which allowed segregation to flourish in the North,
America decided that it was too much to ask of whites that they send their children to the
ghetto for eight hours a day, though blacks and poor whites had to face the bleakness
unceasingly. The avoidance of unpleasantness continued to be a luxury that only the
politically powerful could afford.

48

Metcalf, 269.
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VII
CONCLUSION

"Feeding the Backlash"!
After the Milliken decision many observers predicted that effective alternatives to
metropolitan desegregation would not be vigorously pursued by either the government or
the citizenry.2 Unfortunately, this was an accurate assessment of the majority's attitude
toward the problems of inner cities and the poor whites and minorities who populated
them. As soon as the suburbs had what they wanted, it was back to business as usual:
"The drive for a constitutional amendment dissipated, politics in Michigan returned to
normal, and the threat of a direct congressional confrontation with the courts became less
serious''3 A scant three months after the decision, the New York Times was reporting that
"antibusing candidates in particular" were not faring well in off-year elections, having
become politically obsolete.4
In 1978, after observing four years of stagnant urban policies and unchanged innercity conditions, Gary Orfield wrote:

If nothing is done it will not be because minority families like segregation.
It will not be because nothing can be done, because there are no legal
grounds, or because education would deteriorate from the change. It will be
because most Americans strongly prefer things the way they are, and the
courts will not bear the burden of flying in the face of these deep
convictions.5

1

The title of chapter seven of Tom Wicker's Tragic Failure: Racial Integration in
America (New York: William Morrow and Company, Inc., 1996).
2 See, for example, William Serrin, "'Detroit, Where Life Is Worth Living,"' New
York Times, August 1, 1974, p. 29.
3 Gary Orfield, Must We Bus? Segregated Schools and National Policy
(Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1978), 391.
4 New York Times, October 20, 1974, p. 57.
5 Orfield, 197.
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Some twenty years later, political columnist Tom Wicker has come to the conclusion that
this is precisely what has happened.
Wicker contends that over the last three-and-a-half decades--thanks largely to the
sensationalist portrayal of blacks by the media--whites have increasingly reacted in fear and
anger to the development of ghettos and the "undisciplined ghetto behavior" of their
inhabitants.6 This preoccupation with ghetto life has masked the growth of a stable black
middle class, and has eroded support for substantial desegregation and other programs
which would be helpful to the inner-city poor. Sensing the public's growing aversion to
integrationist policies, the executive and legislative branches of government have been less
and less indulgent of demands for a level playing field for blacks and whites--and thus for
the rich and poor as well. 7
Indeed, Wicker suggests, the association of racial equality with the Democratic
Party has in fact been a great liability with much of the white electorate, especially in
Southern states.s Since the pro-civil rights Johnson administration, Republicans have
dominated the White House, interrupted only by the Carter and Clinton administrations,
which Wicker claims were "political aberrations. ''9 Desegregation efforts have wilted in the
inhospitable political climate: Shortly after Milliken, Congress prohibited Legal Services
offices from pursuing further school desegregation cases; since the Nixon HEW and
Justice Department were similarly restrained, this left further progress solely in the hands
of private organizations with limited resources.IO

6 Wicker, 4.
Ibid., 4.
8 Ibid., 7.
9 Ibid., 28.
10 Paul R. Dimond, Beyond Busing: Inside the Challenge to Urban Segregation
(Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 1985), 116.
7
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The Reagan and Bush administrations were particularly unfriendly to black
interests. Reagan not only reduced funds for desegregation,11 but also attempted to grant
tax exemption to segregated private schools and to roll back court-ordered school
desegregation in several cities, such as Norfolk, Virginia and Oklahoma City, Oklahoma.12
In light of Milliken, his urban policies had the grimmest implications: Confined as they
were to the job-deprived inner city, blacks were hard-hit by Reagan's "trickle-down"
economic policies,13 his termination of revenue sharing, by which cities had received
additional federal funds,14 and his successor's continued cutbacks in urban programs.
Between 1980 and 1990, the federal portion of city budgets fell from 18 percent to 6.4
percent.15 Reagan also opposed affirmative action and the strengthening of the Voting
Rights Act, and, according to Wicker, effectively "neutered" the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission.16 In action, if not in words, Reagan and Bush validated public
opposition to the integration of American society.11
Not to be discounted is the Reagan-Bush influence upon the judiciary. When Bush
left the White House he and Reagan had appointed over half of the federal judges in office
at the time.1 s Together they built what Wicker terms a ''fluctuating conservative majority"
on the Supreme Court (meaning there are still a couple of "swing" voters who defy
categorization); thus the Court as a body has been increasingly reluctant to support
desegregation and racial preferences.I 9 The fact of a long-standing conservative majority

11 Wicker, 95.
12 Ibid., 16.
13 Ibid., 17.
14 Ibid., 20.
15 Ibid., 22.
16 Ibid., 15.
17 Ibid., 13.
18 Ibid.
19 Ibid., 108.
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on the Supreme Court (since the Nixon years) has kept desegregation efforts in a virtual
legal limbo.

Desegregation after Milliken
The few chinks left in the suburban fortress did allow a small number of
metropolitan-wide desegregation orders to stand up to judicial review. The Supreme Court
affirmed one such desegregation order for Wilmington, Delaware (Evans v. Buchanan,
1975) and denied certiorari in a case arising out of Louisville, Kentucky, thus leaving it
under court order to integrate across district lines (Newburg Area Council v. Jefferson

County Board of Education, 1974).20 In both cases, district boundaries had been
disregarded "in the interests of student segregation," thereby satisfying Burger's interdistrict violation requirements as stated in Milliken. 21 Harvie Wilkinson suggests that the
smaller geographic and demographic scope of the remedies in these cases may also have
had something to do with the outcome: Compared to the involvement of 54 districts and
780,000 students in three Michigan counties, integration of New Castle County's 88,000
students in twelve school districts must have seemed much more reasonable; in Louisville
only three districts were at issue, all within one county.22 In 1981, after a volley of
remands stretching over thirteen years (including one trip to the Supreme Court in 1977),23
Indianapolis also squeezed a metropolitan remedy through the Milliken screen (U.S. v.

Board of Sclwol Commissioners of the City of Indianapolis, Indiana) ,24

20 J. Harvie Wilkinson, From Brown to Bakke: The Supreme Court and School
Integration: 1954-1978 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1979), 243, n. 148.
21 Ibid., 243.
22 Ibid., 242-43.
23 George R. Metcalf, From Little Rock to Boston: The History of School
Desegregation, Contributions to the Study of Education Series, No. 8 (Westport, Conn.:
Greenwood Press, 1983), 264, n. 54.
24 Ibid., 265.

137
Elsewhere, however, Milliken severely restricted the ability of plaintiffs to secure
metropolitan relief. Detroit had actually been a progressive model compared to other city
school districts in the sixties; the findings of de jure segregation there meant that it would
be fairly easy to demonstrate segregation in places like Chicago and Philadelphia, where
segregation was even more pronounced.25 But this was of little consequence when
meaningful remedies were out of reach: "Almost immediately [after Milliken] the steam
went out of plans to press for metropolitan solutions in a number of the older cities. "26
New York, Los Angeles, Chicago, Philadelphia,27 Baltimore, Richmond, Cleveland, St.
Louis--all of these cities faced the same dilemma as Detroit: predominantly black inner-city
districts surrounded by virtually all-white suburban enclaves.28
The arbitrary nature of the Milliken ruling is evident in the way that desegregation
played out indifferent cities. For example, the Charlotte metropolitan area happened to be
encompassed within one school district, while Richmond's suburbs were school districts
unto themselves. Thus "a black student in Richmond is, in effect, denied the right to a
desegregated education, though the bus ride would be no longer than that already provided
for children living in the inner city of Charlotte. ''29 Further comparison of these two cities
also lends credence to the Detroiters' fears concerning white flight: "Whereas the
percentage of white enrollment stabilized after metropolitan desegregation in Charlotte, it
continued to decline after central-city desegregation in Richmond. ''30
And what of Detroit itself? In January of 1975 Judge Robert DeMascio--a Nixon
appointee who was quite inexperienced with school desegregation law--took over the case
on remand. The Supreme Court having ordered him to do so, he perused the wreckage of
2s Orfield, 167.
26 Ibid., 391.
27 Metcalf, 268.
28 Orfield, 404.
29 Ibid., 63.
30 Ibid.
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Roth's work with the help of several well-known expert advisors.31 DeMascio could not
see the use in diluting a rapidly dwindling white student population; he therefore ordered
"the minimum [desegregation] law will allow."32 Beginning in January, 1976,
approximately eleven percent of the district's students were reassigned (with nine percent
requiring transportation) in order to integrate the white schools; but 83,000 black children
remained in all-black schools which were essentially unaffected by DeMascio's plan.33
Elwood Hain describes the desegregation order as "openly solicitous of the fears of
Detroit's remaining white population;" indeed, it placed the burden and inconvenience of
the process largely on black students and their parents.34
Judge DeMascio's plan did serve to break new ground in the area of desegregation
by including "'components' designed to improve education or to smooth the transition to a
desegregated system. ''35 These involved remedial reading courses, expanded vocational
programs, bilingual-bicultural education, and a strict student conduct code "to prevent the
discriminatory use of discipline that often accompanies school desegregation. ''36 But the
State of Michigan balked when the judge required it to bear half the cost of the educational
improvements (in addition to three-quarters the cost of new buses).37 Such remedial steps
were not justified by the violations found in Detroit, the State argued.38
The Sixth Circuit rejected the State's reasoning when it reviewed DeMascio's
measures in 1976. Since the State had contributed to the condition of segregation, it should
help defray the cost of educational reforms in order to counter the effects of past
31 Howard I. Kalodner and James J. Fishman, eds., Limits of Justice: The Courts'
Role in School Desegregation (Cambridge, Mass.: Ballinger Publishing Co., 1978), 273.
3 2 As quoted in Orfield, 26.
33 See Kalodner, 284 and Orfield, 26.
34 Kalodner, 281.
35 Ibid., 275.
36 Ibid., 294; see generally 292-296.
37 Ibid., 308.
38 Ibid., 307.
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segregation. On the other hand, the Court of Appeals was not as pleased with the results of
the District Court's pupil reassignments:
The court of appeals noted that Ronald Bradley, the black student whose
parents had sued the school system when he was assigned to a 97 percent
black kindergarten, would now be attending a 100 percent black sixth grade
after six years of litigation and full implementation of the "desegregation"
plan.39
To demonstrate its dissatisfaction with the actual amount of racial mixing that had taken
place, the Sixth Circuit ordered further desegregation, yet it could offer no suggestions as
to how this might be done without intensifying the white exodus.40 In frustration Judge
Edwards (of the Sixth Circuit) accused the Supreme Court of providing, through the
original Milliken decision, a "formula for American Apartheid... .I know of no decision
by the Supreme Court of the United States since the Dred Scott decision which is so
fraught with disaster for this country. "41
On June 27, 1977, the high court upheld the Sixth Circuit with regard to remedial
education and state liability in the case that has become know as Milliken II. 42 Detroit, in
the mean time, had "integrated" as planned. Thanks to the leadership of the Coalition for
Peaceful Integration (formerly the Metropolitan Coalition for Peaceful Integration, up until
the Milliken decision) and other city-wide organizations, the transition was a peaceful one
despite continuing white opposition. Student boycotts subsided after the first few weeks,
with a permanent loss of 800 white students from the system after one month.43 By 1984,
however, "integration" had succeeded in placing the typical black student in a school which
was only 9 percent white.44

39 Orfield, 26.
40 Ibid., 26.
41 Dimond, 117.
42 Kalodner, 308.
43 Ibid., 302-306.
44 Wicker, 95.
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The Detroit case not only foreshadowed the future of metropolitan desegregation,
but also indicated what lay ahead for desegregation in general. For George Metcalf,

Milliken was the "dividing line" between expansion and contraction of the Court's
interpretation of dejure segregation.45 For Donald Lively, the narrowing of the
desegregation principle began even farther back, in Keyes ( 1973). In that case, the Court
did recognize that not all intentional segregation was formally sanctioned by law, but it also
went on to require substantial proof of segregatory intent on the part of officials. Then, in

Milliken (1974), the Court used school district lines to impose spatial limits on
desegregation remedies. In a 1976 case, Pasadena City Board of Education v. Spangler,
the Court decided that time was a limiting factor as well, holding that resegregation after a
period of desegregation would be tolerated in the absence of intent to segregate. 46
These limitations were borne out in subsequent cases, such as Dayton Board of

Education v. Brinkman (1977), where the Court required more convincing proof of
intentional segregation than was originally provided. (In 1979 additional evidence
presented in Dayton/I persuaded the Court to uphold system-wide relief).47 In two
companion cases decided in 1982 (Washington v. Seattle School District No. I and

Crawford v. Board of Education of the City of Los Angeles) the Court essentially approved
termination of busing efforts to address de facto segregation.48 And the 1991 decision in

Board of Education of City Public Schools v. Dowell held that after "good faith
compliance" with a court order, remedies to eliminate de jure segregation could be
discontinued as well.49 Donald Lively, in congruence with Wicker's theory of white

45 Metcalf, 255.
46 Donald E. Lively, The Constitution and Race (New York: Praeger Publishers,
1992), 120.
47 Metcalf, 260.
48 Girardeau A. Spann, Race Against the Court: The Supreme Court and
Minorities in Contemporary America (New York: New York University Press, 1993), 79.
49 Ibid., 80.
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rejection of integration, notes that desegregation plans have increasingly been formulated to
minimize white hostility in the interest of achieving some successful integration.so
One hundred years after Plessy, the Milliken case is serving to perpetuate the legacy
of "separate but equal" education. Its influence upon the progress (or lack thereof) of
desegregation is evident, for example, in a Connecticut ruling which relieved that state of
any responsibility for the isolation of poor and minority students in inner-city Hartford.
Despite intra-district desegregation and substantial aid from the State, student performance
continued to falter, convincing plaintiffs that integration with the suburbs was the only real
solution. However, the state court decision in Sheff v. O'Neill (1995) "closely followed
the thinking in the landmark... Supreme Court decisions in the 1970s, like Milliken v.

Bradley": The racial separation between Hartford and its suburbs simply resulted "from
Hartford being predominantly black and Hispanic. "51
Also in 1995, the Supreme Court issued a ruling in Missouri v. Jenkins, a case
dealing with a desegregation plan ordered into effect in Kansas City. Because effective
desegregation was not to be had within the city district, the lower courts sought to recruit
whites back into the system by ordering the State to help pay for magnet schools and salary
increases for teachers and staff. Once more, state aid failed to help students achieve, and
the State was now seeking to terminate its role in reviving the school system. While the
five-member Supreme Court majority did not order the plan out of existence altogether,
Chief Justice Rehnquist indicated that more convincing rationales (i.e., suburban
violations) would have to be found for continuing what was "merely an indirect way of
accomplishing what Supreme Court precedents forbid doing directly: transferring students
from one school district to another in the name of desegregation. "52

50 Lively, 127.
51 New York Times,
52 New York Times,

April 13, 1995, p. B6.
June 13, 1995, p. Al, continued top. D25.
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The Kansas City case is part of what the New York Times describes as a "renewed
[campaign] to end Federal desegregation initiatives and the busing plans that come with
them. "53 Anti-integrationists, "encouraged by conservative electoral successes and a string
of Supreme Court decisions limiting the responsibilities of schools to foster
desegregation," are calling for a return to neighborhood schools.54 Norfolk, Oklahoma
City,55 and Denver56 are among cities which have already done so, and Cleveland,
Indianapolis, Minneapolis, Pittsburgh, Seattle, and Wilmington are considering this
avenue.57 Critics of the anti-busing movement say that neighborhood schools have failed
to halt white flight or rejuvenate cities as proponents had insisted they would. Nor is the
NAACP standing idly by; it recently announced the filing of an "old-fashioned"
desegregation suit in Minneapolis calling for cross-district desegregation.58 Given current
public opinion and the political climate both inside and outside the Court, even the president
of the local Association chapter admits that they are "swimming against the tide. "59

Tomorrow's Task
Where does all of this leave blacks today? The answer will sound familiar:
Discrimination and segregation in urban housing "continue virtually unchecked;" the same
tactics found to be in use in Detroit in 1974 are still carried on, including unfair lending and
real estate tactics.60 Blacks are still, for the most part, unwelcome in the suburbs.61 The
housing situation has been compounded by the fact that school desegregation efforts have
53 New York Times, September 26, 1995, p. 1.
54 Ibid.
55 Ibid.
56 Ibid., p. B6.
57 Ibid., p. 1.
58 Ibid., p. B6.
59 Ibid.
60 Wicker, 130-31.
61 Ibid., 71.
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"lagged" since Milliken, a reality which is reflected in big-city school enrollments.62 By

1984, the average black student in Chicago or Newark attended schools only 9 percent
white; in New York the percentage was 11, in Baltimore, 16, Philadelphia, 17, Boston and
Cincinnati, 32, and Milwaukee, 35; and 63.5 percent of black students were in
predominantly minority schools.63 By 1992, 66 percent of black pupils were still in
schools with minority enrollments greater than 50 percent, so that America's schools were
"more segregated than they had been since 1967, a quarter century earlier. "64 The
allocation of educational resources has not been equalized after the passage of more than
two decades since Milliken;65 on the contrary, poor (and largely minority) districts have
gotten poorer.66 As a result, minority schools continue to feature higher dropout levels,
lower attendance rates, and lower college entrance and scholastic achievement test scores
when compared to predominantly white schools.67
In the seventies and eighties urban areas suffered a staggering loss of the kinds of
jobs for which blacks were most likely to qualify--due in no small part to the decay of cities
and the flight of whites from them.68 Because today's employers can find "more willing
and skilled workers, at the same or lower wages, in better social and working conditions
... almost anywhere outside the big-city ghetto," employment opportunities are unlikely to
return to inner cities in significant numbers.69 Without jobs, better housing and schools
are still out of the reach of poor (i.e., minority) city-dwellers--and the vicious circle
remains complete. Meanwhile, politicians court middle-class whites with Republican
Congressman Newt Gingrich's "Contract with America," President Bill Clinton's middle62
63
64
65
66
67
68
69
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class tax cuts,70 and Republican presidential candidate Robert Dole's campaign pledge to
end affirmative action.
Today racial parity may seem more elusive for the fact that Americans have
struggled toward it for so long now and have accomplished so much less than was hoped
for. With time it has become clear that it is afar more tangled problem than anyone
imagined. It is easy to talk about the way things should be--that racism is evil, inhumane,
inexcusable. But to solve the problem reformers have to deal with reality: Some people are
racist, and cannot be coerced into a different world view. Close personal contact between
the races is perhaps the best hope for overcoming distrust, and integrated education is a
significant step toward that end. At the same time, forcing the races together (as through
forced busing) can cause backlashes (such as white flight) which lead to renewed racism
and racial separation. This is the dilemma that the judicial system faces. As the branch of
government which is most removed from politics, it can and must push forward to
guarantee minority rights; yet it cannot act without considering the disposition of the
majority. A middle ground must be sought where fears are assuaged and changes are eased
into place, but where efforts are never allowed to halt until racism is overcome.

70 Ibid., 25.
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Milliken v. Bradley
Chronology of Events

April 7, 1970

Detroit School Board adopts April 7 Plan attempting limited
desegregation within Detroit.

July 9, 1970

Michigan legislature passes Public Act 48, neutralizing the
April 7 Plan and imposing segregatory neighborhood student
assignments.

August 4, 1970

School board members who supported April 7 Plan are
recalled.

August 18, 1970

NAACP files complaint alleging de jure segregation in
Detroit, asking for establishment of unitary school system,
and challenging constitutionality of Act 48.

August 27, 1970

Preliminary hearing begins.

September 3, 1970

Group of white Detroit parents are allowed to intervene as
defendants. Preliminary injunction to prevent enforcement
of Act 48 is denied by District Court.

October 13, 1970

Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals also denies preliminary
injunction but declares Act 48 unconstitutional.

December 3, 1970

District Court orders MacDonald "Magnet" Plan to take
effect in September, 1971, in lieu of April 7 Plan.

April 6, 1971

Trial on merits of issue of Detroit segregation begins.

April, 1971

The Swann ruling is handed down, approving busing as a
means to desegregate Charlotte, North Carolina.

July 16, 1971

Detroit intervenors move to join all tri-county school districts
as defendants. This motion is never acted upon and is later
withdrawn.

July 22, 1971

Trial on Detroit segregation ends.

September 27, 1971

District Court rules that State of Michigan and Detroit Board
have acted to cause segregation in Detroit.

October 4, 1971

Detroit Board is given 60 days to submit Detroit-only
desegregation plan; State defendants are ordered to submit
metropolitan plan within 120 days.
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January, 1972

Richmond, Virginia is ordered to desegregate across district
lines.

February 4, 1972

Deadline for desegregation plans.

February 9-17, 1972

43 school districts move to intervene as defendants.

February 23, 1972

Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals rules that Roth's segregation
ruling and planning orders are unappealable.

March 14, 1972

Hearings on intra-city plans commence.

March 15, 1972

43 school districts are granted intervention under limited
conditions.

March 21, 1972

Hearings on intra-district plans end.

March 22, 1972

Deadline for briefs on propriety of metropolitan remedy-intervening districts were asked to adhere to this deadline
(set on March 6, before intervention was granted).

March 24, 1972

District Court rules that metropolitan desegregation is
appropriate.

March 28, 1972

Hearings on metropolitan remedy commence. Later that
day, District Court rules that Detroit-only plans are
insufficient.

June 14, 1972

District Court rules on desegregation area and orders
development of metropolitan desegregation plan by
appointed panel.

July 11, 1972

On panel's recommendation, District Court orders State to
bear cost of acquisition of buses for metropolitan
desegregation in 1972-73 school year.

December 8, 1972

Court of Appeals panel affirms District Court's rulings in
substance.

December, 1972

Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals invalidates cross-district
desegregation in Richmond.

May, 1973

Supreme Court splits four-to-four over busing in Richmond;
the Fourth Circuit's reversal of the busing order stands.

June 12, 1973

En bane Court of Appeals affirms District Court's rulings in
substance.

June, 1973

Supreme Court issues its Keyes ruling, mandating districtwide desegregation in Denver, Colorado, based on findings
of intentional segregation in one part of the district.
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August 6, 1973

Plaintiffs move for joinder of suburban districts not already
party to the case.

September 4, 1973

Plaintiffs file amended complaint to conform to evidence.

September 6, 1973

District Court orders joinder of suburban districts.
Defendants Milliken, et al., file petition for certiorari.

November 19, 1973

Certiorari is granted by the Supreme Court.

February 27, 1974

Oral argument before the Court.

July 11, 1974

Judge Stephen Roth dies after his third heart attack in two
years.

July 24, 1974

The Supreme Court rules against executive privilege.

July 25, 1974

The Supreme Court overturns Judge Roth.

